

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

Bulletin

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
The General Conference on the American History of
American Education

On Diversity, Uniformity, and the American College
What Is Required in the American College?

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(deceased, June 9, 1955)

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
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RALPH F. FUCHS
General Secretary

THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS

A Statement to the Members of the Association

The Council of the American Association of University Professors, meeting at Gatlinburg, Tennessee, on March 3, 1955, approved the appointment of Dr. Ralph F. Fuchs, Professor of Law at Indiana University, as General Secretary of the Association, the appointment to become effective September 1, 1955. The Council's approval was pursuant to recommendations made by a special Committee under the Chairmanship of Professor Richard H. Shryock, of Johns Hopkins University, established by the Council almost a year earlier to nominate a successor to Dr. Ralph E. Himstead, who had requested the Council to relieve him of the duties of General Secretary as soon as a successor could be found.¹ Following the Council's action, Dr. Fuchs was introduced, was accorded a cordial welcome, and briefly expressed appreciation for the Association's confidence in him and for this opportunity for service.

II

Dr. Fuchs' three predecessors were men who, by force of character and understanding of the problems before them, endowed the office of General Secretary with great and merited influence, and used this influence wisely, to give form to the Association and direction to its policies. The first to bear the title, Dr. H. W. Tyler, proved to be exactly the personality needed to create the General Secretaryship and define the rôle of the Central Office. Before Dr. Tyler retired from his position at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to assume the direction, in September,

¹ Concerning the death of Dr. Himstead, on June 9, 1955, see the Spring, 1955 issue of the *Bulletin*.

1930, of the recently established Washington office, the Association had not had a salaried officer; and while it had done creditable work, its progress had been haphazard. Dr. Tyler had the necessary native endowments—character, intelligence, wit, energy; he was already nationally influential in higher education; and he had served the Association as its unpaid Secretary. Thus, he was prepared to make the Central Office the focus of the Association's activities, to clarify the principles of the Association and articulate its policies, and to establish gradually the methods necessary to make the Association an effectual force in the realization of the ideals of its founders. Not only the members of the Association, but educators in general, learned to look to the Association's General Secretary for leadership, and they did not look in vain. For example, a conference convened under Dr. Tyler's leadership in 1925 produced a statement of principles which, in its original form and as revised in 1940, may fairly be said to have determined the thinking of the academic profession, and, indeed, most of American higher education, on the subject of academic freedom and tenure. Strong leadership in the General Secretaryship, combined with an organizational change by which the Council, rather than the amorphous Annual Meeting, was made "responsible for carrying out the general purposes of the Association," has determined the Association's structure and its modes of action to this day.

Dr. Tyler resigned from the General Secretaryship in 1933. For two years his successor, Dr. Walter Wheeler Cook, continued and confirmed his work, and then he too resigned, to return to teaching. Between August, 1935, when Dr. Cook vacated the position, and June 1, 1936, when Dr. Himstead took office, Dr. Tyler returned for interim service, and then continued for a while longer as *Bulletin* editor and valued mentor to the inexperienced General Secretary. Dr. Himstead always acknowledged with warm gratitude his debt to Dr. Tyler, whose wisdom and understanding of the Association he regarded as major influences in shaping his own conception of the Association and the rôle of the General Secretaryship. He himself, by his strong, forceful character, vigorous mind, meticulous, painstaking habits of work, and unswerving devotion to principles, contributed to the Association, for almost

two decades, much of what is now most distinctive in its outlook and working methods. This is not the place to set forth the details of his leadership; much of this is recent history, well known to almost all who are now active in the work of the Association. As in the comments above on Dr. Tyler, one achievement may be cited: Without diminishing the credit due to Committee A, successive Councils, and Annual Meetings, it is hardly conceivable that, during the past eight years, the American Association of University Professors would, alone among educational organizations, have maintained its position in opposition to political dismissals, except for the unfailing insight of Dr. Himstead into the issues before the Association and the country as a whole, and the strength of reason and will by which he made others understand them.

This comment on Dr. Himstead suggests the most significant general fact about him and his two predecessors; namely, that often against active opposition, and always against inertia and misunderstanding, they constantly held before the membership the ideal of a professional association, and successfully combatted proposals which, regardless of conscious intent, would in practical effect have transformed the organization into something quite different and much less useful to higher education and society—would, for example, have made it a pressure group, analogous to a trade union, an instrument of special occupational interests, an army of employees arrayed against administrators and trustees regarded as employers. The General Secretary, detached from the local exasperations of particular campuses, has been in a position to keep the profession aware of what it can forget only at its peril and to the impairment of higher education—that professors, administrators, and trustees have, not conflicting special interests, but a common interest of service in a joint enterprise for the good of society.

III

If Dr. Fuchs, thanks to the labors of those who went before, enters into a position of influence and opportunity, he also brings to this position experience and capabilities of his own which, if well used, will make further and equally valuable contributions to

the General Secretaryship and to the Association. Born in 1899, his present age is the almost ideal one for a combination of vigor and maturity. His background is the Middle West, where for several decades this Association has had its most rapid growth and its greatest activity. St. Louis was his birthplace, and he received the degrees of A.B. and LL.B. from Washington University of that city in 1922. Thereafter he went on to the Ph.D. from Robert Brookings Graduate School (Washington, D. C.) in 1925, and J.S.D. from Yale University in 1935. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He first saw academic service on the Law faculty of Washington University, and since 1946 he has been Professor of Law at Indiana University. He will be on leave of absence from the latter institution for the academic year 1955-56. Dr. Fuchs is the author of articles in legal and social science publications; he edited Volume 4 of *Selected Essays on Constitutional Law* (1938), and *Industry Studies in Trade Regulations*, Association of American Law Schools (1950-53); he is co-editor of *Cases and Materials on an Introduction to Law* (1952). Currently in process is a text on administrative law.

Dr. Fuchs was in the office of the U. S. Solicitor General from 1944 to 1946; previously he was a consultant to other Federal agencies and a member of the U. S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. In 1951-53 he was a member of the National Enforcement Commission, Economic Stabilization Agency. He was Chairman, 1953-54, of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union. He served the Association of American Law Schools as Chairman of its Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure in 1953. He is currently a member of the Council of the Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar Association.

Dr. Fuchs became a member of the Association in 1931, at Washington University, and was elected President of the Washington University Chapter two years later. He served as Chapter Vice-President at Indiana University in 1949-50. His national service to the Association includes membership on the Council (1945-47), the First Vice-Presidency of the Association (1950-51), and the Chairmanship of the Resolutions Committee at the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Annual Meetings in 1951 and 1952.

Dr. Fuchs is married and has two married children. He and Mrs. Fuchs have taken residence at 2540 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, where he will be within easy walking distance of the Association's Central Office.

The Association is to be congratulated on having acquired the services of a man of Dr. Fuchs' capability, outlook, and experience. Dr. Fuchs is equally to be congratulated as he enters upon an opportunity for devoted service and significant achievement which can be offered by few positions in such measure as by the General Secretaryship of the American Association of University Professors.

GEORGE POPE SHANNON,
Acting General Secretary

THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

By WALTER P. METZGER

Columbia University

The full story of the contact between the German university and the American university has not yet been told. When fully treated, it will reveal, first of all, a relationship of one-sided dependence. More than nine thousand Americans studied at German universities during the nineteenth century. Through these students, through the scores of Americans who knew Germany through books and an occasional *Wanderjahr*, through German expatriates teaching in American colleges, the methods and the ideals of the German university were carried into this country. At the same time, the German influence, powerful as it was, reinforced rather than initiated native American tendencies toward change. America took from German sources only that which fitted her needs, only that which agreed with her history. Before 1850, for example, comparatively few American candidates for academic posts followed the trail to Göttingen blazed by Ticknor and Bancroft. For the purposes of the denominational college, German theology was too skeptical, German philology too specialized, German *Wissenschaftslehre* too strenuous. It was not until a German degree offered an advantage to career chances at home—which is to say, it was not until the American college had already grown more secular, specialized, and intellectually ambitious—that the great exodus of American scholars began. Finally, German academic ideals were greatly altered when they came into contact with our own; the Germany seen through American eyes was in part a figment of American preconceptions. The analysis that follows concerns itself with only part of the story—the German contribution to the American concept of academic free-

dom. But even this incomplete account of a complex cultural connection illustrates the three-fold process of dependence, selection, and modification.

II

All through the nineteenth century, but particularly after the establishment of the Empire, German scholars boasted of their academic freedom and brought it to the attention of the scholarly world. And the scholarly world, in the habit of paying homage to the German universities, agreed that freedom was triumphant there, the proof and cause of their superiority. In recent times, it is worth noting, the reality of this vaunted freedom has been sharply questioned. With the capitulation of the German universities to pseudo-science and the totalitarian state, doubt has arisen as to whether, at any time in the pre-Hitler period, these universities had ever been truly free. It is pointed out that professors, as civil servants, had been subject to a special disciplinary code; that, under the Kaisers, Social Democrats, Jews, and ethnic minorities had been discriminated against in appointments; that on most questions of national interest (witness the performance of the German professors during the First World War), the academic corps had docilely taken its place in the chauvinistic chorus. It is also pointed out that the German universities were state universities in an undemocratic state, dependent upon the uncertain good will of a Minister of Education and on a dynasty far more autocratic than the constitutional forms revealed. Granting all this to be true, however, there remains the question of what was the basis of the boast that the German universities were free.

Part of the answer lies in their *cultural isolation*, which they had achieved by relegating most basic courses to the *Gymnasien*, and most technical courses to separate institutes. The German university was not a place where anyone could study anything, nor was it a place, despite the practical preparations demanded by state examinations, where the interest in practice was predominant. It was dedicated to *Wissenschaft*, a word that had overtones missing in its English equivalent *science*. Reflecting the rise

of German idealism and the deep religious aspirations met by its abstruse metaphysics, *Wissenschaft* signified an interest in searching for truth not as an occupation but as a calling; a systematic study of things for their ultimate meanings. At first a characteristic goal of the faculty of philosophy, this devotion to research was extended to the other faculties, and gave the four-part German university a distinctive purpose and spirit. To a large extent, though not entirely, it arrested the tendency of theology to seek antecedent certainties, of law to become the study of procedures, of medicine to become exclusively clinical. Not pastors but theologians, not lawyers but jurists, not practitioners but medical scientists, were the desired end-products. This indifference to vocational ambition and insistence on disinterested research created a gulf between the character of the university and that of everyday life. Like an independent spiritual order, the German university trained its own personnel, held novitiates to its own standards, and kept the world at a certain remove. It became the cynosure of other universities which with reason complained that the world was too much with them.

This aura of independence was further enhanced by the relaxation, under the Empire, of church and state controls over academic instruction. Though test oaths for students had been abolished in the Protestant universities in the eighteenth century, and speculative philosophy had flourished at the expense of theological orthodoxy early in the nineteenth, it was not until complete separation of church and state was achieved under the Hohenzollerns that the universities were finally freed from religious interference. (One exception to this was the appointment to the seven Roman Catholic theological faculties of professors who, under the religious compromise, had to receive the sanction of the bishop of the diocese.) Likewise, punishment of university personnel by the state became rare after unification. The German states lost much of their cameralistic urge to regulate everything directly. The territorial oaths and religious tests in force during the seventeenth century, such as the official resolution of the University of Marburg in 1653 to ban Cartesian philosophy, the capricious absolutism of the eighteenth century, revealed in Frederick William I's expulsion of Christian Wolff and the reprimand

of Kant by Prime Minister Wollner, the repressive censorship of the early and middle nineteenth century, exemplified by the Carlsbad Decrees and the dismissal of the Göttingen Seven, all seemed part of an inglorious but forever finished past. The declaration in the Prussian Constitution that "science and its teachings shall be free" epitomized the permissiveness of the new order. And the allocation of powers between state and faculty was a further guarantee of autonomy. The states drew up the universities' budgets, created new chairs, appointed professors, and framed the general scheme of instruction. But the election of academic officials, the appointment of lecturers or *Privatdozenten*, and the nomination of professors were in the province of the faculties. No lay board of control was interposed between the ultimate authority of the state and the plenary powers of the professors. No elaborate administrative structure was required; no office of the president was established. The German universities were state institutions, but the combination of governmental restraint, limited professorial co-option, elected administrators and cultural isolation gave them the appearance, and a good deal of the reality, of self-governing academic bodies.

III

To explain the satisfied mood of the German scholars of this period, one must also understand what they meant by "academic freedom." They generally referred to a condition summed up by two words: *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit*. By *Lernfreiheit*, they meant the absence of administrative restraints in the learning situation: the freedom of the student to roam from place to place, sampling academic wares; to determine for himself the choice and sequence of courses; to be exempt from all tests save that of the final examinations; to control his private life. By *Lehrfreiheit*, German educators meant two things. First of all, they meant that the university professor was free to examine bodies of evidence and to report his findings in lecture or published form—that he enjoyed freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry. But *Lehrfreiheit*, like *Lernfreiheit*, also denoted the paucity of administrative rules in the teaching situation: the absence of

a prescribed syllabus, the opportunity to lecture on any subject that engaged the teacher's interest. Thus, academic freedom, as the Germans defined it, was not simply the right of professors to speak without fear or favor, but an atmosphere of consent that surrounded the entire process of research and instruction.

The pride of students and scholars in these two freedoms can be attributed in part to the status they conferred and to their significance as patriotic symbols. To the university student, coming from the strict *Gymnasium*, *Lernfreiheit* was a precious privilege, a recognition of his arrival at man's estate. To the university professor, extremely sensitive to considerations of social esteem, *Lehrfreiheit* was a dispensation that set him apart from the ordinary civil servant. In a nation still aristocratic and feudalistic in its mores, caste considerations underlay the high regard for academic freedom. In addition, *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit* had patriotic associations. They were identified with the revival of the nation. The renewal of student peregrinations in the eighteenth century symbolized the breakdown of territorial exclusiveness and the growth of national consciousness. The University of Berlin, dedicated to academic freedom, was a phoenix that had arisen from the ashes of military defeat. In the Metternich era, the attacks upon academic freedom had been the results of Catholic dogmatism, Protestant sectarianism, and petty absolutism—all foes of a united Reich. Subsequently, the state offered strong protection against local and religious pressures. The romantic nineteenth century was given to equating freedom and nationality, but it was a peculiarity of German thought that it made academic freedom one of the major terms in this equation.

Neither *Lernfreiheit* nor *Lehrfreiheit*, however, had reference to the extramural actions of academicians. Indeed, a sharp distinction between freedom *within* and freedom *outside* the university was implicit in the German conception. Within the walls of the university, a wide latitude of utterance was allowed, even expected. With Fichte's heroic scholar as their model, German professors regarded themselves not as neutral observers of life, but as diviners and spokesmen of absolutes, as oracles of transcendent truths. In the normative sciences particularly, "professing" in Germany tended to be the presentation with aggressive final-

ity of deep subjective convictions. Yet even where German scholarship exhibited a most painstaking empiricism, it was polemical and subjective. As Santayana wrote, among German professors "a piece of Biblical or Homeric criticism, a history of Rome or of Germany, often becomes a little system of egotistical philosophy, posited and defended with all the parental zeal and all the increasing conviction with which a prophet defends his supernatural convictions." Some German professors saw dangers in this and sought to construct some code of propriety and limitation, but most of the German theorists of academic freedom—Max Müller of St. Gallen, Georg Kaufmann, Hermann von Helmholtz, and Friedrich Paulsen—thought that there already existed adequate safeguards in the freedom and maturity of the students, who were neither captive nor unprimed. But outside the university, the same degree of freedom was not condoned. Though quite a few German professors played prominent political roles in the nineteenth century, and a number of these, notably Mommsen and Virchow, were outspoken critics of Bismarck, it was not generally assumed that *Lehrfreiheit* protected such activities. Rather, it was generally assumed that professors as civil servants were bound to be circumspect and loyal, and that participation in partisan politics spoiled the habits of scholarship. Even so firm a libertarian as Paulsen, who believed that the teacher should be "attached to no authority" and should "answer for his own instruction," held that

[the scholar] cannot and should not engage in politics . . . [He] is bound to develop a habit of theoretical indifference with respect to the opposing side . . . Political activity . . . produces a habit that would prove fatal to the theorist, the habit of opportunism.

In this dichotomy between inner and outer freedom, one perceives, in transmuted form, some of the classic dualities in German philosophical thought. The assumption that there were two realms of professorial existence—the one, within the university, the realm of freedom; the other, outside the university, the realm of compulsion—suggests Kant's division of the *noumena* and the *phenomena*, of the world of free will and world of causal necessity.

The restriction of freedom to the inner realm suggests Luther's formula of spiritual freedom combined with temporal obedience. And the injunction that the scholar withdraw from the field of practical activity to the anchorite's world of contemplation bears resemblance to Fichte's distinction between the true student and the false one, between him who is dedicated to truth and him who seeks selfish advantage.

IV

From the days of the first expatriates, the American reaction to German academic freedom was envious and panegyric. Ticknor wrote from Göttingen that "if truth is to be attained by freedom of inquiry, as I doubt not that it is, the German professors and literati are certainly on the high road, and have the way quietly open before them." Considerably cooler to the skepticism of the Göttingen theologians, George Bancroft also marvelled at the fact that "no laws are acknowledged as limiting the field of investigations or experiment." Decades later, William Graham Sumner, no Germanophile, paid tribute to the freedom and courage of the German scholar in an area here marked off as sacrosanct:

I have heard men elsewhere talk about the nobility of that spirit [the seeking of truth]; but the only *body* of men whom I have ever known who really lived by it . . . were the professors of biblical science in Germany. That was precisely the range of subjects which in this country was then treated with a reserve in favor of tradition which was prejudicial to everything which a scholar should value.

After the Civil War, when theological freedom under university auspices no longer occasioned surprise, American economists, psychologists, and philosophers were lyrical in their praise. "The German university is the freest spot on earth," wrote G. Stanley Hall, the psychologist. The German university made him "free intellectually, free spiritually," attested Paul Russell Pope, professor of German at Cornell. "We were impressed in the German university by a certain largeness and freedom of thought," said Richard T. Ely, speaking for himself and for the other founders of the American Economic Association.

The lavishness of our praise may be attributed in part to two adventitious circumstances. The earlier enthusiasts happened to attend the freest of the German universities—Göttingen and Berlin—for at these universities they did not have to take the religious oaths that would have sorely tried their consciences at the South German Catholic universities. In addition, it should be remembered that most of the Americans who went to Germany in this century were young men who were suddenly interjected into a culture more permissive than their own. Temperament decided how this situation would be handled, but we can assume that it would be an American, in whom Calvinistic asceticism and Victorian prudishness were deeply ingrained, who resisted the blandishments of a carefree German Sabbath, the *Kneipe* in the afternoon, and perhaps an innocent, initiating affair of love. Biography and autobiography are not very revealing on this score, but it is not unlikely that many an American small-town boy shared, with G. Stanley Hall, a sense of deliverance from "the narrow, inflexible orthodoxy, the settled lifeless *mores*, the Puritan eviction of joy." "Germany almost remade me," the President of Clark University confided in his candid autobiography. "It gave me a new attitude toward life. . . . I fairly revelled in a freedom unknown before." To an unmeasurable degree, the German university's reputation in America rested on the remembrance of freedoms enjoyed that were not in any narrow sense academic. Needless to say, this did not diminish its reputation.

The chief bequest of these fond recollections was the importation and propagation of the idea that academic freedom is an essential condition of a university, a part of the definition of a university. In this country, the meaning of "university" had been depreciated and obscured by an inflation of institutional claims. Before the mid-century, the term had been used to denote (a) as in the case of the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard University, a college with at least one professional school attached to it; (b) as in the case of the University of Georgia and the University of North Carolina, simply a state-controlled institution of higher learning; (c) as in the case of numerous institutions in the South and West, any college that aspired to be grand. Neither the term nor the institution referred to represented scholarship

freely pursued. The German paradigm gave new value to both. In the first extensive study of the German university published in this country, James Morgan Hart wrote: "to the German mind, if either freedom of teaching or freedom of learning is wanting, that institution, no matter how richly endowed, no matter how numerous its students, no matter how imposing its buildings, is not . . . a *University*." This simple, though signally important, idea fixed itself upon American academic thought. It became an idea to which fealty had to be expressed. It took hold of the rhetoric of academic ceremonials, a rhetoric that, for all its flamboyance, tells much about underlying assumptions. There remained, of course, a gap between the words and their implementation. But at least there was a norm from which the distance to practice could be measured.

The German contribution was more than oratorical. From the nineties to the First World War, American scholars who had studied in Germany were in the forefront of the battles for academic freedom. Five German-trained scholars were involved in important academic freedom cases: Richard T. Ely, E. Benjamin Andrews, Edward A. Ross, John Mecklin, J. McKeen Cattell. Others—E. R. A. Seligman, Arthur O. Lovejoy, and Henry W. Farnam—worked powerfully behind the scenes. Eight (of the thirteen) signers of the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors had studied in Germany: Seligman, Farnam, Ely, Lovejoy, U. G. Weatherly, Charles E. Bennett, Howard Crosby Warren, and Frank A. Fetter. Some of the leaders in the fight for professorial self-government before the war were German university alumni: Cattell, Joseph Jastrow, and George T. Ladd. That their attitudes were formed solely by their sojourn abroad is not, of course, certain. It is also possible that their interest in the embattled social sciences and their great professional prominence made them leaders and targets in the fight. But it is not too fanciful also to see in their remarkable showing a pattern of withdrawal-and-return, wherein American scholars temporarily abandoned their world, drew courage from alien springs, and returned to dispense their inspiration.

V

This much we take to be the direct German contribution. But selection and modification can also be perceived. The 1915 Declaration of Principles opened with the statement that "'academic freedom' has traditionally had two applications—to the freedom of the teacher and to that of the student, to *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*." This was a gracious acknowledgment of the influence the Germans exerted. When, however, one reads further in that classic report, it becomes quickly apparent that the American conception was no literal translation from the German. The idea had changed its color, its argument, and its qualifications in the process of domestication.

The most obvious difference was the dissociation of *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit* in the American pattern of argument. "It need scarcely be pointed out," wrote the framers of the 1915 Declaration of Principles, "that the freedom which is the subject of this report is that of the teacher." The frame of reference had not always been so limited. Indeed, before the nineties, academic freedom had alluded primarily to student freedoms, particularly the freedom to elect courses. Once, however, the battle for elective courses had been won, and once attention was focused on the collision of social ideologies that led to faculty dismissals, the term came to apply to the professor, to the producer rather than the consumer in education. After the turn of the century, only one of the important documents of academic freedom linked *Lernfreiheit* with *Lehrfreiheit*—that was Charles W. Eliot's 1907 Phi Beta Kappa Address. Under the heading of "Academic Freedom," the septuagenarian Harvard president included the student's freedom to choose his studies, to refuse to attend chapel, to compete on even terms for scholarships, and to choose his own friends; as well as the professor's freedom to teach in the manner most congenial to him, to be free from harassing routines, to enjoy a secure tenure, and to receive a fixed salary and a retirement allowance. But this catholic approach toward academic freedom was a rarity.

A reading of Eliot's address will suggest the reason for the clue to the subordination or exclusion of student freedoms in later defi-

nitions. In discussing *Lehrfreiheit*, Eliot had to give himself over almost entirely to administrative issues: to the hazardous relations of professors with their boards of trustees, to the friction between professors and dictatorial presidents. The fact that the American professor was an employee of a lay board of control (not, as in Germany, a civil servant of the state), and the fact that the American professor was governed by an administrative hierarchy which had the power to make important decisions (not, as in Germany, by self-elected officials and a Minister of Education removed from the scene) presented a unique set of problems. To resolve the anomaly of being at one and the same time an employee and a scientific researcher, to cope with the difficulty of maintaining spontaneity and dignity in a highly bureaucratized system, to deal with the wishes and whims of a lay board of control—these problems absorbed the attention of American theorists. Faced with the task of adorning, democratizing, and protecting the academic job, they lost sight of the goal of *Lehrfreiheit*. The focus of academic freedom in this country became primarily institutional, not educational.

Another difference lay in the arguments for the defense of the independence of the university. The American university did not achieve the cultural autonomy of the German: for various reasons no sharp lines separated graduate schools from colleges, technical from intellectual concerns, the university from the community around it. American theorists of academic freedom could not lean on the protective power of the state. The tradition of local sponsorship in American education made federal intervention—assuming that it might have improved the position of the university—impossible. The courts were unwilling to upset decisions of administrative authorities save when these clearly conflicted with the university's charter. To appeal to state legislatures was hazardous, since their members were so often no better disposed toward intellectual freedom or professorial independence than were trustees or private pressure groups. Thus, American theorists, unable to appeal with practical effect to the law-makers or the courts, appealed to a more nebulous authority—the will of the people as a whole. They asserted that all universities, private or state, belonged to the whole community; that the

trustees were public servants, the professors public functionaries, the universities public properties. Hence, no matter what were the legal provisions for control, to treat the universities as though they were private possessions, to tie them to a particular faith or ideology, to bend them to the interest of a class or sect or party, was to violate a public trust. American theorists faced a further problem. What if, as so often happened, the public should consent to the violation of that trust? What if crusading newspapers and patriotic groups, presuming to speak for the whole community, should seek to warp the university toward their partial goals? American theorists of academic freedom had to maintain that the real public interest was not identical with the public opinion of the moment. The real public interest was something that transcended all current and ephemeral forms of its expression. Like Rousseau, American theorists found the true will and need of the public not in the public's own transient notions but in something harder to define. They fell back upon a *mystique* of the general will.

VI

We come to the heart of the difference when we compare the American and German conceptions of inner and outer freedom. We need not assume that the lines of each were exactly drawn in order to assert that the areas they covered were incongruent. The German idea of "convincing" one's students, of winning them over to the personal system and philosophical views of the professor, was not condoned by American academic opinion. Within the classroom, the proper approach for American professors was to preserve *neutrality* on controversial issues, and silence on substantive issues lying out of the scope of their *competence*. Innumerable statements affirmed these limitations. Thus, Eliot, in an inaugural address that declared without equivocation that a university must above all be free, made neutrality an aspect of this freedom:

Philosophical subjects should never be taught with authority. They are not established sciences; they are full of disputed matters, open questions, and bottomless speculations. It is not the function of the teacher to settle philosophical and political controversies

for the pupil, or even to recommend to him any one set of opinions as better than any other. Exposition, not imposition, of opinions is the professor's part The very word "education" is a standing protest against dogmatic teaching. The notion that education consists in the authoritative inculcation of what the teacher deems true may be logical and appropriate in a convent, but it is intolerable in universities and the public schools, from primary to professional.

William Rainey Harper, President of the University of Chicago, thus construed the norm of competence:

A professor abuses his privilege of expression and opinion when, although a student and perhaps an authority in one department or group of departments, he undertakes to speak authoritatively on subjects which have no relationship to the department in which he is appointed to give instruction.

A professor abuses his privilege in many cases when, although shut off in large measure from the world and engaged within a narrow field of investigation, he undertakes to instruct his colleagues or the public concerning the matters in the world at large in connection with which he has had little or no experience.

These were not merely the cautious constructions of conservative elements in education. If they were narrowly interpreted by certain members of boards of trustees to prevent professors from criticizing the social order, if they were invoked by university presidents to justify disciplinary actions taken against non-conformists, they were also upheld by liberal professors like Howard Crosby Warren and John Dewey, by progressive college presidents like Alexander Meiklejohn, and by the framers of the 1915 Declaration of Principles.

One of the reasons for these limitations was that the American university had never surrendered its undergraduate department, and thus had never dispelled the parental assumptions of education. True enough, college students tended to be older, but somehow as their age at the time of entry mounted, their putative age of innocence was increased. The old fear that students were easy prey to heretical doctrine became the new fear that students had fragile defenses against subtle insinuations of "propaganda." The norms

of "neutrality" and "competence" thus constituted a kind of code of fair practices in ideas for consumers still in their nonage.

The roots of these norms went deeper still. "Neutrality" and "competence" describe not only the limitations of the American concept of academic freedom, but the very temper of American academic thought. They reflect, in the first place, the empiricist bias of that thought. Even in the pre-Civil War period, the main accent of American philosophy, sounded by the Scottish school, was empirical, realistic, common-sensical. No invading Napoleon in that period forced our professors to seek refuge in thought against drab and disturbing realities. The transcendental philosophy, the American version of German idealism, generally could not breach the academic barrier. Its intuitionism was opposed by our clerics, lest each man find his own religion and become unto himself a church; its idealism was resisted by our philosophers, lest nature or mind be defied, and atheism or pantheism result. With the advent of the university in the post-Civil War period, the triumph of science-oriented philosophies deepened the commitment to empiricism. Kant and Hegel enjoyed a brilliant revival, yet their luster was dimmed by the more effulgent light of evolutionary pragmatism and positivism. Most Americans who went to study in Germany in this period took home the methods of her seminars and laboratories, but left the *Anschauung* of idealism behind. To this empiricist heritage, we must add the influence of Darwinism on American academic thought. In Germany, the first success in the attack upon religious authority was scored by philosophy; in America, the hold of religious authority was broken by the advocates of science. The empiricist heritage fostered the belief that facts must be the arbiters between competing notions of truth (thus strengthening the standard of neutrality); that universal and synthetic speculation must give way to specialized knowledge (thus promoting the standard of competence). The Darwinian influence fostered the belief that certainty was as alien to inquiry as was immutability to the processes of life (neutrality); that the right to pass judgment on scientific questions was reserved for those with special scientific credentials (competence). The German and the American approaches to intramural academic freedom thus reflected basic divergences of thought.

VII

Thus far we have spoken only of intramural freedom. Outside the university, for professors in their civil rôles, the American norm was more indulgent than the German, because it reflected a stronger social and constitutional commitment to the idea of freedom of speech. The connections between free speech and academic freedom are many and subtle. As far as their historical linkages are concerned, it is clear that the advance of the one has not automatically produced a comparable advance of the other. Nevertheless, it can be demonstrated that, under certain favorable conditions, these two freedoms do affect one another, and that the secure position of the one may improve the position of the other, broadening and deepening its meaning and potency. Post-bellum America provided such favorable conditions. That freedom of speech was the right of each citizen was firmly lodged in our traditions; that the American professor would exploit that right was not insured until the coming of the university. First, the post-war university granted its teachers the time to engage in outside activities: it removed the old residence requirement, it ended the boarding-house vigil. Secondly, the university appointed men whose interests were not engrossed by campus duties. It brought in the professional scholar, whose works were appraised by other men in his discipline; it brought in the new-style executive president, a man of wide affairs; it brought in the technical expert and specialist, who remained available for outside consultation. Thirdly, the university professor gave up the quiet retreat of moral philosophy and the sanctuary of classical economics for the factual study of social problems and the evaluation of social policy. This movement was accentuated by a fourth development, the rise of the philosophy of pragmatism, which sanctioned the participation of men of thought in worldly problems and affairs. The American professor, much more so than his German counterpart, relinquished his ivied seclusion and entered the arena of action. No civil service code prevented his entry into that arena. And, in that arena, he demanded the prerogative of free speech which was given to any other citizen. There he felt he had the right to express his opinion on highly controversial subjects and on issues outside his scholarly com-

petence. There academic freedom became an issue and an aspect of the struggle for civil liberty.

And it was precisely in that arena that the greatest amount of academic friction was generated in America. The attempt to assimilate the doctrine of free speech into the doctrine of academic freedom aroused hostility in many quarters. It seemed, in effect, to demand that professors be protected against economic reprisal when they engaged in the rough give-and-take of political action and debate. To urge that the professor's institutional position not be affected by his acts as a citizen seemed to ask that the professor be immune from the usual economic penalties that repay unpopular utterance—the dwindling of clients, or the boycott of subscribers, or the loss of a job. Such a request for immunity, exceeding anything provided by the constitutional safeguard of free speech, going even further than the “free market” conceptions of the great philosophers of intellectual liberty, was bound to strain the less tensile tolerance of American trustees and administrators. A barrage of argument was touched off by this request. In its favor, professors and certain presidents mustered methodological arguments: “ideas must be tested in action”; administrative arguments: “if a university or college censors what the professors may say . . . it thereby assumes responsibility for that which it permits them to say . . . a responsibility which an institution of learning would be very unwise in assuming”; pedagogical arguments: what young men need “are not hermit scholars, but active zealous citizens, with opinions to express on public questions, and power to express them.” The answering volley returned was usually but not exclusively by university presidents and trustees. They too used methodological arguments: when a teacher enters politics, he acts “as a partisan and [loses his] place as a judge and an unbiased individual”; administrative arguments: “to use this institution and the funds so contributed . . . to the propaganda of the exceptional ideas of a single individual, is a perversion of public trust”; pedagogical arguments: the professor who uses his university position as “an object of political purpose destroys his educational effectiveness.” And the salvos resound to this day.

The second source of friction was the closely allied problem of professional ethics in the public forum. Despite their invocation

of the right of free speech, American professors generally conceded that they would reach a limiting line of professional propriety long before they reached the legal boundary of libel, slander, or sedition. But where was that line to be drawn? Was it proper for a professor to run for political office or work actively for a political party?—the academic community was divided on this question. Was it proper for a professor publicly to criticize the actions of a colleague or a superior?—in this most bureaucratically-controlled of all the professions, it was not easy to decide where free speech left off and insubordination began. Was the professor's relation to his trustees analogous to the judge's relation to the executive?—the analogy was useful in suggesting that trustees could not remove their appointees at will, but it was a two-edged sword, for it also suggested that professors were bound by the staid public ethic of judges. Again the conflict between free speech and professional ethics created a storm center which has never lifted from our scene.

America thus transformed even as she borrowed the German notion of academic freedom. The peculiarities of the American university—its inclusion of an undergraduate college, its close ties to the community, its varied purposes, its lay control; the peculiarities of American culture—its constitutional provision for free speech, its empiricist traditions, its abundant pragmatic spirit—made selection and modification of this imported idea inevitable.

WITCH HUNT IN THE LINCOLN COUNTRY¹

By FRANK W. FETTER

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In the summer of 1953 Governor William G. Stratton vetoed the Broyles Bill, as his predecessor, Adlai Stevenson, had done two years before. According to its sponsors, the bill was intended to deal with the "subversive danger" in Illinois. This legislative drive against "subversion," of which Senator Broyles is the leader in Illinois, is not peculiar to his state, but there are features of the Illinois story that give it national significance. The many racial and religious elements in the state, cumulative voting for the House that practically insures that one of the three representatives from each district will be of the minority party, and a "rotten borough" system that gives disproportionate political power to stationary and declining communities, all contribute to bring into sharper relief than is usually possible the forces and the fears that give strength to such legislative proposals.

II

Paul Broyles is fifty-eight years old, a Republican, and a resident of Mt. Vernon, a city of some fifteen thousand in the southern part of the state. He lists his occupation as "farm owner and investments," is a Methodist, and is past commander of his American Legion post. He has been in the Illinois legislature since 1943, and his record, outside of his attack on "subversion," has been undistinguished. In 1947 Broyles started the campaign that has made his name a household word in Illinois. With the backing of American Legion officials he sponsored a law establishing a Seditious Activities Investigation Commission and became its

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chairman. For nearly a year the Commission floundered, with only the vaguest idea of what it was looking for or how to find it. An invited guest of the Commission talked on the dangers of socialized medicine. There was discussion of the need for a committee of veterans to censor school books. Progressive education, John Dewey, George Counts, and the "Phi Beta Kappa Fraternity" came in for general criticism. Broyles plaintively asked: "Would there be any way to stop any of these schools from teaching World Citizenship now?" A meeting with the heads of the state-supported colleges failed to reveal any evidence of subversion, but gave Senator Broyles a chance to explain his educational philosophy: "If the truth could be taught and end up by this: This is why we are the greatest nation in the world. You could end up with something like that and you wouldn't have any of these youngsters wanting any of the other-isms."

A nameless University of Chicago student was invited "to come in and tell a closed meeting about his difficulties in having to answer the questions the way the instructors wanted them answered—in a sympathetic manner towards subversive and Communistic tendencies, in order to please the instructor and remain in the upper rank and be admitted to Annapolis," although the record does not reveal whether he was admitted to the Academy.

The Commission kept in close touch with veterans' groups, particularly with leaders in the American Legion. It met with Joseph Kornfeder, "a self-confessed reformed Communist" who has since been a witness before Congressional committees, who so impressed Chairman Broyles that he asked him: "Say for instance we wanted to reform our Illinois people, would you appear and give some testimony?" Kornfeder quoted his rates with the air of a professional: "Well, I usually receive \$200.00 per week, plus expenses." Then, to show his experience and qualifications, he gave advice as to how his services could be used to advantage:

Your hearings would, however, not be effective unless you have some local color to it. . . . If you have your first hearing, it would be desirable to pick on some local situation there somewhere. Subpoena the Communists too. That adds to the dramatics. Then it is like a fight on a baseball field. It adds to the interest of the subject. But it takes a lot of preparation.

Finally, at a meeting in August, 1948, with the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Chairman, Congressman J. Parnell Thomas, of New Jersey, with his background of Washington experience, suggested to the Commission a definite and positive program:

If you are going into the education phase thoroughly, the University of Chicago would be one of the places we would start. . . . We run into it as much as any other university in the States.

To this Congressman Vail, a resident of Illinois with a better knowledge of the local situation, countered:

In attacking the educational institutions, I would do it under a general heading, without approaching the University of Chicago directly. In Chicago you have a close tie between Roosevelt College and Chicago University. You will draw a measure of criticism by selecting the University of Chicago as your main objective. If you include Roosevelt College, you have two elements there that are very vital in the development of the Communist thinking.

In April and May, 1949, nearly two years after its creation, the Commission, with Dr. J. B. Matthews of recent note for his charges about Communism and the churches as Chief Investigator, held its only public hearings on the University of Chicago and on Roosevelt College. With Laird Bell, the Chairman of the Board at the University of Chicago, Chancellor Robert Hutchins, several of the Chicago faculty, and President Sparling of Roosevelt College on the stand, the hearings provided good newspaper copy but failed to uncover subversive activities at the institutions.

The Report of the Commission, which several members did not sign, made sweeping charges about the subversive menace in Illinois, recommended legislative measures, and finally concluded:

May we further state that this Commission fearlessly and without any pretense of dealing with the subject matter of its investigation; without docility, are anxious to advocate legislation to absolutely curb their operations because of their violation of the basic principles of the very constitution which they seek to destroy, and so this Commission, strongly advocates the passing of nihilitory legislation so needed to treat them as the mongrel class of citizenry.

With all the knowledge of the vicious operations in which they indulge, the members of the Commission believe that once the citizens are aroused as to the type of individuals within their circle, that every patriotic American will guardedly and actively curb their influences, seemingly so innocently exerted, and publicly expose every individual by his own vicious propaganda and secreted treason.

III

The General Assembly at that time refused to enact any of the legislation recommended or to continue the Commission. But when it next met, in 1951, Broyles jointly with a Democratic senator from southern Illinois introduced an omnibus bill with a preamble describing the Communist danger, and numerous provisions duplicating existing Illinois laws against subversive activity; the heart of the bill, however, was the requirement that every employing agency of the State ferret out subversives on its staff and the provision for a special Assistant Attorney-General for the express purpose of running them down. The bill passed both houses by large majorities, but Governor Stevenson vetoed it in an extended message with the following closing paragraphs:

In conclusion, while I respect the motives and patriotism of the proponents of this bill, I think there is in it more of danger to the liberties we seek to protect than of security for the Republic. It reverses our traditional concept of justice by placing upon the accused the burden of proving himself innocent. It makes felons of persons who may be guilty more of bad judgment than of anything else. It jeopardizes the freedom of sincere and honest citizens in an attempt to catch and punish subversives. It is unnecessary and redundant.

I know full well that this veto will be distorted and misunderstood, even as telling the truth of what I knew about the reputation of Alger Hiss was distorted and misunderstood. I know that to veto this bill in this period of grave anxiety will be unpopular with many. But I must, in good conscience, protest against any unnecessary suppression of our ancient rights as free men. Moreover, we will win the contest of ideas that afflicts the world, not by suppressing these rights, but by their triumph. We must not burn down the house to kill the rats.

When the General Assembly met in 1953 Broyles introduced Senate Bill 101, to establish a Seditious Activities Investigation Commission and Senate Bill 102, with contents similar to his vetoed bill of 1951. Many sincere and public-spirited citizens of Illinois, worried about the international situation and the Washington headlines, were in a mood to support, without reading or analysis, any legislation that purported to get rid of Communists. Stevenson's crushing defeat in the presidential campaign was interpreted as due in part to his softness on Communism, of which his 1951 veto was considered evidence.

Most of the witnesses for the bills at the Senate hearings in March represented veterans' groups, the American Legion spokesmen taking the lead. They made no serious attempt to argue the merits of the bills or to defend the extremely loose and vague definition of subversive organization and the arbitrary and probably unconstitutional administrative provisions. A much-used argument was that when Communists were shooting American boys in Korea, nobody but a fellow traveler or a "dupe or dope" would oppose such legislation. Progressive education, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Friends Service Committee, and supporters of the United Nations were all mentioned as among the undesirable elements in American life that made the passage of such bills necessary.

Late in April the Senate voted its approval, 35-11. The House hearings were delayed until the middle of May, and by then opposition had become active and vocal. Opponents, loosely organized, exploited the political weakness of the bills: the lack of widespread support for them, once their real nature was recognized, outside of aggressive groups of professional patriots and the small towns and rural areas of southern Illinois. The fact that the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois Bar Association issued unfavorable reports on Bill 102 probably had little direct effect on legislators, but made it easier to get substantial citizenry to recognize the bills in their true light: that they did little to deal with subversion that could not be done under existing legislation, but were the product of hysteria and demagoguery that could easily be as great a threat to property rights as to civil rights. Outside of veterans' groups, the Daughters of the American Revo-

lution, and the Freedom Clubs of the Freedom under God Movement, there was almost no organization support of the bills. By May the opposition had reached an impressive total, including, in addition to the Chicago and Illinois Bar Associations, the American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters, many Protestant and Jewish church groups, the Illinois Association of School Boards, the Illinois C.I.O., the Illinois Federation of Labor, and chapters of the American Association of University Professors in the larger institutions of the state. The Chicago *Sun-Times* reported that letters to the Governor were ten to one against the bill.

Late in June the House passed Bill 102 by a vote of 87-51. The vote does not indicate accurately the strength of the opposition; under the Illinois Constitution a bill must have a majority of the elected members—77 in the case of the House. Absenteeism is thus equivalent to a negative vote. A few days later the House rejected Bill 101, providing for the Commission, 69-66; in July, after the adjournment of the legislature, Governor Stratton vetoed Bill 102. Senator Broyles, firm to the end in his view that only Communists and “dupes and dopes” had opposed him, said: “The veto should make a headline for the *Daily Worker*.”

IV

The vote on the bills reveals the nature of the forces that supported and opposed the Broyles program. Some of the voting may have been determined by political deals, but the basic pattern of voting is far too clear to be explained in terms of political friendships or the activities of smoke-filled rooms. The bills had bipartisan sponsorship, and the greater proportion of Republicans supporting the bills represented a geographic rather than a political division. The outstanding feature of the legislative vote on the substantive Bill 102 was the division between Cook County and “downstate.” In the Senate the “downstate” vote was 28-2 for the bill, in Cook County 9-7 against it. In the House the “downstate” vote was 69-21 for the bill, in Cook County 30-18 against it. The three legislators from Sangamon County, hallowed with memories of the tolerant Lincoln, voted solidly for the bill. The difference between the views of the state leader-

ship of the Legion and of its membership was a striking feature of the vote. The principal opponents of the Broyles bills in both houses were Legion members, in some cases former post commanders, and the percentage of Legion members in the legislature voting against the bills was almost identical with that of non-Legionnaires so voting. The Legion vote was part of the larger geographic pattern; in Cook County 13-6 against the bill; "downstate" 33-6 for it.

The split between Cook County and "downstate" has added significance because there has been no reapportionment since 1901, although in the ensuing half century the state's population has nearly doubled, and its geographic distribution has changed greatly. Cook County, with 37 per cent of the General Assembly in 1901, had 38 per cent of the population; in 1950 it had 54 per cent of the population. The wealthy and populous suburban seventh district of Cook County cast its three House votes against the bill, and the two Republican members were among its most outspoken opponents. Yet seven districts in the southern part of the state, five of them with less population than in 1900, and with a combined present population less than the seventh district, cast their fourteen Republican and seven Democratic votes for the bill.

The relation between support of the bill and membership in the Protestant, and particularly the evangelical churches, would have delighted Henry Mencken in the most irreverent mood of his raucous youth. Legislators who listed themselves in the Illinois legislative Blue Book as members of a Protestant church were much stronger in support of the bill—45 for and 13 against—than were the Catholic members—11 for and 8 against—or those who showed no church affiliation—66 for and 41 against. Despite the fact that the Illinois Conference of the Methodist Church had gone on record against the Broyles bill in 1951, sixteen of the eighteen Methodist legislators were for the bill; of the two Methodists in opposition one was a Negro. Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists combined voted 30-5 for the bill.

There was a strong note of anti-intellectualism. Rarely stated in so many words, but just below the surface, in the remarks of more than one witness and legislator, was the thought that new ideas of all sorts, of which Communism was but one form, are responsible

for the troubles of the United States. That the two Phi Beta Kappas in the legislature voted against the bills may not prove anything, but is worth noting. It is clear that the "anti-subversive" movement in Illinois in 1953 was no attack of propertied interests against the worker, to be explained in pat Marxian phrases of rich against poor. As a sociological phenomenon, it cut across and even ran counter to any economic interpretation. Although much of the support for the bills suggested the spirit of the Klan and the Nazis, no spokesman for the bills in the Legislature made specific reflection on any religion or minority group. But the unspoken attitude of minority groups showed that they felt that the spirit of the legislation boded no good for them. The five Negro members were solid in opposition, as were the four Jewish members. Only three out of twelve members with Italian names voted for the bill.

If we accept the Broyles movement at its own estimate—an attempt on the part of patriotic Americans to run subversives out of Illinois—the opposition was an incongruous assortment of fellow-travelers. But if we look at the deeper significance of the opposition to the Broyles bills, the fact that most of the prosperous suburbanites of the North Shore approved the position of their Representatives in fighting bills that the C.I.O. and A.F.L. also opposed; that the League of Women Voters, and some members of the notorious bipartisan West Side Bloc of Chicago—frequently regarded as the protector of gambling and gangster elements in Illinois—found themselves agreeing on the Broyles bills; and that successful businessmen of the state should, by Senator Broyles's standards, fall in the class of "dupes and dopes," is all of a pattern. In 1923 Frank Kent, of the *Baltimore Sun*, wrote:

... the meetings of the Klan are of a deeply religious and patriotic character, and the rank and file of its membership is made up of narrow-minded but well-meaning men, who believe that they are helping to "save the country." ... Mostly, they are members of the same evangelical churches that support the Anti-Saloon League. . . .

His words are a prophetic description of those who were the hard core of support of the Broyles program in Illinois in 1953.

The opposition in large part consisted of four overlapping groups: minorities, teachers, clergymen, and those with a background of wealth and education. For quite different reasons, most of the members of these groups arrived at a common conclusion: the provisions, and even more the spirit of the backers, of the Broyles bills were a threat to them and to the values that they esteem. Whether from intuition, from knowledge of the activities of the modern Klan, or familiarity with the story of the rise of Hitler, almost any member of a minority group sensed that to support this sort of legislation was to encourage those who might next time turn on him. Undoubtedly, some of the opposition of the clergy and teachers can be explained, as supporters of the bills more than once suggested, as part of the conditioned behavior of professional "do-gooders." But there was something deeper and more basic in the almost unanimous opposition of these groups: a knowledge from their "intellectual" background of the dangers of intolerance for their own professions as well as for the society of which they were a part. A man of wealth who knew his history was likely to sense that a spirit of intolerance and of demagoguery that made a mockery of the Anglo-Saxon ideas of civil rights might next turn itself against property rights. The strong opposition of many persons of wealth, social position, and education to the Broyles bills apparently left Senator Broyles and his friends with mingled feelings of bafflement and rage, but it makes sense.

V

It is not clear whether Senator Broyles's campaign is the product of a shrewd political sensing of the latent fears and prejudices of the American public or whether it simply represents the distrust of the well-meaning man of limited outlook of the activities of a larger world of change that he does not understand. Reading Broyles's statements, hearing him talk, and conversations with those who know him incline one to favor the visionless and sincere rather than the shrewd and scheming interpretation of Paul Broyles. There is a temptation to compare Broyles with McCarthy, but it can be misleading. Aside from the fact that McCarthy is a Catholic and Broyles a Methodist, McCarthy is a man of greater intellect and education, but far more aware of the forces at large

in the world. Broyles with plaintive persistence is spokesman for a sector of white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, and small-town and rural America in a way that the flamboyant McCarthy is not. Those who know Senator Broyles believe that high on his legislative program for 1955 will be bills to curb the subversive menace in Illinois.

EDITOR'S NOTE.

Since the writing of this article, Senator Broyles introduced two Bills in the 1955 session of the Illinois legislature. Senate Bill 59 was not passed, but Senate Bill 58 was passed on June 29, 1955, and signed by Governor Stratton thereafter. Senate Bill 58 provides for the re-enactment of an earlier provision forbidding payment out of appropriations to anyone who advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence, etc. The new part of Senate Bill 58 provides a requirement for a loyalty oath from the employees of the State of Illinois or any political agency or instrumentality thereof. This oath is required before any compensation may be received.

THE FABLE OF THE YOUNG MAN WHO READ THE PAPERS

By LOY E. DAVIS

Purdue University

There was a Young Man who didn't like to Work during the Hot Summer Months, and didn't have much Appetite, so he decided to be a Teacher. He could Read and Write, so he decided to teach English.

These were the Real Reasons, but he managed to Think Up some that Looked Good on Paper, and after a While he even got so he half Believed Them.

He said that Money Isn't Everything, and it would be Quite Noble to Hold the Lamp of Learning Way Up, and let the Gleam go down the Dark Corridors, and keep the Young Truth-Seekers from Falling Over One Another in their Hurry to Get There. All over the Country, Young People were Lying Awake Nights for fear the Alarm wouldn't Go Off, and they might Miss Out on Something They Ought to Know. He said the English Language was a Great Heritage, and had been used Quite a Bit of the Time by Some of our Most Illustrious People. He said that all the Students would Greatly Appreciate any little Bit of Information that would help them Achieve Complete Mastery of their Beloved Mother Tongue. And they would of course be Dying to become Intimately Acquainted with the Great Literary Masterpieces that Bejewel the Diadem of the King's English, like *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and *The Psalm of Life*. He would Wind Up with a Quotation from Shelley about Driving his Dead Thoughts over the Universe like Withered Leaves to Quicken a New Birth. The Dead Thoughts was the only part that Fitted In, but it all Sounded Nice.

So he got some Rimless Glasses and a Box of red Verithin Pencils, and Set Up—I mean Sat Up—as Instructor in English on the College Level.

II

In September he Started In with High Hopes and considerable Eagerness, and a Suit of Clothes that was beginning to Wear Through. By October he had begun to Wonder whether Somebody had been Putting Him On, and whether the Real Thing wasn't maybe a bit Different from the Way he had Heard It.

First, that Part about the Money. His Salary looked like What the Boy Shot At. His Pay for Carrying the Lamp wasn't enough to buy the Coal Oil. It was more than he Deserved, but it was Inadequate. Inflation was Striking like Chain Store Lightning all Around him, but his Pay Check had Lightning Rods on it, and not much Else. Money isn't Everything, but the local Purveyors of Viands had a regular Mania for it, and the Lady who Rented Rooms was downright Mercenary. But by Cutting Out Dessert, and absentmindedly Overlooking a Meal now and then, and Settling for a Room with no Hot Water, he was able to Get By, and find a Small Amount of Melancholy Joy in Suffering for the Common Good. At least that was the Phrase he had seen used in the Books.

Besides the Money, there was that Stuff about the Gleam down the Dark Hallways, and the Young Seekers Falling Over Themselves. This is the Way It Was:

The Alarm Clocks often failed to Wake the Earnest Young People who had finally managed to Get to Sleep just before the alarm Failed to Go Off, after they had Tossed All Night at the Unbearable Thought of not getting there On Time. Sickness was at an all-time Minimum in the City where the Teaching Went On, but back in the Home Towns there were Epidemics of Everything from Chronic Eczema to Avian Leukosis, and Relatives were Dying Off like Flies, especially on Week-Ends. Then there were Football Games, Football Pep Sessions, Football Banquets, Convocations, Movies, Victory Varieties, Dances, Midnight Serenades, Initiations, Bridge Parties, Student Elections, Meetings of the Fraternities, Meetings of the Independent Association, Meetings of Student Fellowship, the Newman Club, the Glider Club, the Camera Club, the Glee Club, etc., etc., etc.

None of the Young Instructor's students ever Attended any of These Things, because they were Trying to Take Advantage of There Opportunities, so they could Take There Place in the World, and English was There Weakest Subject, and they Knewed how Important it is in this Present Day an Age for a Individual to Speak and Write Good, a Specially in the Business World or Things Along That Line, so they were all Burning the Midnight Oil and Holding There Noses to the Grindstone, and etc. But they seemed to be more Susceptible than most people to Toothaches, Headaches, Earaches, Stomachaches, Touches of the Flu, and Nightblindness, so they wouldn't be able to Take the Test at the Scheduled Time, and the Theme would have to be Handed In Late. In Short, the Young Instructor was running Head On into Human Nature on the College Level.

III

When the Papers came in, he thought he must have Got Hold of the Wrong Batch. They didn't seem to be Talking About the things *he* had been Talking About. He knew the English Language had done a lot of Borrowing, but he didn't know it had borrowed So Much. The Theme Writers often Took Things for Granite, they Preformed Brilliantly in Atheletics, they ate their Desert in the Dinning Room while dressed in their Best Cloths, they Behaved like Angles and kept up their Moral, they had, or Could Of had, Expierences with Burgulars, Villians, Phamplets, Prespiration, and Mischevious Members of the Femine Sex. They were Familiar with Airoplanes and Similiar Equiptment. They Beleived that one of the Principle Factors of a Person is Undoubtably Enviroment, and that it is a great Tradeegy that some Goverments won't leave the Rest of the World live Peacably, without Allways Attacting them. They said that School Work was Druggery, but they would try their Upmost to do it Couragously, Irregardless.

On the Literature Papers he had a Hard Time recognizing the Masterpieces that Bejewel the Diadem. One student said the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table conducted one of the Radio Programs where they gave people Orchids, and the Scarlet Letter was worn

by a Girl Yell Leader from Anderson High School. Others talked about the play *Orthello*, and Satin in *Paradise Lost*, and Sherlock in *The Merchant of Venus*, and Thorio's *Waldron*, and *Imitations of Immorality* by William Wadsworth. Others said they had Read the Wrong Assignment.

On the Grammar Test they had Held their Noses so long Preparing for, they gave the Instructor a New Slant on the Terminology. For Instance:

In the sentence "The Instructor's Salary was Raised by the Department Head and the Dean because he Deserved More Money," *Money* was the Object of the Instructor, and *Salary* was an Adjective because it Depended on the Department Head and could be Modified by the Dean. Some Students went on to say that "because he Deserved More Money" was a Non-essential Pharse.

In the sentence "The Closing of her Eyes showed that the Girl enjoyed the Kiss," *the Girl* was Passive, *the Closing of her Eyes* was Reflexive, and *Permission* was Understood.

In the sentence "The Man Put Soda Water in his Whiskey and Drank with Confidence," *Soda Water* was Parenthical because it Could Of been Left Out, and *Confidence* was Misplaced.

And in the sentence "The Baby being too Young to Walk, his Father carried him," *the Baby being too Young to Walk* was Dependent because it couldn't stand Alone. They said *his Father* was Indefinite, and the Antecedent of *the Baby* was not Clear.

The Young Instructor went to his Room and turned the Basin full of Cold Water and held his Head Under for a Long time.

Moral: Life is a Tough Preposition.

THE PROFESSOR AND GOD

By GEORGE PAUL SCHMIDT

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The typical college professor does not wear his religion on his sleeve. Academic man is apt to be cagey about parading his religious convictions, and the reasons are not far to seek. Either he has gradually outgrown or consciously rejected the inherited religious habits and formulas of his youth and is still in the process of recasting them into a satisfactory philosophy of his own; or else he has been so interested in his teaching and research, or so immersed in the routine chores of his profession, that he has come to be almost a religious illiterate. At any rate, feeling inadequate and slightly embarrassed, he does not like to be put on the spot.

And so it may come as an unpleasant shock to a professor of history, for example, to be asked, out of the blue, for a public expression of his views on the Christian interpretation of history. And if the request happens to come just at the time when he is worrying his way through Dr. Norbert Wiener's latest version of *Cybernetics and Society*, the professor is really caught in a riptide of conflicting ethical and metaphysical currents. Here is, on the one hand, the persuasive call for a reassertion of a theistic, teleological view of the world, in keeping with the Christian tradition. Standing in sharp contrast is Dr. Wiener's compelling and, to a layman, startling analogy between the behavior of human beings and "thinking" machines; the whole argument presented from a naturalistic premise and with the long-range intellectual pessimism of the physical scientist. Though this pessimism is not exactly new, but rather a reaffirmation with new evidence of the second law of thermo-dynamics—Henry Adams' cosmic blues with fresh lyrics—yet it forces a perplexing choice upon the scholar. Will he teach the inevitability of doom or the ultimate triumph of the

City of God? Is he to predict a society taken over by robots or saved by revivals?

As he turns to examine his own views on these questions, by way of reaching some conclusions about the Christian interpretation of history, the professor soon discovers—he has really known it all along—that it is going to be difficult to define the term *Christian*. So many versions of Christianity have evolved in the course of nineteen centuries. Even the Catholic churches, Greek and Roman, have turned more than one corner in their long careers. As for Protestantism, in spite of the recent encouraging *rapprochement* through the World Council of Churches, it apparently still ranges the full width of the theological spectrum from near-humanism, through various shades of liberalism, to neo-orthodoxy and old-fashioned fundamentalism, with such smaller but active groups as Quakers, Christian Scientists, and Jehovah's Witnesses still unaccounted for, even under this broad generalization. In short, the scholar finds a definition of Christianity that will satisfy Bishop Oxnham and Cardinal Spellman, Reinhold Niebuhr and Billy Graham, clearly beyond his powers.

II

But if the question cannot be dealt with in the form originally presented, it is possible, and perhaps useful, to reformulate and enlarge it into an examination of the ethical and metaphysical premises on which all university research and teaching rest. Sooner or later every conscientious practitioner of the liberal arts and sciences must pause to ask himself what he is doing and why. And the present is as good a time as any to rub the tarnish off long-unexamined basic assumptions to see if there is sound metal underneath. For a change in the intellectual and ethical climate is under way. The theory of progress by evolution, so appealing to the romantic nineteenth century, is hardly tenable today after the experiences of the twentieth, and secular and theological thought alike are challenging its easy assumptions. Science, but yesterday the key to open all doors, turns out on closer inspection to be a technique more than a philosophy, indispensable for modern life but hardly the answer to every human need. Sobered and

disillusioned, Western thought is once again taking on a conservative cast. All this is no longer news. Positivist and pragmatist viewpoints have been under fire for some time now, and although some of the criticism, especially the popular kind, is unfair and rooted in misunderstanding, the sheer volume of it has grown so large that it can no longer be ignored. The liberal arts can no longer be effectively taught under the dispensation of those wellnigh discredited oracles, Herbert Spencer and John Fiske. A sense of tragedy is returning to our lives. On this point, strangely enough, the old-fashioned theologian and the new-fashioned physicist find themselves in substantial agreement, though for different reasons. Man, whether born in sin or merely one of the more complex machines, is limited in power and doomed to physical extinction. Ultimately, as the cosmic forces rumble on, entropy will prevail, the earth will die, and the heavens will be rolled up as a scroll.

Since a change of direction in thought movements usually indicates that the pendulum has swung too far the other way, the current conservative reaction, at least in its religious aspects, is probably inevitable and should be welcomed. As a corrective for a generation that had been too inclined to equate scientific techniques and hypotheses with ultimate truth, and economic well-being with the good life, it will be invaluable. Courses in religion, taught by academically respectable personnel, are reappearing in college catalogues and strengthening a long-neglected area of the liberal curriculum. But there is another side. Religion, if alive, carries an emotional impact, which can get out of hand. With the best of intentions the back-to-religion movement, if uncontrolled, could build up into a twentieth century revival with evangelical sweetness and anti-intellectual overtones, engulfing the universities in an unwholesome sentimentalism. It would not be the first time in our history. Beginning in the days of the Great Awakening before the middle of the eighteenth century, revivals used to sweep through the colleges with almost predictable regularity, and with mixed results. They probably raised the tone of campus life for a time and also led to the building of more colleges. In fact, some of the most respected institutions of higher learning in the country today owe their existence to the fervor of

a revival. But there were negative results as well. One suspects that the senior in South Carolina College was speaking for a good many sanctity-surfeited undergraduates when he confided to his diary, in 1845: "A day of fasting and prayer for colleges. I neither fasted nor prayed."

Caught in the swirling crosscurrents of scientific pessimism and renascent theological conservatism, the teacher of history or, for that matter, of any of the liberal arts and sciences, had better look to his foundations. These have often been pointed out to him, learnedly and at length. At the risk of appearing didactic, and of laboring the obvious, I should like to set down, in the simplest terms, what I think they are. What all the learned discussion of fundamental principles and ultimate objectives really boils down to is this: it is better to know than not to know, it is better to be informed than to be ignorant. This is an ethical assumption, a value judgment, which does not grow automatically out of science or the practice of scholarship but is antecedent to them. Nor has it always met with universal assent. There are those who do not agree that it is always better to know. From their ranks come the censors of the world, who would keep certain kinds of information from us, on the grounds that what you know will hurt you. Actually it is they, the censors, who will be hurt, if the information they suppress is such as to disturb their vested interest or undermine their arbitrary power. Censorship may be exercised by a government, a church, or a political party: history is full of examples.

If the major premise, that knowledge is preferable to ignorance, is correct, certain conclusions are inescapable. For one, knowledge must be accurate and authentic. From this corollary stem all the paraphernalia of scholarship: the weighing of sources, the amassing of critical bibliographies, the proper use of footnotes; and their counterpart in the sciences: the precision of laboratory techniques and the rigorous testing of hypotheses. Implied here too is the honest attempt to rid oneself, so far as one recognizes it, of the personal and environmental bias which always blocks the attainment of objective knowledge, and the rejection of all uncritically espoused party-line science, be it Lysenko biology, or Marxist or Manchester economics. Intellectual honesty is the *sine qua non*

of all scholarly activity. On the same grounds we justify academic freedom, that much discussed and sometimes abused term. The antithesis of censorship, academic freedom, too, is an ethical concept, as Columbia University clearly realized when it adopted as its bicentennial slogan "man's *right* to knowledge and the free use thereof." (*Italics mine.*) Even honor pledges on student papers and honor boards maintained by student government associations derive their relevance from this same source; they are the students' way of saying that they will abide by the moral obligations of scholarship. Neutrality in these matters is impossible if learning is to survive. You cannot portray intellectual honesty and academic freedom as interesting examples of the mores of Western culture, to be compared dispassionately with different standards of other cultures. You are committed. From whatever source derived, these moral standards are indispensable to the scientist and the scholar. Without them his house of scholarship, his entire civilization, comes crashing about his ears.

III

The basis of scholarship, then, is ethical. It is also reasonable. Is it Christian? Emphatically yes! Whatever else Christianity may be, it is the assertion of the importance of the individual or, in theological terms, of the infinite value of every human soul. And this in spite of the fact that the tendency to evil in human nature is as deep-seated as his capacity for good. If, as Christian scholars have often pointed out, man is an end in himself and not a means to an end, he has the right to develop all his capacities to the fullest extent, taking care not to injure—he ought to be happy to help—any fellowman who is doing the same. On this dogma, I believe, most churches would agree. Nor is there cause for quarrel here between the theologian and the scientist, for this is a platform that science and religion can share. Around this rallying point, furthermore, education and religion must make common cause against their common enemy: totalitarianism in all its forms. I have advisedly switched terms here, saying "religion" and not "Christianity," because I believe that the latter, too narrowly de-

fined, does not take in enough ground. The foundation of scholarship and of freedom of the mind must be broad enough to hold sages from many shores, like those of Arnold Toynbee's litany; it must have room for men of good will from all faiths and philosophical persuasions. We would all be the losers if too exclusive a formulation of Christianity were to shut out Jews, humanists, and others who are fighting the good fight.

At this point, for the historian re-examining his premises, another problem looms up, a metaphysical one. It is the question of the meaning of history, that old teleological teaser which has exercised great minds in the West from Augustine to Toynbee. Most practitioners of the discipline would agree, I am sure, that in an immediate and obvious sense history has meaning. An understanding, even though incomplete, of the origins of our society and of the character of other societies in other times and places will contribute to an understanding of present-day problems and aid in dealing with them effectively. Trite as all this is, I can think of no better reason for teaching history or any of the social sciences in a tax-supported institution. The professor who does not see some such value in his subject should think twice before accepting his pay check. If it were true, as a cynic has suggested, that all we learn from history is that no one ever learns anything from history, the fault would not be history's, but ours. On a higher level, however, when one begins to look for a long-term cosmic significance in the chain of events, the question gets complicated. The libraries which have been written on the philosophy of history, culminating in the monumental work that is today on everyone's lips, have done little to simplify it.

By way of highlighting the problem we might as well start with a quotation from Mr. Toynbee:

History is a vision—dim and partial, yet true to reality as far as it goes—of God revealing Himself in action to souls that are sincerely seeking Him.

The idea is familiar, having been stated, in many forms, time and again. Augustine, writing in the fifth century, pinpointed it more precisely than Toynbee. For him the key to history was the

preservation, through the ages, of the City of God. The American Founding Fathers, though writing in the unhistorical eighteenth century, thought of the Declaration of Independence as having its significant place "in the course of human events" and saw it growing logically out of the laws of nature's God. To the nineteenth century mind, caught up in the vision of beneficent evolution, history disclosed the One Increasing Purpose. All such philosophical interpretations, no matter how cogently reasoned or buttressed with circumstantial evidence, are in the end subjective versions and acts of faith. They are not, nor are they intended to be, subject to scientific proof or demonstrable in terms of strict rules of evidence. So far as they postulate God, they are "a vision—dim and partial." The individual historian may discern and be comforted by such a vision of God within the shadows, but cannot pin Him down with footnotes. In his classes, however, he must operate with footnotes if he would build in his students a respect for valid data and critically tested generalizations; to do otherwise would be dishonest. And so he is neatly impaled on the horns of a dilemma: intellectual honesty, which assuredly has Christian sanctions, forbids him to inject any exclusively Christian world view into his class discussions. Fairness to his students demands that he inform them of his own religious philosophy, but also that he present, as objectively as he can, the claims of competing philosophies.

IV

Looking for the hand of God in history raises practical difficulties. How do we recognize it? Even trained scholars don't always agree. We smile indulgently at Homer's gods taking sides in the Trojan War, and keep our fingers reverently crossed over the behavior of a tribal Jehovah swapping blows with Dagon of the Philistines. We dismiss as seventeenth-century obscurantism the Remarkable Providences of Increase Mather, who saw in sinking ships and wayward hurricanes the guiding hand of the not so inscrutable God of Massachusetts. Yet the writer of the *Iliad* was no fool, and as for Increase Mather, he was one of the most intelligent and best educated men of his time, and the portents

he describes are rational deductions from his theological premises. A Moslem historian of the Crusades would probably portray the rôle of God in that meeting of East and West somewhat differently from the Christian historian writing on the same topic. Devout Catholic and pious Protestant scholars have differed widely as to the Divine intent in the Reformation. Once, in an informal discussion, a professor of American history confidently asserted that he saw God working for righteousness and progress in the Abolition Movement and the Civil War. A colleague in the group, who, I believe, was from Georgia, took vehement exception, and before long these two experts were fighting the War between the States all over again.

In the face of such contradictory opinions it is safer for the historian to walk by the light he has. The complexity of the course of human events, and the multiple factors which must be accounted for in explaining even the simplest historical situation, should be enough to keep him busy—and humble. He needs to learn something of the techniques that are constantly being evolved and perfected by the other social sciences, without losing sight of the humanistic aspect of his craft. For it is his specific task as a historian to synthesize, to put the parts together, to recreate the past, and for its proper performance literary skill is as essential today as it was in the days of Macaulay and Parkman. And if, as he grows in knowledge and insight, he comes to sense in the story of mankind values that transcend statistics and documents, and which he recognizes, through a glass darkly, as justice, mercy, and love, who is to gainsay him?

EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY¹

By H. GORDON HULLFISH

The Ohio State University

I know of no simple answer to the question, "What education will best serve a democratic people?" Few problems within a democracy, subject as they are to consideration by all of the people, are readily, or permanently, solved. Education is no exception. The totalitarians face a simpler problem in constructing an appropriate education. They have only to design an educational machine which the machine operators, the teachers, will service. The intricacies of the machine and the resulting character of the service may need to be changed from time to time, but this is a "top office" decision, so to speak, one in which the operators are no more involved than are the machines. A democracy dare not come at its problems in this way, though some of the more fanatical educational critics and, indeed, some educational officials, act on occasion as if theirs were a "top office" responsibility. But this is only to say that one of the luxuries democracies have long indulged in has been to permit some citizens to demonstrate publicly the inappropriateness of their ideas and of their behavior. How far we dare to indulge ourselves in this direction is a pertinent question, though we need not pursue it here.

If there is no simple answer, there are some factors, nevertheless, that may be marked off as elements essential to any full consideration of the problem. And, obvious as it may be to say this, the public school must be noted as the ground in which the democratic aspiration is rooted generation by generation. I will not say that schools other than public fail to provide a ground in which these roots take hold. I must say, however, that were we without public schools the tendencies among us toward divisiveness would be accentuated dangerously. We should have to find a way to invent such schools. Fortunately for us, our forebears wanted

¹ Address presented at The Cooper Union, New York City, January 19, 1955.

no man to have an unwarranted advantage over others, on education or any other score, and in their wisdom they evolved a public instrument of enlightenment and, significantly, of association. I can point to no charts, to no statistical tables, to prove the point; yet a claim that our public schools, opening their doors as they do year in and year out to the children of each neighborhood, asking only that residence as of the moment be established, have been the greatest single force in building whatever sense of oneness, of togetherness, we have achieved, is hardly open to challenge.

I can point, of course, to our failure, in some neighborhoods, to be neighborly. Some of our children have been denied the enriching experience (or better, perhaps, the democratic right) of maturing in situations where they could share their interests and emerging values freely with the interests and values of all of the children of the neighborhood. The Supreme Court has now made this denial a matter of public record, labelling it for what it has always been, a failure to live up to the commitment of our heritage, a failure to educate for democracy. But there is another side of this situation which is not so obvious, one not dramatized by court decision. The deprivation of some children of a freely shared experience with others in any neighborhood, from small town to the nation as a whole, is, in fact, a deprivation of all children. Our chance of living together with understanding in our adult years is directly proportionate to the opportunity afforded us to develop a sense of togetherness as we mature. Private and parochial schools, while they may not be undemocratic, either in conception or in practice, will have more difficulty than do public schools in meeting the responsibility for combatting divisive tendencies which both schools share. What all of us need to remember is that children in a democracy should share their growth as they share the sidewalks, as pathways to common adventures—where they may meet to play together and to plan together; where they may jostle one another as pathways cross; where they may go their separate ways; where they may deny to none the right of use.

II

Woodrow Wilson was not thinking primarily about public educa-

tion, though he was thinking deeply about the future of democracy, when he remarked, "We overlook the fact that the real source of strength in the community comes from the bottom." Pursuing this thought, he asked,

Do you find democracy renewing itself from the top? Don't you find society renewing itself from the ranks of unknown men? Do you look to the leading families to go on leading you? Do you look to the ranks of men already established in authority to contribute sons to lead the next generation? They may, sometimes they do, but you can't count on them; and what you are constantly depending on is the rise out of the ranks of unknown men, the emergence of somebody from some place of which you had thought the least, of some man unanointed from on high, to do the thing that the generation calls for. Who would have looked to see Lincoln save a nation? . . . All the while there was springing up in him, as if he were connected with the very soil itself, the sap of a nation, the vision of a great people, a sympathy so ingrained and intimate with the common run of men that he was like the people impersonated, sublimated, touched with genius. And it is to such sources that we must always look.¹

But he was thinking of public education when he said,

You know that the great melting-pot of America, the place where we are all made Americans of, is the public school, where men of every race and of every origin and of every station in life send their children, or ought to send their children, and where, being mixed together, the youngsters are all infused with the American spirit and developed into American men and American women.²

Before leaving either this point or Woodrow Wilson, we should note that the function of the public school in providing an education for democracy is not restricted to the children, any more than education itself is restricted to the immature years. No society ever suffered from an excess of knowledge or intelligence, or from an over-supply of understanding shared by its citizens. A democracy strengthens itself as it makes gains in each of these directions; and the citizens, in the institution which is the public school, possess an instrument that may be used neighborhood by neighbor-

¹ S. K. Padover, editor: *Wilson's Ideals*, pp. 18-19.

² *The New Freedom*, p. 97.

hood to strengthen themselves and their common life. Education, as is true of democracy itself, is never "a thing done, but," as Archibald MacLeish has phrased it, "a thing a-doing." Thus, Woodrow Wilson noted that "When, in addition to sending our children to school to paid teachers, we go to school to one another in those same schoolhouses, then we shall begin more fully to realize than we have ever realized before what American life is."¹ Quite specifically, he pointed to his participation in this Forum as giving him the assurance that this was so. It was against the background of an early experience of his at Cooper Union that he said:

And what I like about this social center idea of the schoolhouse is that there is the place where the ordinary fellow is going to get his innings, going to ask his questions, going to express his opinions, going to convince those who do not realize that the vigor of America pulses in the blood of every true American, and that the only place he can find the true American is in this clearing house of absolutely democratic opinion.²

A nation which develops education widely, involving many of its citizens and all of its future citizens in its program, has provided itself with an assurance that it will not stand still, that its life will almost certainly improve. And this is so even when the purpose of education is admittedly to maintain the status quo. Ideas beget ideas; they stir the imagination of those who entertain them. Whenever we permit the examination of some ideas, we open the possibility that ideas which hold no permit will confront the thinker and ask to be heard. It is no accident that parents in small and private ways withhold some ideas from their children, being fearful that if certain implications come into view the children will go on to speculate about ideas the parents would like to hold back for a later day, if not forever. Nor is it an accident that organizations and institutions behave identically, on a large scale, and publicly. But over the long haul the censor fights a losing battle. Thus, we may hope that the Communist world presently, if the figure is not inappropriate, has a bear by the tail. If the Communists are to be the force in our time they

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

clearly wish to be, they will need citizens as knowledgeable and as skilled as are citizens in other parts of the world. No other road to survival is open to any nation in our complex scientific and technological present. Every demand upon the Communists, therefore, that they extend their knowledge, in whatever area, is equally a demand that the diligence of the security police be extended. So it is that the purge and the public apology for having thought wrongly are becoming familiar features of Communist life; but, also, so it is that ideas are extended and reconstructed even as the intention is that they remain static until such time as, an order permitting, or demanding, change is given. Our repressive critics are but faint counterparts of these security police and, so long as we retain our devotion to open discussion, to the free examination of ideas, they are reduced to the nuisance level of the horse fly. Yet we had better bestir ourselves whenever the self-appointed censor gains the slightest measure of governmental backing.

III

It is at this point, of course, that we find the critical test of how well we are doing in educating for democracy. We can put aside for the moment, almost as irrelevant, the many current arguments about what specifically we are teaching, and how well. The anecdotes that the critics regale us with about the young men and women they have met who cannot spell are interesting, yet they are unrelated to the main issue. This is equally true of the counter argument, that test results show present students to be learning the fundamentals as well as did students in an earlier day, and frequently better. I am not suggesting that we should fail to teach well whatever we select as fundamental. Few of us ever know enough. This is true even of those who find it profitable to tell the rest of us of our lacks. What I do wish to suggest is that the critical factor is the atmosphere that pervades and surrounds the learning situation. Democracy makes no gain, no matter how well the basic tools of learning are taught, if teachers and students are caught up in an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and repression.

That such an atmosphere has prevailed for a number of years, and that it has had serious consequences for education, we well know. Each of us has his anecdotes on this score, too. My latest comes from the chairman of a large department in a liberal arts college in a great university. He was seeking an instructor to add to the staff. One letter, that recommended a young man highly, made note of his years of study and experience, of the character and range of his scholarship, of his personality and of his promise as a teacher. But, then (was he perhaps throwing an anchor to the windward?) the writer said of his candidate that while he had a broad social point of view he was in no sense a radical. We have more than anecdote to go on, however. We have the fact of the harassment of individual teachers and school systems the country over by those who would use the limitations of their own minds as the limits of growth for the minds of others. The atmosphere has not been good; it has not encouraged our best efforts to animate the educative process by keeping always to the fore the spirit of that free-wheeling intelligence on which the democratic aspiration feeds. Yet, in my opinion, the atmosphere is improving. We are getting our second wind. We are discovering that free people will not gain security when they deny, to the institution by which they renew themselves generation by generation, its right to be free.

Democracy is in need of the best-informed thought, and of the best-disposed thought, that the genius of the people can generate. About these ends, when stated thus, little difference arises among us. We find most men to be for the free mind, and for the generous heart, about as readily as Calvin Coolidge found them to be against sin. Differences appear only when we construct the educative means to foster these ends, quite as differences arise when men set out to check sin. Actually, of course, the differences go beyond means, beyond instrumentalities. There are some who are sure that the best-informed thought, and the best-motivated conduct, stand in some duplicating relationship to standards which reside beyond time and place and, thus, beyond man. There are others (John Dewey was one of these) who believe that it is within time and place, and circumstance, that standards for thought and conduct are developed and the tests of their adequacy

found. There are those who believe, therefore, that man lives under the guidance of absolute standards and that education ought to bring him to an understanding of this fact. There are others (again, Mr. Dewey was of this company) who believe that men are capable of generating the standards and ideals by which to guide their thought and conduct. And there are those, to narrow this discussion somewhat, who seem to believe that all that is wrong with modern education is that John Dewey lived and, in the living, convinced others that the philosophy he evolved was meaningful for the improvement of life in general and for the improvement of education specifically. Some of those convinced do use what Douglas Bush of Harvard has recently referred to as "John Dewey's philosophy of barbarism,"¹ as a point of orientation, in planning programs for the education of teachers and, in consequence, so it is held, the true purposes of education have been subverted.

It does seem to me at times that some critics of education resemble the habit-ridden citizen who, come what may, is determined to defeat Franklin Delano Roosevelt each time he casts a ballot. But, be this as it may, the differences in outlook are facts of our times. They are not to be laughed away nor, as I see it, are they to be reconciled. I think we have spent enough time trying to find the common elements in our differing views, knowing all the while that the uncommon element, the element that made for the difference in the first instance, would not be under scrutiny. What we have to ask ourselves is whether our differences have brought us to the end of the road, reducing us to the pathetic gesture of calling the other fellow barbaric, while seeing naught but the acme of civilization in our own mirrors.

I do not believe that we are at the end of the road, though I do believe the pathway we have been following leads but to frustration and unnecessary bickering. Our democratic experience ought to be more useful to us than we have permitted it to be. We are not without experience in developing unity as we have clarified differences, even deepened them. Let me be quite specific. On the issue presented above, I stand with John Dewey. I will not

¹"Education for All Is Education for None," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 9, 1955, p. 13.

say that those of other persuasions are wrong. I will only say that I think they are. In some specific instances I believe that some who differ are ill-informed and I must believe, further, that where this is so the discovery of this fact would have the same impact upon their views as a comparable discovery should have on mine. But where does this leave us? In a democracy, since neither camp has the authority to abolish the other, it should leave each of us, first, with the right to believe as he does and, second, insofar as any one of us has responsibility for the education of others, with the responsibility to gain supporting evidence for the practices he advocates. Nostalgia, we should note, is not a substitute for evidence, nor is the niggling use of anecdote a substitute for reasoned conclusions. Our schools will not become adept in educating for democracy as long as those of us who try to give them direction fail to understand its meaning for our own behavior.

There are several reasons why we have not done better than we have, including the limitation each of us confronts in his own person. Education has changed as the needs of the nation have changed. It has changed as the trend toward urban life made our rural character a thing of the past. It has changed as the nature and character and purposes of those who seek it have changed. It has changed as the nature and character and purposes of those who provide it have changed. It has changed as knowledge—the knowledge the schools are asked to transmit, as well as the knowledge of what is involved in the act of transmission—has changed. It has changed as the place of our nation in a concert of nations has changed and as, in the process, our obligations and the conditions of our security have changed. The wonder is not that education has been under criticism. The wonder is that it gained such obvious vitality while undergoing one growing pain after another.

But there is yet another reason, one that takes me back to my standing ground, my point of difference with those who stand otherwise. Each of us finds his standing ground good and from it expects to give order and meaning to all that he touches, including education. From it we each move toward system, toward substance, labelling the result a philosophy of life, a philosophy of education or, more simply, yet perhaps more forcefully, a way of life.

Thus we move toward inclusiveness, preparing ourselves better all the while to fend off those of other persuasions. If we have done our task well, we shall have no difficulty in showing, when we come to education, that whatever the other fellow proposes or does is, on the face, wrong. It is in these terms that one of John Dewey's critics has said, in effect, that even if Mr. Dewey's pedagogical proposals were correct, so far as enhancing learning is concerned, he would reject them. It is paradoxical that the excluding potential of each point of view is raised as each advances toward inclusiveness. I am reminded of a favorite remark of my former colleague, Boyd H. Bode, "The trouble with the university professor is that he identifies the university with the universe."

IV

As soon as we turn to the social scene, and all who think about education must do this, the problem appears in clearer focus, though the difficulty of dealing with it is perhaps increased. Many who would lay no claim to having a philosophy, or to having formulated a philosophy of education, would tend to recognize a personal commitment in the phrasing, "the democratic way of life," and would anticipate, now that they feel themselves to be aware of competing ways of life, that our schools should advance the democratic way. This seems reasonable, and many have been and are involved in setting forth its pattern, at ease with their conviction that in doing so they will put the schools on the right track. Boyd Bode gave this conviction support when, in discussing fascism and communism in *Democracy as a Way of Life*, he said, of these doctrines, that each provided "a comprehensive plan for the organization of both individual and collective conduct, which is essentially what is meant when we speak of *a way of life*."¹ The title of this volume gives evidence that its author, devoted as he was to the rights of free men, was concerned to show the superiority of the democratic way of life, in contrast to the patterns of fascism and communism. He did show this, yet he left a question with me that I still find bothersome.

In what sense is democracy a way of life? In what sense,

¹ P. 7 (italics in original).

indeed, is communism a way of life? In what sense is the latter more than the lengthened shadow of the leader's whip? Do we mean that each has an internal substance that all who live in relationship to it grasp and understand? If so, neither qualifies as a way of life. Was communism equally communism under Lenin and Stalin? Is it now the same way of life under Malenkov? Was democracy not democracy before women were granted the vote? And what of our way of life when it was legal to conduct segregated schools? Was our way of life more in evidence on the frontier, when the individual took the law in his own hands? At what point do we stop and say, "There it is; have a go at it"? Was democracy non-existent when unions were unheard of? Is our way of life more in evidence now that the stockmarket is watched by government than when bullish and bearish movements were its private business? And who among us is our authority—historian, politician, businessman, churchman, educator, farmer, miner, or factory worker? What, then, is in conflict when we speak of competing and conflicting ways of life? Do we select a single feature (say, the two-party system) or a central tendency (say, belief in a divine being) or an historic fact (say, a general dependence on individual initiative in economic matters) as our point of contrast?

Now, I recognize that our past has given us preferences in the realms of social and individual values. It has given us opportunities, too. I can swell with appropriate pride when I think of these. I recognize further that some of these values are not prized by all others in the world, and that when others threaten them we value them more intensely. This latter fact is inescapable, and it is good that this is so. Bode was not wrong in insisting that the commonly shared values in a culture give life its meaning and purpose. I am not happy over the prospect, however, that some among us may come up with a delineation of *the* democratic way of life at a moment when a pervading anxiety provides a power opportunity which will end speculation for the rest of us. If this happens, the problem of educating for democracy will be solved. Schools will be used to assure continuity for the newly developed power and, while a way of life may seem to prevail, democracy

will be but a façade for authoritarianism, obscuring the motives of those who manipulate the controls in the back room.

This sad ending was not envisioned by Boyd Bode. Far from it. His was a blow struck against authoritarianism, against, so far as schools were concerned, indoctrination in any form. As he put it,

Democratic education is obliged to stake everything on a program for the liberation of intelligence. It need not, and must not, demand uniformity of belief. Pupils come to school with all kinds of backgrounds; it is hardly conceivable that they should all emerge with the same set of conclusions. It is not to such uniformity of conclusions, but to certain habits of thinking and feeling and acting, that democracy must look as its hope for the future.¹

He held that the democratic school could make "an honest disclaimer of any intention of predetermining the patterns"² of belief young people would achieve in an education appropriate to the democratic way of life. He equally held, however, that the democratic school should help young people achieve understanding of the values they hold simply by having been born among us, that it should help them think through the conflicts which arise when such values are compared and contrasted, and that its continuing obligation was to help the young person at each stage of his development advance his understanding of that which was distinctively democratic in the human relationship. "Unless the next generation can do a better job than we have done," he insisted, "the values of our civilization will be seriously endangered. He [the student] is entitled to have all the light that the school can furnish on underlying issues and he should have the opportunity for the exercise of enlightened and independent judgment."³

My question arises because the phrasing, *a way of life*, is used loosely. At times we refer to a belief which holds that each individual should develop his own values and learn to use them as the means of gaining meaning and purpose for his daily living. We recognize that this is an individual matter, that democracy provides each individual with this opportunity and privilege. At other times, however, what we refer to is an individual perception of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

democracy that we have staked out as a way of life into which the immature individual should be inducted. I don't believe we can have it both ways. If the latter meaning is at issue, the former meaning is denied. If we know in advance what the democratic way of life is, we are acting wastefully, if not dangerously, when we permit each individual to formulate his *Weltanschauung* independently. Moreover, if we know in advance what this way of life is, we shall have little further need for the free-ranging intelligence, the play of idea upon idea, the give and take of discussion and conference as differences are explored, or the achievement of compromises as understanding is substituted for force—all qualities which have characterized our past.

For my own part I prefer to leave the problem of a way of life in the hands of each individual, helping him, to be sure, but leaving up to him the choosing, the judging, the reflection which give him his personal character. This, I am sure, was finally Bode's position, despite an emphasis that some might misuse in their anxiety to assure democracy's survival. I believe, too, it was John Dewey's position, though the emphasis in the first sentence that follows may cast a doubt: "We have advanced far enough to say that democracy is a way of life. We have yet to realize that it is a way of personal life and one which provides a moral standard for personal conduct."¹ On the personal level we can discuss our differences. We can accommodate ourselves one to the other in terms of our dispositions and our tolerances. We can create the social instruments, as we have already done in part, to facilitate our relationships and to extend the range of our common interests and understandings. We can, in short, come at life in ways that involve each of us responsibly in determining the shape of things to come, without giving to any of us the privilege of doing the final shaping.

Democratic principles are involved, of course, in what is here suggested; and these did not come out of the blue. They have been developed over the years as men have struggled with others, and with themselves, to find and to maintain ways of living together that would make the burdens of life more tolerable. To

¹ *Freedom and Culture*, p. 130.

question the usefulness of referring to democracy as a way of life, so far as the conduct of education is concerned, is not to question the distinctiveness of democracy. Ways of life are surely involved in democracy; a way of life is not.

What we need to emphasize is the quality that pervades the human relationship because certain *principles of relationships* are at issue. Respect for the individual person; respect for ideas that individuals generate; respect for decisions taken jointly; respect for law as this is hammered out on the anvils of interpretation that respect both the individual and the need for social controls in order that individual respect may be maintained; respect for legislation that seeks to equalize opportunity both at the beginning and at the end of life—these are among the working principles of those who take democracy seriously. As principles they help men discover ways, better ways, of conducting the human relationship. They do not, being principles, underwrite what the specific ways are to be. It is the function of shared intelligence to make this discovery as we move from situation of relationship to situation of relationship. Our principles help us in our valuing; they provide us with bases of judging how better to organize our lives; they function as dynamic instruments that keep us coming at life democratically. What they add up to, indeed, is a way of coming at life. And this, as I see it, is just what democracy, over and beyond its more limited political meaning, connotes: *a way of coming at life so that each individual and each idea may have an opportunity to be heard in situations of tolerance and understanding, providing us thus with a normal means of progressively extending the base line of our common interests, the ever-present democratic concern.*

V

An education designed for democracy, then, should exemplify all of the flexibility, all of the tolerance, which democratic principles demand, if it is to be free of dogma or of routine practice. No school of thought has an inherent right to take it over. No specified body of subject matter will guarantee its success. No single methodology will of itself transform it from an authoritarian operation into a democratic one.

We argue over the wrong things. Instead of examining the consequences of our actions to see what qualities of democratic relationships they advance, and in what degree, we quarrel about the validity of the prospectus we propose. Thus, some say that all who believe in absolute standards are undemocratic, that all who believe in organized subject matter are authoritarian. Others reverse the picture, saying that those who do not believe in absolute standards are irresponsible, that those who turn to interest and need in building the curriculum are barbaric. All use labels too freely. The test lies in the consequences of the teacher-student relationship, in the meaningful quality of the learning situation which results, in the spirit that pervades the total undertaking.

I happen to believe, for instance, that men have progressively built up the principles that guide them in their behavior and that this is a never-ending process. Yet I know those who believe our directing principles to be absolute and, though they are surely wrong, they are good men. They believe that life is somehow fulfilled for them by their sense that what they take to be personally true and good has objective status in the universe at large. They believe in democracy, I discover, quite as much as I do, and their desire to achieve it for all men is no less than mine. Are we then to part company when we turn to the task of education? I don't think so. I do think we might properly part company, with the parting being initiated from either quarter, if one were to discover that the other mistreated students by denying them the right to become persons in the only way that they can, by doing their own choosing, judging, thinking.

Life would be simplified if we could tell from the reading of an individual's philosophical and pedagogical credentials what consequences would follow his entry into the classroom. But life is not this neat, and we shall have to continue to reach our judgments by evaluating the quality of the intellectual and human enterprise which results as the teaching-learning act is initiated and maintained. It is here, if any place, that we may gain evidence on which to establish preferences for curricular patterns, for methods of teaching, or for purposes. If we come at education democratically, we shall be patient with those who differ with us, more tolerant of their deviations. If we come at education democratically, we

shall share as our common holding the values and the principles by which free men may create an enriched life in which all may participate with dignity and, through education, may create future citizens who possess the techniques and the temper to carry this life forward.

We shall be educating for democracy, it seems to me, when we see, in the need to help the immature grow into the skills, the knowledge and the attitudes needed by free men, an opportunity to educate ourselves concurrently in what it means to come at life democratically. Ralph Barton Perry has said:

To live appropriately to a democratic society requires that one shall prefer this form of association to the company of the servile and obsequious. It is this interplay of freedoms—this living among the free—that creates the zest and exhilaration of democratic social relations.¹

To grow to prefer the democratic society requires that one shall have the opportunity to live within an educative experience that gains its meaning from those who do their teaching under the spur of the zest and exhilaration which they know will accompany the achievement of democratic social relations.

¹ *Realms of Value*, p. 286.

THE PROFESSORS AND THE POLITICIANS¹

By JOTHAM JOHNSON

New York University

A lot of the misunderstanding between the professors and the defenders of the republic arises out of sheer ignorance of what a professor is and what he does.

In the secondary school system it may be adequate, for the needs of the country, to teach our future scientists the multiplication table, the value of *pi* to two decimal places, and to distinguish between *stationary* and *stationery*. The college teacher conceives of his job as something quite different.

If a college education stands for anything, it means that the graduate has been taught to do his own thinking and to reject canned or predigested ideas. Our freshmen may not know who the president before Roosevelt was, but they arrive with hand-me-down prejudgments on everything under the sun, including politics, economics, segregation, the sanctity of marriage, and commissioned officers of the armed forces. The first task of the college teacher is to jolt them out of this.

Now, there is no detectable benefit in mutual applause. The student's assumption that Socialists are little if any better than Communists may be right; on the other hand, it may be wrong. In order to find out whether it is right or wrong, a convenient way of getting discussion going is to set up the proposition that Socialism is a very fine thing and it would be wonderful if the country had elected Norman Thomas president, and challenge the class to knock it down. Regardless of whether he himself votes Democratic or Republican, the teacher knows some nice things that can be said about Socialist theory. He knows that when the smoke of battle has blown away the Republicans will still be Republicans, the Democrats will still be Democrats, and the Communists will still be Communists; but he also knows that when-

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ever in the years to come they hear the term "Socialist," every student will remember that from the discussion emerged certain fundamental distinctions between Socialism and Communism.

Habits are built by repetition. If the teacher and his colleagues pull the rug often enough, they establish reflexes, so that when the student hears a controversial topic coming up he will (a) instantly identify it as controversial, (b) look for the gimmick, and (c) get into the argument as fast as he can. Four years of this makes college graduates.

There are plenty of materials for discussion, but the more feelings they hurt the longer the discussions will be remembered, and if you sit in a contemporary classroom long enough—it doesn't matter which one; these are matters which leap across departmental lines—you will hear suspiciously friendly things said about Fascism, Communism, capitalism, and atheism, sharp criticism of the legend of the Creation, and savage commentary on the workings of our courts of justice, all in order that the student's faith may rest on solid ground and not on muck.

The bloodiest row I ever witnessed was when a teacher of English called Social Security a fraud, a swindle, and a national shame, and for once found himself without a supporter in the class. They backed him right up to the wall and it was only the 10:55 bell that stilled the tumult and saved him from a knockout.

Teaching thrives on free discussion, and on this principle the colleges are turning out graduates who, among other things, can see right through politicians. It is precisely this fact, that they deliver to the community a hard core of men and women who have been permanently immunized to demagoguery, which enrages certain of the elected representatives of the people. And it is the fact that, by the nature of the case, the teachers can at one time or another be found on almost any side of almost any subject, that leads these same representatives to conclude that teachers are vulnerable and can safely and profitably be attacked.

There is no reason for the teachers to change their mode of life and there is no reason to think the politicians will, so that the conflict will have to be resolved, as usual, by public opinion. With each succeeding June the proportion of college graduates in the electorate is rising.

THE NEW CONSERVATISM

By GAYLORD C. LEROY

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It is hardly news that on the university campus a new outlook and a new tone have become well established, having taken the place of an older outlook and tone which usually went under the label simply of liberalism. The new mode, as yet without a name, is most easily defined by contrast to the liberalism it superseded. Where the liberal had confidence in the power of man, specifically of American man, to improve the human lot, his successor has discarded this optimism, and has little hope for human betterment. The liberal was a man of hearty affirmations. His successor is skeptical and negativistic; in alluding to evil, he uses a capital E, and he may often be heard saying that the source of Evil lies in "the corruption of the human heart." Where the liberal believed we were born to make the world "a better place to live in," his successor believes we were born principally, it would seem, to witness one more performance of that perennial repertory show, *The Human Tragedy*.

Among the names I have heard proposed for the new mode are the New Orthodoxy (because the theologically orthodox tenet of original sin has been brought back into fashion), the New Pessimism (because the new men are sad), the New Medievalism (because so much of modernity is repudiated in the outlook), and the New Conservatism (because the new men are mainly distinguishable by contrast with the liberals). No one of these terms is satisfactory, but until the leaders of the new mode oblige by giving a name to themselves, as Irving Babbitt did when he started an earlier fashion among American intellectuals, perhaps the most convenient thing to do is to refer to them as the new conservatives.

Meanwhile, there are on the campus a good many men who are holding out in protest. Confronted with the choice between

vigorous but naïve and now outdated liberals and a solemn but (as they see it) fundamentally irresponsible band of mourners at the deathbed of humanity, they can only say that they prefer not to associate themselves with either party. To them it is clear (as to whom is it not?) that the older liberalism set up unwarranted expectations of utopian change; but if they are unwilling to endorse the dreams of childhood, they are no less unwilling to adopt a view that often seems appropriate to nothing so much as a defeated old age.

One is sometimes inclined to suspect, in fact, that a common error may underly the old liberalism and the new conservatism, for the two outlooks seem almost equally unsatisfactory to certain representative minds of today. I wish to suggest that such a common error does exist, and that we can find it if we look away from the campus for a moment and examine shifts that have taken place in recent years in the church. For the shift from an older liberalism to a new conservatism is as much a church phenomenon as an educational one—or rather it is more so. More so, in that moral attitudes, such as are involved in a liberal or a conservative outlook constitute a central concern in the church, whereas in education they are generally subordinate to some particular body of knowledge with which the teacher is primarily concerned (though perhaps he should not be). So it is that the shift in the church took place more consciously than in education, with a greater accompaniment of analysis, commentary, and exegesis, and with bystanders more articulate in their tendency to applaud or deplore. In education, the shift has been largely silent. The new attitudes are not discussed directly, but are implied by a critic who is discussing something else—Shakespeare, or Shelley, or the fall of Napoleon. It is consequently rather difficult to analyze what has happened in the college, whereas with the parallel phenomenon in the church the cards lie face up on the table.

II

If we look at these cards, then, we see first that there is no dispute about the time of the shift in the church to the new conservatism (here called the New Orthodoxy, or Neo-Ortho-

doxy), nor is there dispute about the conditions that brought about the change. The shift took place between the two wars, and the precipitating conditions were three: the shock of World War I, the depression, and the rise of fascism. These conditions combined to compel churchmen to re-examine the established liberalism represented by such men as Walter Rauschenbusch, Shailer Mathews, and Henry Churchill King. They examined it, they came to the conclusion that it was shallow, and they thereupon began that reformulation of the foundations of faith which, under the leadership of Reinhold Niebuhr, culminated in the New Orthodoxy.

But now, since we are examining the church phenomenon, where everything is in the clear, instead of the college phenomenon, where the changes have been almost surreptitious, we are in a position to carry the investigation further. Let us see more particularly what fault the new conservatives found with the older liberalism, and then ask whether the conservatives in fact corrected the shortcomings of liberalism, or whether, instead, they simply went on to embody the same shortcomings in a new framework and with a different emotional charge.

The conservatives complained, first, because they found in liberalism a naïve and unjustified faith in the power of reason. The liberal seemed to suppose that man is rational enough so that you need only make him understand his true interests, and you can then be sure that he will take appropriate action. The conservative, alive to the irrationality manifest in the war, in the depression, in fascism, felt that this liberal faith in reason was wholly untenable. Second, the conservative charged that the liberal held an equally exaggerated belief in freedom. He seemed to think that it was with freedom as with the reason: you need only show men what would be good for them and they would find themselves free to take appropriate action. Third, the charge was made that the liberal has a faulty notion as to how a society can be made righteous. All you need to do, he seemed to think, is to increase the number of righteous individuals; and he assumed, accordingly, that if he pressed on with his mission of reforming individuals, eventually a reformed society would necessarily come into being.

Today it is plain that these charges against liberalism were in the main valid enough. Liberalism did display naïveté, it was

in error, in these basic assumptions. We hardly need anyone to point this out for us, for history has made the lesson clear. As we reflect on this and on the course that was followed by the new conservatism when it became conscious of the liberal errors, however, other things become plain too: first, that these errors of liberalism had their source in a failure to apply certain insights that have been newly developed in recent years; and second, that the conservatives in this regard have done little better than the liberals did before them.

Consider, for example, liberalism's over-estimation of the reason. Today everyone knows that man is not nearly so rational an animal as he was thought to be in the more optimistic periods of the past, but also (this is less a commonplace, but not less true for that) it is clear that the potential domain of rationality has been increased in the past half-century. As investigation moves into areas previously dark, these areas are conquered, potentially at least, for the reason. When we have learned about irrational sources of behavior, we have taken a step toward making behavior rational. In our time, however, a great deal has been learned in this area. We have a better understanding than we had before of sources of irrational behavior in the individual and also in the group. Much is known, for instance, about the psychology of war and about the psychology that supports dictatorships (Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*). Of course, knowledge is not enough; it has to be applied—and our failure to apply new insights is as manifest as our success in acquiring them. Nevertheless, the developments of our time probably offer as much support for an increased as for a decreased faith in the reason; we can say this, though it is clear that many will not agree.

III

Similarly, we know today that man is less free than he was thought to be in certain optimistic periods in the past, but at the same time we know how he can become more free than he has been. It is with freedom as with the reason: with each new stretch of our understanding of the conditions which make an individual what he is, or a society what it is, we take a step toward freedom

to make the individual and the society what we want them to be. With each advance in understanding of conditioning factors, that is, freedom increases. But this is an area, again, in which remarkable advances have been made in our time. We have, in fact, learned a great deal about the limiting, inhibiting factors which condition the behavior of the individual and the group. Having learned these things we have, potentially at least, gained the power to create areas of freedom that did not exist before.

As to the third point, we have learned, to be sure, that the liberal's way of reforming society can never succeed. You don't make a society righteous simply by reforming individuals—that has become certain. But while learning this, we have learned at the same time something about how you *can* alter society, namely, by changing the structure of economic and social relationships which determine its character. If we really want people to live less acquisitive lives, we should not think it enough to preach to them, we now know, but rather we should create social arrangements that give rise to cooperative rather than competitive acts. War does this (the fact is notorious), with the result that the battlefield creates buddies that peacetime can never match. On the home front, the scarcity of manpower in wartime creates a situation where our need for each other outweighs our drive to get the better of each other; hence the great moral well-being, and even elation, of a war situation. Clearly, what is needed, if we want a less competitive society, is (instead of exhorting people to be selfless) to find a way to make such social relationships—relationships, that is, which call upon men to benefit instead of out-strip one another—a little more normal.

All this represents a part of modern knowledge which the old liberalism failed to incorporate. But if liberalism failed to make use of these insights, what is to be said of the new conservatism? Opinions will differ about this, and there will be many to applaud, as Professor Trilling does in *The Liberal Imagination*, the "hard-headedness" and the "realism" of the new outlook, and the sense we get there of the difficulty and complexity of the modern world. Yet no one would claim, I believe, that the run-of-the-mill conservative goes any farther than his predecessors did in embodying the significant insights achieved by the modern mind. To many

it will appear, in fact, that the conservative, seeing that the liberal had an exaggerated belief in the reason, simply bounced to the opposite corner and told us that the reason is ineffectual—a conclusion popular today, it is true, but not in any better accord with the facts than the liberal's exaggerated faith. Similarly, it will seem that the conservative, becoming conscious that the liberal's belief in freedom was excessive, bounced away and concluded that man's power to shape his destiny is so slight as to be negligible—a conclusion that, once more, has no better foundation in the evidence before us than had the liberal's excessive faith. It will appear, in the same way, that when the conservative came to feel that the liberal was in error in his notions about how society could be reformed, he came to the quick conclusion that society cannot be reformed at all, and gave up trying.

As we examine what has happened in the church, then, we see that in fact there is a common error underlying the old liberalism and the new conservatism—and this error is a failure to apply what has been learned in the last half-century concerning key areas of human behavior. That this should be so is not surprising; on the contrary, it is in every way in keeping with the character of our age. This is not an age, as is so often claimed, when our understanding of man and society lags far behind technological advances. It is an age, rather, of fabulous advance both in technology and in knowledge of human behavior; what gives the age its special character, however, is that technological knowledge is applied and knowledge of human behavior is put on the shelf.

IV

I do not think there is any great difference between the shift to conservatism we have been examining in the church and the parallel transition on the campus. The older liberalism among educators was quite as naïve as the liberalism in the church, and for much the same reasons. But what are we to think of the conservatives who have taken the place of these liberals, the men who talk sadly about man's dark destiny and the corruption of the human heart? Is it not true that they are just as much out of touch with the

significant developments of our time as were their predecessors? If the liberal was in error in telling us that man had a power he lacked, the conservative is guilty of much the same error when he tells us that man lacks certain powers that he unquestionably has. What is needed is someone to tell us just where man's power lies and where it doesn't.

Perhaps this could be a function of the isolated men who have been muttering, "A plague on both your houses!" Might they not be able to discover an identity they now lack by stressing their disagreement with both the old liberals and the new conservatives together, and developing an outlook which affirms the guarded belief in reason, in freedom, in the capacity of man to change society which modern knowledge warrants?

What are the prospects for a renovated liberalism of this sort? In a society so fear-ridden that almost every advocate of reform is accused of subversion, courage would be needed. But there is no reason to think that the necessary courage would be lacking. The doubtful question is rather whether the necessary clear-sightedness can be maintained in the face of the mighty pressures of contemporary obscurantism—an obscurantism that commands the most massive mind-shaping apparatus that has ever existed and in whose service so many honorable men are enlisted.

The great attraction of a renovated liberalism, however, is that it would make possible an art of life based on the coolest estimate we can get of what the real world is like. In offering an alternative alike to the optimistic distortion of the older liberals and the pessimistic distortion of the conservatives, it would furnish one with the equipment needed for a life freed so far as possible from illusion and therefore from sentimentality—in particular, the sentimentality of men who escape the challenge to act by telling themselves that action is useless.

HOW IMPRACTICAL ARE THE HUMANITIES?

By LOUIS B. SALOMON

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While the average American undergraduate may not realize that his time and attention during his four college years have long been the disputed territory in a cold war between the three major educational powers, his teachers know it; even those who may not have taken an active part have been close enough to hear the blasts and counterblasts from spokesmen of the humanities, the natural sciences, and the social sciences.

The humanities, of course, have seen their once-mighty empire eaten away by nibbling attacks until they currently find themselves entrenched in a sort of Formosa-bastion from which they now and then issue manifestoes full of faith and determination, and from which even their supposed enemy—the awesome combine of the natural and social sciences—has so far made no serious effort to dislodge them. Why have they been left so relatively unharried? Is the enemy craftily planning new Koreas and Indo-Chinas? Is he massing his forces for a final engulfment? Or does he merely find the present position of the humanities so innocuous as to be worth no more than occasional harassment? If the defenders' heaviest artillery can fire nothing more telling than star-shells like "cultural heritage," "esthetic values," "appreciation of beauty," which sparkle against the night sky like Fourth of July rockets without setting anyone's shingles on fire, perhaps even the enemy can afford to watch and enjoy the fireworks. But when the scientists zero in on you with a salvo of "practicals," you know you've been hit.

While I, as a teacher of literature, stand committed to the Formosa-garrison of the humanities, I do not share the suspicion of some of my comrades-in-arms that the science-mainland harbors a sinister, grasping breed. If the mainland-dwellers regard us patronizingly instead of respecting us as equals, it may well be

because we answer their blockbusters with skyrocketers while our own heavy weapons rust unused in our arsenals. As for the outsider, who takes no interest in doctrinaire squabbling and demands to see "results," if all we have to show him is time-hallowed phrases, he can hardly fail to think of us as merely clinging to the shreds of our gentility instead of coming to slug it out in the forum with those who cry, "Look, folks, this culture stuff is all very well if you can afford it, but let me tell you some *facts* . . . some *useful* facts . . . some *practical* facts."

Now, aside from the fact that words like *practical*, *useful*, *factual*, lend themselves just as easily to incantatory mumbo-jumbo as do words like *cultural*, *esthetic*, and *beautiful*—just how impractical is this culture stuff, which in academic circles goes by the more genteel name of the humanities? First of all, what *are* the humanities?

II

When I use the term *humanities*, I do not automatically include all the subjects taught by departments of language, literature, philosophy, and fine arts. In so far as a student takes a course purely for his financial or social advancement (e.g., Spanish, to qualify as a commercial attaché in Bolivia; philosophy, to get a job as a philosophy teacher; classical Greek drama, for "alertness credit" or so he may flabbergast his pseudo-intellectual friends at cocktail parties), such a student is engaged in vocational training no less than if he were boning up on metallurgy or soil chemistry. Some of the departments conventionally classed among the humanities distribute booklets ("Careers for English Majors," "Jobs for Fine Arts Majors," etc.) listing business and professional openings which their students are equipped to fill. These ventures serve an undeniably useful purpose, since a bachelor of arts graduates with the same appetite for porterhouse and penthouse as a bachelor of science or of laws—but they simply do not deal with the approach to experience which I regard as the distinguishing characteristic of the humanities.

It is a question not of subject-matter alone but of an attitude toward subject-matter. Any subject-matter, however frivolous

or non-utilitarian it may seem (e.g., antique-collecting), may conceivably be put to use as the basis for a thriving business, if only through snob-appeal; and the most obviously practical skills of one time or place (say, papyrus-manufacture or falcon-breeding) may become the mere leisure hobby or museum curiosity of another society. I know at least one teacher of mathematics who insists that math should be classed as one of the humanities—surely not because it helps an engineer to figure how much concrete he needs for a bridge pier or an actuary to calculate an insurance premium. And one of the most eminent chemists of our time, Dr. James B. Conant, writes of science in terms that might well embarrass the defenders of the “practical”:

To my mind, the significance of the fabric of scientific theories that have been produced in the last three hundred and fifty years is the same as the significance of the art of the great periods in history, or the significance of the works of the musical composers. For most scientists, I think the justification of their work is to be found in the pure joy of its creativeness; the spirit which moves them is closely akin to the imaginative vision which inspires an artist.

III

By what sign, then, do you distinguish the humanities, if not from the kind of science Dr. Conant describes, at least from the kind most people have in mind when they say that we must train more scientists if we want to keep up with the Russians?

Basically, it is the difference between a parable and a case-history. In preparing a case-history, you look for every single fact you can discover about Mr. A——: when and where he was born, what he ate when he was a child, what he refused to eat, what his father did to him for refusing to eat it, etc.—just as a chemist notes every phenomenon that occurs in the course of a laboratory experiment, because any scrap of information, no matter how irrelevant it may seem at the moment, may, in conjunction with other data, not yet observed or not previously considered important, close a circuit which will throw a brilliant light on the whole subject under investigation. The more facts the psychiatrist or chemist

observes about his topic, the better he is qualified to build a reliable hypothesis explaining what goes on in patient or test-tube. This is science. Its business is to reduce experience as far as possible to finite quantities, which can be assessed by finite understandings, so that men and women may make plans—whether for a picnic or for a space-ship, for wangling a marriage proposal or a presidential nomination—with the greatest probability of success. For this business it is the best method yet contrived or likely ever to be contrived.

The case-history, however, can never be complete; no matter how many facts you have recorded, there will always be some, minute or otherwise, which have escaped detection—hence, any hypothesis about what makes Mr. A—— want to kill his grandmother is perpetually subject to revision or discard on the basis of new evidence or new tools for evaluating the old evidence. The Piltdown Man, the unsplitable atom, phlogiston, the “possession” theory of lunacy—the discredit that has befallen these and countless other once-proved truths testifies to the readiness of science to divest itself of intellectual garments as soon as they begin to look shabby. It was only with the development of that readiness that modern science began.

The humanities, on the other hand, speak characteristically in parables. The artist, unless he subscribes to the pursuit of an illusory “naturalism” (in other words, misguidedly tries to make himself a scientist), approaches his subject qualitatively rather than quantitatively. What he perceives to be the truth of his subject may seem midsummer madness to many others, but one’s impression of its truth or falseness bears no relation to the size of the subject or to the amount of time the artist has spent gathering data. It is unlikely that Rembrandt compiled an exhaustive dossier on a grizzled old man before painting his portrait, inconceivable that the painting would have seemed truer if he had. Imagine Shakespeare doing “research” on Hamlet, or any reader of *Hamlet* feeling the reality of the play suddenly shot to pieces if he should discover, say, that the Danish prince really had spent his freshman and sophomore years at Jena rather than at Wittenberg!

This has nothing to do with the "sublimity" of Shakespeare or Rembrandt *versus* the earthbound achievements of Edison or Pasteur, nor with daring anyone to think *Hamlet* a crashing bore and *The Night Watch* an unfortunate waste of good tent-material. I merely want to indicate a difference in kind, not in value, between the two methods. Mark Antony used the humanistic approach when he remarked of Brutus that the elements were "So mixed in him that Nature might stand up/And say to all the world, 'This was a man'"; the aim of the scientific approach would be to so disentangle those elements that they might be listed as: patriotism 32%, self-sacrifice 19%, antagonism to authority 28%, etc.

Now, a popular syllogism seems to run like this: since the two methods are very different, and the scientific method is unmistakably practical, the humanities must be impractical. Which is as much as to say: hammers and saws are very different; hammers are practical; therefore saws are impractical. Science and the humanities are also tools, devices to help mankind come to grips with the "facts" of life. But there is more than one order of facts (the facts of modern relativistic science, indeed, appear to the layman more topsy-turvy than those of *The Arabian Nights*); and just as there are more ways to kill a cat than stuffing it with cream, and more ways to roast a pig than burning down a house, so there are more ways for a man or woman to be a useful, happy citizen than operating a lathe or a public opinion poll, than running a bank or a gin-mill, than splitting atoms or common stocks. The humanities offer their way, just as the sciences offer theirs.

IV

Let us take a look at some of those ways.

First, the humanities and their discipline are vital to the defense of science itself: *i.e.*, to the liberty of scientists to continue their pursuit of truth. From what quarters have the efforts to muzzle scientists always come? Not from the humanists—secure in their conviction that no matter how carefully you measure the finite parts of reality the sum will never add up to 100%, they never fear that science will undermine the foundations of

order and belief. Rather it has been from the supporters of a logical, codified set of doctrines that assigned everything, including God, its place in a system as definitive as the periodic table of elements. The quarrel of the church with Galileo, like the antagonism of totalitarian governments to free scientific speculation, was really a jurisdictional dispute: a union which had staked out its claim to sole possession of *the* answers to all questions saw its franchise threatened by anyone who suggested that even one of those answers might be wrong. Those who have followed the discipline of the humanities feel no such threat to their security; they know that whether the earth moves around the sun or the sun moves around the earth or both scramble about like a pair of mad jitterbugs in a crowded ballroom, there will always be questions which the mere observation of bodies in motion will never resolve. In so far as Galileo's view of terrestrial motion enables anyone to make life more comfortable, they will applaud it, just as they will applaud his law of the pendulum—yes, and take up a collection to buy him better lenses for his telescope and a more reliable chronometer than his pulse-beat. They are too keenly aware of the fallibility of all rational judgments to feel alarmed because one more time-honored doctrine goes out of fashion.

Less dangerous to science than the threat of interference from its enemies, but, I should think, equally embarrassing, must be the sort of adulation it receives from a public that has not only placed it on a pedestal but firmly chained it there. Clad, however unwillingly, in the Nessus-shirt of omniscience, the "expert" cannot step down if he wants to; the public will impute his disclaimers not to modesty but to mere churlishness. It is the average layman, not the scientist, who ascribes witch-doctor powers to the man with the microscope or the electronic control-panel or even just the blackboard covered with eerie equations. It is the layman who has made the words "Science says . . ." the most potent ritual incantation of our time. Though he has watched theory after theory thrown into the discard, he never loses his childlike faith that *this* time science has settled the question once and for all.

As time goes by, in fact, your science-fan behaves more and more like a yokel eagerly shelling out his money for nostrums at

a country fair. He takes his ulcer or his broken shin to the physician as trustingly as he takes his auto to the mechanic or his TV set to the repairman, his melancholy to the psychiatrist, his theological qualms to the pastor, his domestic squabbles to the marriage counselor, his employment difficulties to the personnel man, his educational frustrations to the education expert, or his quest for total security to the chairman of the appropriate Congressional committee. Saying: find the loose connection; devise the perfect curriculum; prescribe the miracle drug; rearrange our sex-life; set up the fool-proof security test—just don't ask us to do any thinking, and be sure the answer is **RIGHT**.

He is indeed like Tennyson's infant crying for the light, and with no language but a cry. But how many scientists take the trouble to tell the infant bluntly: "If you're after a sure thing, you may cry your little eyes out; the light is as far away as ever"? Meanwhile, you can learn the same bitter but necessary lesson simply by reading the stories of people who consulted the oracles of the gods—people who also wanted the sure thing, the error-free answer, to help them achieve their desire; but whether the answer came in such cryptic terms that human intelligence could not rightly interpret it, or whether it foretold a clear and explicit doom, it afforded mortals no vantage-grip on their own destiny, no way to beat the game.

If conscientious scientists sometimes find it embarrassing to be regarded as oracles even in their specialties, how much more annoying must they find an attitude that so often runs perversely concomitant with this: namely, the view that the specialist, though infallible in his own field, has no competence whatever in any other. I, for one, were I a brilliant theoretical physicist, for instance, would find it quite humiliating to be told that I had no right to expect my views on politics, ethics, or religion even to be taken seriously in grown-up company. But I don't know where I'd go for comfort or support if not to literature. I can't think of a single "great book" that pictures a man of dazzling brilliance in one field as being a dolt in every other respect. Yet from earliest times myth-makers have recognized that the populace would so regard the expert: even as the strong-armed Trojans hauled the wooden horse through their

streets, their companions were telling Cassandra to go back to her knitting.

Study of myth and literature, indeed, has often furnished scientists with useful instruments for tackling their own problems. Freud could presumably have isolated psychic complexes without the help of Ovid and Homer, but his choice of labels suggests his acknowledgment that the stories of Oedipus, Electra, and Narcissus carry the same significance as *The Interpretation of Dreams* and are a good deal more readable. Dr. Frederic Wertham based one of his most fascinating case-studies on the *Hamlet* story. Anthropologists find in a people's fables a far more quintessential clue to its values, taboos, and ideals than can be sifted out of its kitchen-middens or codes of law.

V

You don't have to be a scientist, however, to profit from the aid afforded by the materials of the humanities. In the long run, practical success or failure reflects the extent of your understanding of your fellow-man; hence, your ability to face his whims and vagaries without surprise, and perhaps even to anticipate them more often than not. The contributions of science to this end need no advertising—but it would be a sad waste of available materials if we overlooked the wealth of insights furnished by literature and the arts to whoever examines them as closely as he would have to examine, say, Newton's *Principia*. Thus, if you want to study man as a political animal, you can learn as much from *Coriolanus* or *Civil Disobedience* as from a political science textbook; if you want to become a successful diplomat you can learn as much about a country's mores (and hence, how to avoid giving or taking unintended offense) by studying its truly popular literature than by memorizing its import-export balance sheets for the past half-century; if you want to see the disturbed personality in action you can learn as much from *King Lear* or *Crime and Punishment* as from a volume of case-histories; if you want to discover whether men have courage you can find the answer in the stories of Beowulf or Protesilaus as well as from a statistical summary of casualties and decorations in World War II.

If you want a quick glimpse of the problems brought on by old age you can find it in the myth of Tithonus or of the Cumaean Sibyl, or in Swift's picture of the Struldbrugs, as well as in the almost brand-new science of geriatrics. If you want to scare yourself into fits over the prospect of a totalitarian society you can get as good results from a reading of *1984* as of the latest correspondent's book about Russia; and if you want to comfort yourself with a reminder of man's indomitable urge to assert himself as an individual you will find more encouragement in *Walden* than in the C.I.A. estimate of the strength of the underground behind the Iron Curtain.

Actually, most people use and respect the humanistic approach in practical affairs a good deal more than they realize. What, for instance, do we mean when we call a man "a good judge of character"? Not, obviously, one who declines to form any judgment about a stranger until he has amassed and digested a "file" on him, and then limits his estimate to what the facts in that file prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the method of caution, of distrust—in a word, the method of science—but, while it has its advantages, it will hardly avail a juror confronted with two or more witnesses telling conflicting stories. Rather, we think of a person who may base his judgment of another on a single interview, perhaps a single act, a single gesture—and yet turn out to be right at least as consistently as any scientific character-evaluation would be.

Scientists show a sorry inconsistency when they reproach the Federal security system for using methods which it has learned (however clumsily) from them. Scientific character-analysis measures and dissects what I did yesterday, and the day before, and all my yesterdays, then tickets me, say, as one who can be trusted with "secret" secrets but not with "top-secret" secrets; thus it acts to bar me from making whatever contribution I might possibly make if I had access to all information, and still does not cushion the general dismay when I am discovered to have sold an enemy the information—still pretty valuable—that I do have. The "good judge of character" forms a total judgment of me as a trustworthy person or an untrustworthy one; he may be mistaken, but if right he stands to win bigger rewards, and if

wrong will he be any wronger than the screening-system which gave clearance to Klaus Fuchs?

I don't mean that such character-divination occurs only in people who have read a lot of great books or heard a lot of great symphonies. It would be a denial of the very spirit of the humanities to assume that compulsory exposure to great works of art and philosophy will automatically produce a humane spirit in the people so exposed. You can no more guarantee to make people humane by giving humanities courses than you can guarantee to make them reverent by building churches. A student might quite possibly come away from *Don Quixote* with nothing but a feeling of pity that the old man lived too early to be straightened out by a psychiatric clinic; his reaction to the Bovary household might be that they demonstrate the need for competent marriage-counseling; he might shake his head over the tragedy of Sohrab and Rustum and point out that if they had carried identity cards the unfortunate duel might have been averted; or he may find in *Moby Dick* only a reason to congratulate himself that he lives in the day of radar navigation and electric harpoons. In such a case, to debate whether he should take three, six, or sixteen hours of humanities courses is about as meaningful as to debate whether to shoot him with a Colt or a Smith and Wesson.

I do mean that the spirit (not the mere letter) of the great books and symphonies constitutes a decidedly usable approach to experience: a compound of humility and boldness, an acceptance of the fact that absolute certainty can never be reached, together with a confidence that the sort of certainty which the human mind can attain through non-logical processes has a pragmatic value of its own. This, it seems to me, is the spirit that imbues all classical tragedy, and leads to that catharsis, that "calm of mind, all passion spent," which Americans pay their psychiatrists so many millions of dollars a year to induce. If this should mean that you can make as deep a dent in your Oedipus complex by an attentive, sympathetic study of *Oedipus Rex* as by spending the same amount of time on an analyst's couch (I suggest it only as a possibility), then surely no one would question the practicality of a good dose of Sophocles.

If furthermore it is true, as alleged, that aggression by in-

dividuals or by nations results largely from human beings' inner tensions and inhibitions, then perhaps the very survival of the species depends on an ever-widening submission to the discipline of the humanities. In these days when every newspaper blazons tidings of a heavier doom than ever Cassandra dreamed of, I do not recall having seen a single allegation that our present danger may be due to a poet, a painter, a philosopher, or a musician. If, on the other hand, we hear very few voices calling on the poets, painters, philosophers, and musicians to avert catastrophe, this does not necessarily mean that they are incapable of doing so. I believe they have an antitoxin which at best can save the human race from self-destruction, and at worst can help it meet its end not with a whimper but a bang; but their remedy, like any other, can function only if the patient uses it. Smallpox vaccination itself was once regarded as impractical, even by some scientists. Cotton Mather (not a scientist), for advocating it, had a bomb thrown through his window.

VI

Whether science is more practical than humanities or vice versa depends pretty much on what you're after—and on what you mean by science. In its brash youth, a century or more ago (though the great myths of *hybris* and its downfall—Lucifer, Adam and Eve, Prometheus, Faustus, the tower of Babel, etc.—were available then to scientist and humanist alike), ultimate comprehension through observation and logic seemed possible. Today, when scientists look beyond their test-tubes, their microscopes, even their cyclotrons, and attempt to construct an epistemology, a philosophical tool for grasping not the atom or the avalanche but the whole nature of reality, they are apt to be found in attitudes of humility which stem directly from the startling advances in scientific thought of the past few decades. Modern scientific philosophy, as in these words of physicist P. W. Bridgman, winner of a Nobel Prize, sounds remarkably like mysticism:

The structure of nature may eventually be such that our processes of thought do not correspond to it sufficiently to permit us

to think about it all We are now^{*} approaching a bound beyond which we are forever estopped from pushing our inquiries, not by the construction of the world, but by the construction of ourselves.

In other words, science, a Johnny-come-lately, has finally arrived where the humanities have been all along.

¶ This unanimity of viewpoint, however, is to be found only at the top level of scientific theorizing, where, except for differences in vocabulary, it makes little difference whether a student reads Emerson or Einstein. As you go down from there, the road forks, and the farther you get from the top the more vital it becomes to choose your guide according to where you want to go. If you want to make synthetic diamonds or pulverize a city, look for the man in the technician's apron, not the one in the artist's smock. If you want to find out where to go from there, don't stir without at least hearing what the other fellow has to say.

Very recently I read a jocular but startling boast by the scientist in charge of General Electric's successful experiment in making synthetic diamonds (based in large measure, incidentally, on Professor Bridgman's studies). Explaining that his laboratory helpers are now able to reproduce the conditions of heat and pressure that would be found at greater and greater depths within the earth's torrid core, he proudly announced their goal: "To hell by 1956."

I, for one, have confidence in these fellows, and I would be the last one in the world to bet that they will not make it. But, if Dante doesn't happen to be around when they arrive, who will show them the way back?

MYTHICAL POTPOURRI

By THOMAS CUTT

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The professor had reached the point of frustration; after weeks of study, the evidence just *wouldn't* jell. And after all, he reflected, with the world soon to be blown to bits with atomic bombs, what difference did it make whether Prometheus was "essentially a culture hero" or "a primitive *numen* of fire?" Who cared whether his name was cognate with Greek "forethought" or Sanskrit "fire-stick?" Comparative mythology be damned! The professor would join his wife in the living room and watch TV. Half tempted, he rose from his chair, but conscience stricken, sat down again, lit a cigarette, gazed off into space and blew a great billow of smoke across his study toward the easy chair opposite his desk. The smoke swirled in fascinating eddies round the lamp above the chair.

Another deep draw, another impatient puff, more eddies of smoke, which, as if controlled by some mysterious fate, slowly but inevitably took on a familiar form. The professor blinked his eyes. Sure enough, in the easy chair sat a man quite nonchalantly naked, except, of course, for the usual fig leaf. There were deep, dark scars on his flanks, his wrists and ankles, and a large, round, livid spot on his chest like a monstrous birthmark. Despite these ghastly disfigurements, there was something heroic about him. His head was nobly poised; his jaw was firm, but his mouth had a friendly twist, and his eyes were those of one who has patiently endured eternal misunderstanding.

II

Naturally, the professor felt perfectly at ease with him. "Ah," said he, "Prometheus! You're the very man I needed."

"Kinda had a hunch you did," said Prometheus, as he tried to make his large limbs comfortable in a mere mortal's chair.

"Tell me," said the professor abruptly, "were you ever a fire-stick?"

Prometheus' eyes clouded. "Sorry," he said, "I can't answer that question without legal counsel. I must appeal to the Fifth Amendment."

"Now my dear fellow," said the professor, with a sly glance, "you wouldn't risk being called a Fifth Amendment Fire-stick, would you?"

"Must take the chance," said Prometheus firmly.

"Oh, come now," said the professor, "you must help me out. If you would just give me the dope, I could write an astonishing article. There'd really be a furor. The Dean would start calling me by my first name, and I'd be sure of a promotion. You really can't refuse."

"Sorry, old man," said Prometheus, "that fire-stick stuff was all water over the dam ages ago, but who knows what's to be next on the Attorney General's 'little list'? What's to prevent its being Primitive Society?"

"Never thought of that," admitted the professor reluctantly, "and your record *is* a bit spotty. Homer, who is usually ready to talk at the drop of a hat, wouldn't even take the risk of mentioning your name, though he does record how your father was punished, obviously for some sort of subversive activity. And Hesiod gave you a very bad character. According to him, you can be a regular Matusow, the way you tricked Father Zeus about the sacrifices. Can't say I much blame him for being so mad. But why did he have to vent his wrath on innocent man, who just happened to profit from your trickery?"

"Oh, that's just 'His' way," said Prometheus wearily. "You get used to it. Some fine day you learn that the Powers-That-Be always find some screwball way of covering up the fact that they have been mistaken—or hoodwinked. But Hesiod was too dull to understand that, and in any case, he didn't know the whole story."

"Well, did Aeschylus?" asked the professor, trying not to betray his obvious self-interest. "If we just had the two lost plays of his trilogy—how they got removed from the files is a mystery to me—but if we just had them, they would clear up a lot of questions."

Even if they proved you to be a culture hero, I could take it, though I am very much enamored of the fire-stick theory."

"Culture hero, fire-sticks—fiddle-sticks!" said Prometheus contemptuously. "What's fire-sticks to Aeschylus or he to fire-sticks? He never heard of anthropology, and he wasn't a Boy Scout either. He had me approximately right, though. But people didn't understand too well even when they had the whole trilogy. The many, as Plato loved to call them, are not even yet ready to take to their hearts a god whose mercy and justice are infinitely greater than their own, nor can they abide any of their fellow men who achieve an exalted or liberal view of things. To them the Liberal looks like a namby-pamby because he does not beat the drums and proclaim himself infallible. He appears to be incapable of practical decisions because he spends so much time listening to all sides of a question, and since he never seems to be totally in agreement with anyone, he is regarded as a potential fellow traveler along every primrose path, blown about by all the winds of doctrine and therefore likely to be blown in 'the' wrong direction. *Hoi polloi* insist that the Liberal must be immoral, because who ever heard of a man who, on principle, refuses to accept the obvious absolutes and, when he does venture an opinion, actually insists upon constant re-examination of his own premises? Liberals are therefore a very important political commodity, for when the going gets tough, your great and powerful Zeuses, to satisfy the populace, have only to look about for a few good Liberal scapegoats. Take it from me—I know!"

"But, but," stammered the professor, "you can't afford to be too liberal nowadays, and if you really are, you'd better find a different name for it; *tempora mutantur*, you know"; and then added, apologetically, "Hope a little barbarian Latin doesn't offend your sensitive Greek ears."

"Greek?" queried Prometheus. "Who said I was Greek?"

"Then you are Sanskrit, after all," exclaimed the professor triumphantly, pleased as Punch at the success of his little stratagem, "and your name does mean 'fire-stick'."

"Have it your own way," conceded Prometheus. "It really doesn't matter. You can't prove much by mere etymology, and you know very well that derivations have frequently led even

the wisest men astray. It is an egregious error to let words do your thinking for you. Take the name of your friend Zeus, for example. There can be no shadow of etymological doubt whatever that he is named for the bright sky, the very light of heaven; and thereby hangs a tale of reputed respectability, despite the most scandalous behavior, for the frank, open light of heaven can do no wrong, and if it does, it needs must be considered right. But the fact is that in good, plain American English his name means 'the Boss'."

The professor gasped, but Prometheus took no notice. He went on bemusedly: "Now, if I'd been allowed to choose a name for myself, I'd have chosen to be known as the Liberal. This name would have been more suggestive of the long agony I have suffered—centuries of it—more consistent, too, with all my efforts to emancipate man. The Liberal, you see, is the only one for whom freedom is absolutely a matter of life and death."

"You're getting a bit mock-heroic, aren't you?" said the professor. "You mean there are no others who are concerned for freedom?"

"Some are," said Prometheus, "but only in a fragmentary sort of way. They think of freedom in economic, political, or social terms only; beyond that they fear the shadow of Zeus. And to 'defend' this limited area of freedom, they would deprive other men of the freedom of criticism. They fail to understand that every freedom man has ever gained, even the fragmentary sort in their own minds, has come through those who have declared their intellectual independence and have claimed the right to re-examine even the sacrosanct. But these rebels have always had to reckon with the old adversary, Zeus, who is a past master in the art of playing on the fear of intellectual freedom. Through the ages he has assumed an astonishing number of different authoritarian forms. He knows very well that it doesn't much matter which form he takes because, to date, there has always been a large number of men who are ready to be told what to do and what to think. They always follow him, and once they are accustomed to following him in one form, they find it very easy to shift their allegiance to another as soon as it appears advisable to do so. At the moment, he has adopted the strategy of appearing in several

very different forms at the same time. Very clever, but it betrays his own desperation. Many men were just about to see through his former trickery, but this new device of multiple disguises has got even them so confused and distressed that, along with *hoi polloi*, they again feel the need of his paternal guidance."

"Then things are in a pretty bad way," said the professor.

"Not so bad as appears," said Prometheus, "for when I created man—incidentally, Zeus hasn't the faintest inkling of this—when I created man, I implanted in him a strain of freedom-loving genes. It will take a long time, but it is a dominant strain, and eventually it will become stronger. Right now, if you observe closely, you will see that there still are those who oppose Zeus in all his forms. They have to and they know it. If he were to win out, they would be annihilated. It is a matter of life and death with them, for they can never come to terms with Zeus; their very nature won't let them. If you don't want to call them Liberals, I don't much care, but to borrow your phrase, professor, I am rather enamored of the word."

"Then Shelley—bless his intuitive, Neoplatonic heart," said the professor, "Shelley had got you just about right, wouldn't you say?" Prometheus did not say; so the professor went on. "Only he went so far as to destroy Zeus completely—rather rough treatment for an Olympian, don't you think?"

"Now *you* are the one who's being too Liberal," said Prometheus. "What else can you do with Zeus if men are to be free?"

"Well, it's a little hard to say," said the professor. "Of course, Shelley had all the enthusiasm of the Enlightenment to inspire him, and one must admit there's a certain grim logic to it; given his premises, I suppose Zeus had to go. But this is the twentieth century, and we are not quite so sure of ourselves. After all, even in science, the ideal of objectivity, which was drilled into me in college, is now so engulfed in mathematical abstractions that it is virtually a myth."

"Ouch!" exclaimed Prometheus, as if an eagle had pecked at his liver. "Don't use that word! It is even more abused than the word Liberal. As for Shelley, I'll have you know that he knew full well the limits of scientific objectivity. Poor fellow, how the true believers roasted him! Well, it was to be expected. They

are all of them bar sinister descendants of Zeus, an ill-advised experiment in odd combinations of genes." Prometheus sighed ruefully and continued: "But they have done Shelley no permanent harm. He was just a thousand years ahead of the times. Some day people will catch up with him. I'll see to that myself—just wait and see. It will be a sad day for Zeus and all his descendants, bar sinister and vice versa!"

III

The professor thought it wise to change the topic of conversation. "Good!" said he, "and since the frenzy of prophecy has come upon you, I wish you'd tell me a few other things about the future. Shall we have a tax cut soon? What of the international situation and the Big Three? What of Academic Freedom—and oh, yes, General Education?"

"General who?" asked Prometheus.

"General Education," the professor repeated.

"Oh, that guy," said Prometheus, "son of Progressive, if I am not mistaken. It's axiomatic with me that it is better for military men to keep out of civilian affairs. This general will stand watching. He has the neat, organizational cast of mind that results in military genius. Honest enough. Means well. But he tends to think of students like soldiers, in statistical terms, and of college courses as integrated around a corps—I mean "core"—corpse might be still better—with a sort of General Headquarters, whose policies of interpretation will be followed perforce through the whole organization in order to be 'meaningful in concept, sociologicalwise and psychologicalwise'."

"Hold on," said the professor, "you are becoming even less intelligible than the Delphic oracle. Please be a bit more specific."

"Well," said Prometheus, "for example, take the teaching of science. It is certainly true that for non-professional purposes, a student gets more out of the implications of science than the technicalities. Just note the innocent, little definite article preceding the word implications; it may easily lead to the assumption that said implications can be definitely and even completely known.

This suggests a few questions. Which implications? What sort of implications—social, ethical, moral, philosophical, or what? How is a student to judge the validity of the implications if he does not have a reasonable competency in the technicalities? Can these two things be completely divorced? And who is to choose which implications shall be discussed and which shall receive the greater emphasis? General Education? What are his qualifications in these matters? I hate to say so, but one might infer that this military gentleman is distantly related to Zeus."

"Then he will come to a bad end?" queried the professor, with just a tinge of eagerness in his voice.

"Not necessarily," replied Prometheus. "If he marries the right woman, all may yet be well." He paused, and over his face crept a smile like the smile of the Mona Lisa.

"As for your other questions," Prometheus continued, "let's see. Oh yes, Academic Freedom. Well, that's up to you and your colleagues. You will have to continue the fight for it. The going may be pretty tough at times, but be not weary in well doing, for as in the past, so in the future, you should be able to face Zeus, whatever form he may take. Of course he will bluster like all get out, but you really have the trumps—just see to it that you play 'em right. And if you do lose, just remember that the universities and colleges have no corner on intellectual activity; Socrates, Copernicus, Leonardo da Vinci can scarcely be regarded as having had 'regular status.' Thus you may be sure that the essential thing that Academic Freedom seeks to protect will live, regardless of the fate of 'the profession,' for it is a part of the genius of man, and despite all the evidence that may be adduced to the contrary, history shows that the questing of the human spirit is irrepressible. Zeus in all the forms he has ever taken has never been able to do more than scotch it for the nonce."

"But," said the professor, "all that sounds rather remote and irrelevant, when you are facing an urgent crisis."

"You humans!" exclaimed Prometheus. "Do you ever look beyond the end of your noses? The long view of this, if you could see it with my eyes, would give you faith in your cause, and faith is what you most need, in facing a crisis. Of course, if you are motivated merely by a desire to hold your jobs—"

"How dare you, sir?" demanded the professor, glaring at Prometheus.

"I beg your pardon, honestly I do," said Prometheus contritely. "I should have stated the case in more general terms. I merely intended to point out how desperate, panicky, and ineffective men become when they are motivated only by mundane things."

"Very true," said the professor in a mollified tone of voice, "and speaking of mundane things, what of the Big Three?"

"The Big 3 = 3 Zeuses = 3 deuces," said Prometheus with delightful, algebraic subtlety, "and what a hand!"

This cryptic syllogism pleased the professor. He felt that it presented a distinct challenge, but had no doubt that the solution of it would dawn on him presently. Since he was loath to reveal how rusty his math had become, he refrained from comment and reminded Prometheus of the tax cut.

"Oh that," said Prometheus laughing, "that's easy. Of course, the Democrats will use it as an 'issue,' which being interpreted means 'bait,' and when elected, they may even keep their word. But they'll make up for it by extending Social Security to everyone, increasing the dues, and using the money for current expenses. You can't win on that score, old man."

The professor was a bit crestfallen. "There are times," he said, "when you are not very serious, Prometheus."

"I am not an Olympian," was the rejoinder, "and I find it difficult to be serious about trivial matters."

"Well," said the professor, "what about the atomic bomb? That's serious, isn't it? And the hydrogen bomb! It's simply terrifying. I find it rather hard to concentrate. I really don't much blame students who are indifferent. How can they know they'll ever live to profit by an education? It creates a bit of a mental hazard, don't you think? And the cobalt bomb—they tell me the poison from it would last a thousand years."

"What's a thousand years?" asked Prometheus with an air of perfect innocence.

"Of course, for an immortal," the professor replied, a little condescendingly, "it must be very difficult to conceive of time. But please do try."

IV

The professor was obviously very much in earnest. The pathetic time-limited, human appeal did not fail to have its effect on Prometheus. It awoke the myriad echoes in the caverns of his mind. Had he not been the champion of man these thousand thousand years? Had he not been the giver of all good gifts to man? Had he not suffered the agony of Caucasus for man? His face became very serious, the tone of his voice very kind, as he answered the professor: "Yes, my friend," said he, "it is very natural for you to be appalled. Atomic fission, my latest gift to man, is somewhat premature. It's my fault. I should never have entrusted it even for a moment to my brother Epimetheus—he's such a scatterbrain and his wife Pandora is incurably curious. The package was clearly marked 'Not to be opened till Wisdom-Day,' but they just couldn't wait. And Zeus—well, you know how he always tries to profit by a situation of this sort. But let not your heart be troubled. When I gave fire to man, Zeus would have kept it for himself. He argued that man was too stupid to use fire without getting burnt. It was he who was stupid, for he did not realize that along with fire I gave man the power to use it to his advantage. With this he has developed a thousand useful arts. When I gave him writing, Zeus, through those minions of his, the ancient priests and tycoons of finance, withheld it for a long time from common use, on the ground that 'twere well for ordinary men not to be corrupted from their noble, pristine simplicity. But eventually I broke their strangle hold on writing; consider how it has benefited man in literature, in philosophy, in science. Ah, science! There again they tried the same trick, but they failed. The Renaissance—'twas all my doing. The—but there is no need to rehearse the whole long story of my benefactions to man. In every case, despite Zeus and all his satellites, they have turned out well. The bombs?"

He paused, and his eyes for a moment looked far away, then focused and held the professor's glance steadily, as he went on: "Man has only to continue to have faith in me, that is, in himself, for I am the Spirit of Man."

With these words, the figure of Prometheus quickly faded away,

leaving only the large livid spot on his chest, which now appeared like the great, round eye of Polyphemus. But it did not seem to the professor especially weird or repulsive, for lo! there was a real twinkle in it. Finally it winked and disappeared.

The professor, quite unaccountably, reached for a volume of Sophocles and began to read his favorite chorus:

"Many the wonders of the world,
And none so wonderful as Man"

THE MAKING OF A RADICAL

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The term "radical" is one of many meanings. Its first recorded use in English was in 1797, by Charles James Fox, who promoted a "radical reform" in government which was instrumental in securing the franchise for the working classes and removing corruption from the government of the urban areas. Since that time the term has been popular with the layman, but has been used for so many different aspects of human activity that it has lost its usefulness to the social scientist. In his effort to explain rather than merely to describe, the psychologist has been forced to adopt "cultural deviate" as a cumbersome substitute.

This term bears no implication of goodness or badness, but emphasizes the fact that the important thing about the radical is that he is off-center, and different from the average or typical, to a significant degree. But the conservative also deviates from what is typical in the culture, and differs from the radical primarily in the direction of his deviation. The emphasis on the essential similarity of the two groups causes difficulty for the layman, but it has been of great value in searching for the forces that drive a person to depart from the customary goals of the culture that has nurtured him. Whether the deviation is to the "left" or "right" is of primary significance to the political scientist, but of secondary significance to the social psychologist. The layman is also likely to consider a deviation as good or bad, but the social scientist must be content to search for causes and measure the extent of the deviation. Our contemporary culture is so imbued with this tendency to judge the goodness or badness of an attitude that the conservative is thought of with pride as the offspring of the *milieu* in which he was born and nurtured, while the radical is denied this courtesy. The fact of importance is, however, that

they are both equally the products of their social environment and that they deviate from the expected norm.

The making of the radical has long been the subject of enquiry by psychologists and sociologists, but the results of these researches have been ignored in the present turmoil. The spotlight of condemnation that is now turned on the radical is so intense that it blinds one to his background and origins. A true evaluation of his nature and origins requires an objective approach.

II

Deviates are found in every culture, whether literate or pre-literate, and anthropologists, who try to approach other cultures with few, if any, value judgments have been of considerable aid in removing value judgments and clarifying the nature of the radical in our own. Political scientists have also helped by pointing out that, in the literate groups, the radical differs according to the prevailing social philosophy. They have pointed out, for example, that with the emphasis on freedom of thought as a fundamental tenet of British democracy, it is difficult to conceive of anyone's being prosecuted for radical opinions. In the American pattern of democracy, freedom of opportunity holds the predominant place. As a result, the industrial deviate becomes a hero, but the political, social, and religious deviate becomes suspect.

The person who deviates in some area of minor social consequence, such as dress, food, or interpersonal relations, may merely be regarded as "queer" or "Bohemian" rather than radical. Disapproval is implied in these epithets, but it is mild and secondary. When a comparable degree of deviation occurs in the political, social, economic, or religious areas, the term "radical" is used, and serves as an expression of strong disapproval and condemnation on the part of the majority. During periods of national stress and indecision, this overshadows all other considerations. The reformer, on the other hand, may be tolerated if he restricts his approach to a single phase of human activity, while maintaining a middle-of-the-road or conservative attitude in other respects.

The legal stipulation that the background and motivation of an act are relevant to the adjudication of an offense is often ignored in

the intensity of the negative reaction to the radical. It is here that the work of the social psychologist can be of value.

It is frequently assumed, for example, that radicalism is, so to speak, a "disease" of adolescence and young adulthood. There is much friction between the older and younger generation, and the mature person looks hopefully to a little more experience of life as the remedy. Research has confirmed neither the fact nor the hope. There is only a slight connection between age and such radicalism as is shown by membership in leftist groups and similar activities. Research has repeatedly shown this to be true. The slight relationship that exists occurs as an increase in radical tendencies in the mature and upper age ranges.

Furthermore, the history of western culture shows that radical movements have been instigated by the young and the mature alike. The average age of those who were active in promoting the Russian Revolution was twenty-two, while the average age of the membership of the clubs that touched off the French Revolution was forty-two. In England, Cromwell was forty-three before his political radicalism became effective. Radicalism bears no close relationship to age.

The seeming upsurge of radicalism during adolescence can be explained in a much simpler way. In Western culture the degree of parental control over the child is very great. As a result, the adolescent feels the need to free himself from these restraints and "apron strings." In this emancipation from the home, there occurs a period of negativism and awkwardness in his relationship to his parents. The adolescent transfers his loyalties to his own age group, and consequently is apt to depreciate the standards maintained by his parents. This negative phase of maturity is mistakenly regarded as radical. With many parents who maintain standards of behavior derived from the "old country" the situation has been acute for the recent adolescent. The recognition that this "negativism" is an essential step toward achieving maturity will do much to alleviate the difficulty as well as remove it from the radical category.

Research on this problem has shown a strongly conservative attitude on the part of the young adult toward most social issues.

Educators and leaders of youth activities have not been surprised at these results; they merely confirm their observations.

The similarity between the personalities of those who deviate to the left and those who deviate to the right is not so obvious to casual observation. There are, however, fully as striking resemblances between them as there are differences. Both groups feel the need to draw away from the codes and practices of the majority. Mental conflicts play an equal part in the background of both types of reaction. Both are at odds with the existing state of affairs. Both are alike in their antagonism even to modernity and innovation in the arts. The conservative looks upon modern art as decadent, while the radical tends to look upon it as futile. Lenin, the radical in politics, was forthright in his condemnation of modernistic tendencies, while fully appreciating the classic and realistic in literature and the graphic arts. Of the latter he said: "I cannot value the works of expressionism, futurism, cubism, and the other 'isms' as the highest expressions of artistic genius. I don't understand them. They give me no pleasure." The list of similarities is long, though generally ignored.

Those who wish to regard radicalism as being predominantly a form of neurotic expression get little satisfaction from contemporary research. What the results show is that the conservatives, middle-of-the roaders, and radicals have essentially the same proportions of neurotics. An aggressive defiance of society provides only one of the many ways by which dissatisfaction with one's rôle in that society is expressed. The surprising thing is that it is not more frequently used. The reactionary, of course, expresses the same dynamic aggression and wish to change the shape of things as does the radical.

Even when the neurotic resorts to radicalism, it is difficult for him to find satisfaction. He retains his basic neuroticism in the new situation and soon becomes dissatisfied. A typical story is that told by Thomas Merton, in "The Seven Storey Mountain," of his own experience in this respect. Before finally joining the Communist party, he experienced a prolonged period of irresolute anxiety. "I was a mess. Even the sight of my own face in a mirror was enough to disgust me." Then he came to the conclusion "that it was not so much I myself that was to blame for

my unhappiness, but the society in which I lived." Communism offered a simple solution: "it seemed to cut across all complexities by its sweeping and uncompromising simplicity." He joined the party, but the solace was brief. "I was still interested in doing good for only one person—myself," and he soon lost interest in the party.

Others have been more fortunate. In affiliating with radical groups, the "fringer" and the mild neurotic may find satisfaction and the opportunity for growth. He gains insight into himself and can then return to take his place in the society from which he had withdrawn to seek solace and comradeship. If the neuroticism persists while he is within the party, he, like Merton, is assigned to the minor rôle of fellow traveller, a procedure which Whittaker Chambers maintains to be the customary one today. In this connection, Cannon, in his *History of American Trotskyism*, comments on the reluctance of the Communist League to admit one "who wears a corduroy suit up and down Greenwich Village, with a trick mustache and long hair." The neurotic may feel drawn toward a radical group, but the needs of his personality on the one hand and the needs of a militant group on the other soon lead to a parting of the ways. He lacks the stability necessary for effective participation in an aggressive radical movement.

III

Recent research has thrown some light on the question of why one person becomes a radical and another, with so many of the same essential characteristics, becomes a conservative. Both revolt against the status quo, but the greater self-sufficiency of the radical permits him to take an aggressive stand, while the conservative can only defend established values. His sense of personal adequacy enables the radical to contradict the commonly held attitudes of the group and find a challenge in doing so, while the conservative wants only to preserve values handed down to him. The lure of adventure is strong for the radical, but this does not appeal to the conservative. When this self-sufficient attitude is harnessed to adventures approved by society, it motivates the adventurer, the athlete, and the trail blazer, who in earlier days could

heed the advice to "go West." Many of the Russian revolutionists gave the craving of adventure as one of their reasons for joining the party. This accounts for the preponderance of youth in similar movements. Only the self-sufficient can seize an opportunity. Another significant difference is in the stronger urge of the radicals to achieve independence from their parents. The conservatives are held by such close personal ties to their families that, as they express it, they do not wish to differ from their parents, nor do they dare to disappoint them. The structure of their personalities is revealed by such observations as "I am all that my mother has and I wouldn't think of going against her wishes"; or "my father depends on me and I can't be disloyal to him." Psychiatric interviews were used to verify these observations and conclusions.

To the extent that the early childhood experiences of Hitler and Stalin are known and can be interpreted, their revolt against their fathers emerges quite clearly. Other frustrations, such as failure to be admitted to the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna and expulsion from the Greek Orthodox Seminary in Tiflis are also evident, but these came later. The pattern had been laid down early, as the fathers of both Hitler and Stalin died while they were in their early adolescence.

The cultural environment from which the radical emerges has been repeatedly investigated and the results are consistent. In a few cases exploited groups will organize, as in the case of the I.W.W. in the United States, but this is not the rule. The underdog lacks the dynamic and means for changing his status. The cultural "climate" of the radicals is the middle and upper middle class. They come from the aristocrats of the trades: the skilled workers as contrasted with the unskilled; the self-owning business man rather than the wage earner. In a study of the origins of sixteen hundred labor leaders and radicals, Sorokin found that they came primarily from the upper levels of the middle class. In another study, those with high and low incomes—that is, under \$1000.00 and above \$5000.00 a year in the United States in 1936—were separated from the middle income group. The middle income group were decidedly more radical than those at either extreme. The *Fortune Survey* of 1940 attacked the problem differently, but confirmed this by showing that the small businessman, the shopkeeper, the profes-

sional man, and the well educated showed less hostility to radical ideas than either the wealthy or the underprivileged. They were also more lenient in the degree of control of radical activities that they considered necessary and in the amount of punishment to be meted out for radical activities. Whittaker Chambers has recently stated that the leadership of the Communist Party is still drawn from the upper middle class and that the membership is still predominantly middle class. The privileged can remain indifferent, but poverty, as history has repeatedly shown, can lead only to rioting, not to revolution. Sophistication is required before a change in the social structure can be planned and implemented.

When a member of a wealthy or aristocratic family promotes a radical cause, the explanation is found in his reaction to his family rather than in his status as a product of his social class. Many of these life histories reflect a rigid and artificial upbringing, and such a childhood has provoked a resentment which rejects not only the parents, but most of what they have stood for. A radical movement gives these persons the opportunity to gain group prestige by virtue of their social status, to express their resentment, and to alleviate their feeling of insecurity and isolation. They are sincere in advocating such drastic changes, as the motivation of their attitudes has long since become unconscious.

The myth that it is the poor and deprived that promote radical movements dies hard. In this respect it resembles the rags-to-riches theme which has been such a distinctive feature of our folklore. The recently published *Encyclopedia of American History* clearly indicates that, of the three hundred Americans who have made the most substantial and lasting contributions to our way of life, only about eighty-four, or considerably less than one-third, have risen from poverty to eminence in statesmanship, the arts, science, and other areas that are essential features of a democratic system. Those who strive to change as well as those who strive to perpetuate the democratic ideal are derived from the same source, the literate and educated middle class, the aristocrats of the working world. The virtual absence of this group and the minor rôle played by its members in the dictatorships may well prove to be the greatest source of internal weakness in such governments. In the democracies, members of the middle class

have served to define and protect the liberty of the individual as well as to change or destroy these values.

IV

The failure of the radical to be consistently radical in his thinking has frequently been remarked upon. It is a commonplace to encounter one who is rigidly reactionary in one respect but aggressively radical in others. Historical cases are numerous. Oliver Cromwell and William Jennings Bryan (to a lesser degree) were radical in their politics but were militantly conservative in their religious beliefs. On the other hand, Robert G. Ingersoll, who is known for his radical religious views, was a conservative in politics, while Lenin, as has been pointed out, was as explicitly conservative in his thinking on the arts as he was radical toward political ideas. It would not be difficult to find their counterparts in public life today.

Because of its practical significance, this problem of consistency in behavior, whether radical or conservative, has been subjected to much research, and the results are explicit. Though there is a tendency toward consistency, no normal human being is completely consistent in his behavior, whether in matters of belief or in the practice of honesty. The radical deviate also shows inconsistencies, but these are more readily observable than those of the average person. If, however, the degree of radicalism is very pronounced in one area, such as politics, there is a marked tendency to be radical in other areas, such as economics. Results of research in the United States and England show that the same generalization holds true for the conservative. The one exception is religion. In general, the tendency to be radical in religion is much less closely correlated with radical attitudes in other areas than in the case of political, social, or economic radicalism. A contempt for revealed religion was one of the basic ideas of the Radical party in England in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Religion in the Western World seems to be relatively isolated from the other main currents of human activity. One reason for this may be that religious attitudes are formulated early in life, typically at adolescence, and radical ideas in politics generally in late

maturity. It is the rare person who feels the need of self-consistency sufficiently to demand a reorientation of all his attitudes.

Among the most important outcomes of research in this area are those that deal with what is known to the social scientist as situational radicalism. This term is applied to the radicalism that derives from the accidental circumstances of time and place in which the individual participates, even though unwillingly, rather than to the radicalism which is an expression of his own personality. It has been found, for example, that voting for left wing political groups such as the Non-Partisan League was definitely more prevalent among mid-western farmers whose soil was unproductive, and especially when a scant rainfall had added to the grimness of life. Women have been conspicuously radical only in those situations where their rights and obligations have been involved; and the Jews, while active in the Russian revolution, were conspicuously inactive in the revolutionary movements of France and England in the last century. The enormous instability and turnover in the membership of radical groups adds further confirmation. In 1925, for example, the Communist Party in Great Britain had 5000 members. This number increased to 10,700 in 1926, but dropped again to 3,500 in 1929. In Germany the Communists added 50,000 new members in 1929, but within that year they lost 39,000, a loss of nearly 80 per cent, while for 1930 the figures were 143,056 gained and 95,399 lost. From 1928 to 1932 the Socialist and Socialist Labor vote in the United States more than tripled. There was also the upsurge of membership in the radical groups in the 1930's from among the intellectuals, which was matched by their defection after the signing of the Russo-German pact. Crises and the conditions of living thus occur among the major determinants of the radical attitude, and it is facts such as these that give the lie to the commonly held opinion, "once a radical, always a radical." The situational radical retains his basic non-radical orientation, and the tendency to return to a non-radical point of view is very strong. His temporary rôle as a radical is displaced when the situation that created it has disappeared.

In a culture that stresses the virtue of economic adequacy and independence, the sudden threat of unemployment produces ob-

servable changes in personality, and an economic depression becomes one of the major crises that an individual encounters. The depression of the 1930's provided psychologists with an opportunity to study its effects on personality both in Europe and in the United States. The results show that the frustration and insecurity brought about by such conditions may lead to the development of a radical point of view. A group of engineers was selected in one study, and each unemployed engineer was carefully matched with an employed engineer of the same age, marital status, salary (when employed), and so on. When the results were compared, the unemployed showed a conspicuous increase in radical tendencies which could only be accounted for by the fact that their capacity to earn a living had been suddenly destroyed by forces outside of themselves, and over which they had no control. The greater number of unemployed who maintained that "success is more dependent on luck than on real ability" is a significant indication of lowered morale. One-half of the unemployed group believed that there was little chance for either advancement or security without some kind of "pull," while less than a quarter of those still employed maintained this point of view. Two-thirds of the unemployed declared that "most employers think only of their profits and care little for the welfare of the employees," while those who maintained that a revolution would be a good thing for this country were four times as numerous among the unemployed as among the employed. Radicalism, in these cases, was clearly one of the outcomes of unemployment. Equally revealing is the fact that the leftist tendency increased with the gravity of the individual's financial situation and prospects. The extent and nature of the relief received also entered the picture. Those with a backlog of their own were the least radical, those supported by their families somewhat more so, those given work relief still more so, and then, most of all, those who had not yet received any relief. Even among those who were still employed, those who were likely to lose their jobs were markedly to the left of those who were secure. These tendencies were more pronounced in those engineers between the ages of 30 and 40, the period when accumulated reserves are small, homes are not fully paid for, and educational expenses for the family appear with increasing distinctness.

V

Studies such as this show how susceptible personality is to the stresses it encounters. From stress comes radicalism. The idea that man is the captain of his soul is only partly true—the sailing becomes so rough at times that he has great difficulty in maintaining his course.

Research on the effect of unemployment on Polish workmen during the same period brought out this comment: "Yesterday I saw a foreman shoving a workman around. I gave him a heavy blow . . . I need a few bullets. I would get a hellish satisfaction if I could see fear in the eyes of that slick rascal."

The application of scientific method to the study of human personality is still at the rudimentary stage, but some progress has been made. The demands that are made on the facts that are available are frequently excessive, but in a period of turmoil, of charges and countercharges, the facts that have been established may serve as a stabilizing influence.

THE CREATIVE WRITER IN THE UNIVERSITY

By DON GEIGER

University of California

Unquestionably, American colleges and universities more warmly welcome creative writers to their faculties at present than they did a generation ago. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that an increasing number of writers seek, and sometimes find, university employment. After the first World War, the young man who suspected himself to be with talent made his self-explorations in Paris. Since the second World War, often he has searched his psyche between bouts with literary criticism and the graduate school regulations. If he survives both, he is likely at least to think about seeking employment on the campus as a teacher.

This neat schematization is probably especially appropriate to the experience of many novelists; the poets, in general, got a head-start into the universities. A few years ago, for example, Mr. Yvor Winters reported: "One of the most curious facts about the poets of my own generation and of the generation following—that is, about the poets now, roughly, under fifty years of age—is this: that many of the best of them are teaching in the universities. There has been no comparable unity of profession among the poets since the 17th century, when most of the best poets were members of the clergy."¹

Observing this situation, Mr. Jacques Barzun has suggested that poets (as well as other artists) have found "a sanctuary" in the universities, which have thus become counterparts of "the German princely courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."² If true, this is not, I suspect, an altogether complimentary reference to German princely courts, but the comparison does at

¹ Yvor Winters, *In Defense of Reason* (New York, 1947), p. 570.

² Jacques Barzun, "America's Passion for Culture," *Harper's Magazine*, 820, (March, 1954), 41.

least point up the present situation. If the universities are not exactly bulging with creative writers, nevertheless there are enough of them to create many problems of evaluation and adjustment.

I neither know all the solutions of these problems, nor mean to imply that they have been solved nowhere satisfactorily. But I should like to discuss here certain aspects of the writer's situation which surely must have been realistically appraised, wherever satisfactory conditions of his university employment have been established.

Examples of a contrary mode of appraisal, by stock response, are numerous enough; and stock responses to "writers" lead nearly always either to excessive estimations or, more usually, no doubt, to minimizations of their skills and usefulness. A few professors and administrators seem to melt like wax in the bright light of the writing genius (just any old genius will do, thank you). A considerably larger number, I suspect, think of their talented colleague as a kind of modern shaman in tweeds, whose frenzies simply do not come within the range of intellectual evaluation (until, at least, his work is safely embalmed in anthologies; again, usually, just any old anthology will do).

II

A more realistic appraisal of creative writers in universities, as individuals and as a class, must begin with a consideration of at least three questions: (1) Is creative writing a kind of labor which should be rewarded within the academic context? (2) How can creative writing be evaluated? and (3) Is the creative writer a good teacher of literature?

No doubt there are other important questions, but these seem to me to be basic ones, insofar as their answers affect the writer's status in and usefulness to the university. Even incomplete and general answers, such as I shall try to provide here, may be of some value during a period in which increasing numbers of writers are joining, or attempting to join, college and university faculties.

The first question, concerning academic rewards to creative writing, may be asked in a couple of other ways. Is creative writ-

ing a genuine academic equivalent of scholarship? More narrowly, perhaps, should an instructor be granted academic advancement on the basis of accomplishment in writing?

I think that such questions should be answered affirmatively. I can perhaps most clearly present my reasons for thinking so by considering the usual sources of contradictory opinions.

The belief that universities should not reward writers, as writers and for their writing, ordinarily derives from one of two opinions. Some persons believe, to put it baldly, that creative writing should be paid for by the writer's public rather than by the university. Their opinion is often not quite so simple as this, of course: perhaps the writer is initially employed by the university, in part or largely, because of his talent as a writer. But there are persons, willing to accept this situation, who nevertheless would be opposed to the writer's further advancement on the basis of his writing, claiming that any other rewards for this accomplishment must come from the book-buying public.

But to speak of his book-buying public is to pay the creative writer an undeserved compliment. In a 1939 *Partisan Review* symposium, a large number of poets and fictionists—of established reputation invariably reported either that they could not earn a living from their writing, or that they could do so only precariously. None of the poets—including Wallace Stevens, Allen Tate, Louise Bogan, and Horace Gregory—earned a living from writing. Katherine Anne Porter was equally unable to gain a livelihood from her fiction. For “popular” John Dos Passos, it was “nip and tuck,” as it was for equally popular Sherwood Anderson and James T. Farrell. R. P. Blackmur bravely thought that a well-known writer had as good a chance of “getting along” as a lobsterman.¹

Nor is it possible to argue that the situation has changed significantly since 1939—except insofar as it has probably worsened for the “new” writer, who has had increasing difficulty in getting his work published. Only recently one of the best known of the “younger” poets (a man in his mid-thirties) told me that his total earning from poetry—he has been publishing now for well over ten years—would not support even his simple needs for a period of six months.

¹“Excerpts from Symposium: The Situation in American Writing, 1939,” *The Partisan Reader* (New York, 1946), pp. 596-628.

This is the general situation. Of course there are a few vivid examples of writers who have broken the TV and Funny Paper barrier; but so, too, are there among scholars a few best-selling Toynbees. But these are merely the occasional monsters produced by down-trodden races.

Facts like these, evident, we might think, to anyone who cares to look, force us to look wryly on suggestions like Mr. Barzun's that, since we do not guarantee a livelihood to lawyers, neither should we guarantee one to poets.¹ Whether or not poets should be guaranteed a livelihood (certainly I am not proposing it), it is plainly absurd to compare their economic status with that of lawyers. That is like comparing the prospects of a man scaling a cliff with those of the corpse already at its foot. It is one thing to know that one must run certain hazards and may fail (a lawyer's "failure," by the way, usually means that he has not become "well-to-do"). It is another thing to learn that one's doom occurred before one got up that morning.

Now, Mr. Barzun surely realizes that the poet, in the world's economic struggle, is already a dead soldier; and so he considers an argument for endowment of the artist which sometimes follows from that realization. Mr. Barzun writes: "Is it true, as many worthy Americans now believe, that art has an inherent claim upon the public? If we say 'art' the proposition seems reasonable, but if we say 'artists' its character changes and the avowed aim defeats itself."²

Whatever the value of public endowment of artists, this passage is not striking for its analytical acuity. It is hardly "reasonable," for example, that art has an "inherent claim upon the public." Mr. Barzun passes off for a logical proposition what is a superb act of faith. Especially is it (when it is) a superb act of faith on the part of the great uninterested public to *honor* that "inherent" claim upon it—for what is talk of art's "inherent claim" but a graceful allusion to the claim which the public itself indeed does not make upon art? Mr. Barzun is really asking us to consider once more the terrible question of value—how a thing can be extremely valuable, can in fact be of greatest value, even

¹ Barzun, 42.

² *Ibid.*, 43.

though only a relatively few people value it. That Mr. Barzun has such faith in art seems unquestionable. That he also seems not to recognize that it is faith, is a pity; were he to realize his faithfulness to art, perhaps he could more easily extend his faith to art's makers. Perhaps the most astonishing part of Mr. Barzun's argument, in fact, is the rapidity and completeness with which he denies to the artist that "inherent claim" which he has so readily and cheerfully accorded to art. We would be no more astonished at seeing a man refuse to buy feed for the hens from whom issue occasionally the golden eggs.

III

The university can offer the writer an alternative both to living entirely by patronage—usually distasteful, even in theory, for a variety of reasons—and to attempting to gain a livelihood from a barely existent "market." What the university can offer the writer is exactly what it offers the scholar: a rather strange, and not always comfortable, but essentially "decent" admixture of work and patronage.

This condition is often obscured. The writer himself may obscure it by saying vaguely, if he's asked, that he went into college teaching because he thought it would be "easier" or would provide "some time for writing." The same writer, however, is liable to have spent many a 48-60 hour work week in teaching (often, winter and summer), and in "doing" scholarship and working on committees, in order to get along within a university. In short, he is a writer who has become a scholar (sometimes, even a good one), and who confines his writing to those few spare hours during which other scholars turn to gardening, poker, and Sunday painting.

That a creative writer who (aside from his teaching and fulfilling his share of committee chores) does nothing but creative writing, is in part gaining his livelihood from patronage would be clear enough to many of his scholarly colleagues. But that they themselves live in part by patronage is a fact which a self-induced mist not too kindly conceals from them.

I am not, heaven help me, suggesting that teachers are overpaid or are not "worth" more than they earn. In fact, it strikes me that

society is a very wretched successor to the munificent princes (who exist at least in my imagination). But niggardly or not, society is patron as well as paying customer, and the scholar, as scholar, must live, however badly, on public largesse. Any scholar who believes otherwise might ask the next man he meets how much 6-12 hours of teaching a week plus all that terrible committee work is worth on the dollar-market. The probably significant difference between *that* figure and the scholar's total salary—miserable, no doubt—is, to my eyes, plainly patronage.

Naturally, I do not mean that the citizens have thought the matter out in this way. Most of them, I suspect, regard the college as they do the weather—there it is. If and when they think about professors, it is probably only to wonder a bit why some intelligent men aren't a little more ambitious. On the whole, though they probably suspect something slightly seditious is going on, the citizens, patrons or not, seem unlikely to demand less pay for professors.

Neither do I fail to recognize that many scholars *do* obviously earn their salt. They are usually scientists and technicians, and that is why they get more salt—as well as, frequently, better teaching schedules, richer research grants, and all the rest of it. But the scholar in the humanities—with whose situation alone the creative writer's can be properly compared—must usually look at the creative writer's market with envy. Not even the scholar's relatives, it seems, will buy a study of plagiarism in the Middle Ages.

Those scholars who feel unreasonably guilty over producing something which nobody wants sometimes try to prove that their scholarship *really* helps their teaching. No doubt it does, or can. So too must his artistic activity often make the creative writer a more stimulating teacher. But that is as wretched an excuse to make for scholarship as it is for art, and one that does honor to nobody. It is like saying that one picks pearls from an oyster in order to make the thing taste better.

Scholarship that is of any importance is not done so that Friday's lessons will be better than Thursday's. Granted, that should be a valuable by-product of scholarship. But if, as the famous phrase suggests, the scholar is truly at the "frontier of knowledge," he must nevertheless dash back to Boston to meet his class—and I

think true scholars recognize this and take even a (let us hope, humble) pride in it.

There is, of course, no reason whatever to deny that either scholar or artist is living partly from public patronage. Patronage is not charity. That is the great thing about patronage—one can take his hand-out and still guiltlessly spit on the beneficent hand. The public, whether or not it wants them, is offered valuable objects in scholarly works: riches of knowledge and perception are contained therein. That is our story and we should stick to it. Like Mr. Barzun, I recognize art's implicit claim on the public; I also recognize scholarship's implicit claim. Going beyond Mr. Barzun, perhaps, I think that the hand-out everywhere should be larger than that managed even by the Columbia University pay-scale. Even that I would take to be a temporary arrangement, until the Last Day arrives, when all values will be righted, and the public will feverishly "demand" for their last hours our books and magazines with far more dollars than they "give" us now.

In short, I defer to no one in the contempt with which I think all of us, artists and scholars alike, should hold our pay-checks. Such contempt is part of our psychic income. I mean here only to suggest that in this real imperfect world, the checks that we hold, however little and in whatever contempt, in part represent public patronage. My argument is that the creative writer deserves *his* patronage for writing—not for having become also a scholar or a committeeman. *Their* patronage comes from another fund.

A second reason for denying academic advancement to a writer on the basis of his writing derives from the belief that creative writing, compared with scholarship, is an innately inferior mental activity. The argument has little to recommend it. It would seem, on the contrary, that since scholars in several departments spend their lives in studying the results (and not always the finest results) of the writer's activity, it is only reasonable to admit to college faculties the creators of such products.

I do not mean, however, to correct one absurdity with another, by placing writers as a class above scholars. The number of great ones of both classes have a better chance than the Schoolmen's angels of standing on the head of a pin. Padding leagues behind these giant unicorns, writers and scholars, in no particular order

and often with a reprehensible lack of humility, bring to the Muse's linotype machines what little gifts they can manage.

It is, I think, a great mistake to insist categorically on too wide a gulf between "creative" and "scholarly" minds. Writers may often know something and are, we think, better writers for their knowledge; many of them certainly have unusual powers of analysis. Similarly, it is impossible for us to conceive of a really competent scholar who lacks imaginative capacity. As their differences in perspective and talent provide one strong argument for the association in an intellectual community of writers and scholars, so do their similarities provide another.

IV

It is one thing to agree in general terms to the value of creative writers on the campus; it is another thing to determine the value of a given writer. Thus the question is often asked—probably in a tone which implies that there is no reasonable answer—"But how can we possibly evaluate the worth of current creative writing?"

The best answer, I suppose, is that one appraises creative writing as one does scholarship—that is to say, hopefully. The man who has an ethical fit attempting to appraise creative writing "dispassionately" is liable to be the very man who thinks he can rank whole tubs of scholarship at a single sitting. But surely we cannot have so low an opinion of scholarship. Books of scholarship are not to be judged simply, like packages of cigarettes—valuable insofar as they are fully packed with standard items.

I almost blush to emphasize that truism in this place. But how easily we ignore the evident implications which follow from a recognition of the complicated differences between works of scholarship. The truth is that all our judgments of scholars and their works are dubious. If we spoke the truth, we should say even of the scholar whom we should be most fit to judge, "He's brilliant—I hope," and of his work, "It is superb—if by some miracle my opinion means anything." Often enough, whole areas of scholarship are thought by some persons to be worthless. We are all familiar with historians who find nothing of value but

history, of botanists who find nothing of value but botany, and of philosophers who find nothing of value but mathematics.

Nor are the students in one's own field spared. Especially, they are not spared. To take one example only, there is not a single well-known literary critic in America today who is not a dolt—if we can trust the opinions of at least one other “professionally competent” critic.

It is of course a dreadful situation. Because of it extremely able students (I guess) are sometimes fired—or should I say “disassociated”—from the university; others, who can't think their way out of a paper sack (I do not doubt it at all) are retained. I sympathize intensely with those persons who can't sleep nights worrying over the problem. They are right to be restless.

In the meantime, appraisals and decisions must be made. So the scholar is judged by his peers—and if he's lucky they will really be peers. So too should the creative writer be judged by his peers. In a sense, the editors who have published his pieces are at least something like peers, and rather extensive publication should mean at least as much to the writer as it means to the scholar.

Publication of either scholarly or creative work (in the field of literature, at least) ordinarily implies survival in a rather rigorous competition. For example, Mr. Grant Redford has quoted a report which indicates that *PMLA* accepts but one article out of five submitted. But Mr. Redford writes of his experience as an editor of *Western Review* that, “Because we published poetry and fiction as well as articles, we received 15 to 20 items for every one published.”¹

Editors do not, I am sure, always publish the best pieces that are submitted to them, and like everyone else I long for that remarkable day when the worth of a work in manuscript will be as evident to the judicious eye as the same work in print. Waiting for that day, I mean only to call attention to the difficulty which surrounds the publication of creative writing. Its publication, to put it mildly, is at least as certain a criterion of its quality as is publication of scholarly work.

¹ Grant H. Redford, “Publish or Else,” *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, 38 (Winter, 1952-1953), 611.

However, it is certainly reasonable that more extensive judgment of the writer's work be sought. This surely means that the opinion of other creative writers may be relevant. If writers available for judgment aren't to be found in sufficient numbers on the local campus, they can probably be found elsewhere. Literary critics might well be consulted about the work; so also might a few more haphazardly chosen scholars, if they can be kept from holding their limitations against the writer.

I would be the first to admit that, whatever they say, it will have little to do with the "real" value of the work. A whole age can praise a poet, as one did Southey, and be wrong; an age can decry a poet, as this age does Shelley, and also be wrong (*I* know, as who doesn't?). But the Ages find scholarly profundities equally dispensable, equally hard to evaluate.

I am willing to leave the future's judgment in both instances to the future (if it's interested); here I am talking only of judging a writer's or a scholar's right to a university position. The judges of *that* question can only knock their heads together; and from the probably confused ensuing report, the writer, like the scholar, can only hope that he will hear something which bodes well for his future academic status.

The report, so far as the scholar is concerned, occurs in most cases, I am sure, only after an investigation which is at once tentative, sympathetic, and hard-headed. I am only recommending that the same attitudes be taken toward the work of the creative writer.

V

It remains for us to consider the important question of the creative writer's teaching effectiveness. It is sometimes assumed that "artistic" persons are temperamentally ill-equipped for teaching, or that they do not possess the knowledge requisite to a proper performance of their duties.

Both generalizations, unless seriously qualified, are as patently untrue of "artistic" as they are of any other persons. Undoubtedly some creative writers are arrogant, self-centered, impatient, uncontrolled—or any of a half-hundred other disagreeable attributes. So, too, are many scholars; and that college which,

without loss of artistic and scholarly quality, is staffed with co-operative, considerate, and stimulating teachers is both wisely and luckily administered.

In short, I hold no brief for writers who, as teachers, are personality "problems" (although we always do well to remember that one man's problem is another man's delight). But I think that we can only reject, as false and unfair, arguments against the writer's adjustment to teaching which seem to be based on the tacit assumption of the inviolability of the scholar's personality and teaching tactic.

The fact is rather, I believe, that many writers possess special (though of course not unique) virtues as teachers. One thing that *can* be said of creative writers as a class is that they *are* creative. Sometimes, when the writer's ability as a teacher is called into question, it is just his creativity, as such, which we suspect is really being held against him.

It is no wonder that such an argument is usually camouflaged; it is vicious and disreputable. In its malice it applies to creative scholars and writers alike. It comes ordinarily from that small company of pedants who, manning the Trojan Horse within academic walls, cherish a vision of the ultimate triumph of athletic mediocrity over the mind's excitement. Such persons lovingly insist on the teaching "chore" or the teaching "grind." So, of course, it is; but so too are art and scholarship a chore and a grind. But like these, teaching is an activity whose values do not begin and end with the grind; it ends, in its perfection, with the modeling and vivifying of a human mind and personality. We are wiser, I think, to accept the more frequently voiced, and richer, conception of teaching as an "art"; and we should not be too surprised to find artists often particularly well-equipped to practice it.

I realize, naturally, that teaching is an art different from creative writing, and a very great writer may possibly be a very poor teacher. But so too is scholarship very different in many respects from teaching. I am merely suggesting that if it does not surprise us that good scholars are often good teachers, neither should it surprise us that creative writers may also often be good teachers. Although the overlap of scholarship and teaching is different from

that of writing and teaching, overlap potentially exists in either instance; and when we find it, in either instance, we should take great pleasure in it.

The creative writer also frequently possesses, I believe, a certain order of knowledge which can be extremely valuable to the teacher of literary subjects (in creative writing courses, naturally; but also in courses emphasizing "appreciation" and analysis; in the oral interpretation of literature, etc.). An artist himself, the writer may be expected to be keenly aware of the "art" of literature.

This does not imply that he is alert only to "mere" technique. Mr. Mark Schorer has delivered an opinion with which many modern students of literature would agree: "When we speak of technique, then, we speak of nearly everything. For technique is the means by which the writer's experience, which is his subject matter, compels him to attend it; technique is the only means he has of discovering, exploring, developing his subject, of conveying its meaning, and finally, of evaluating it."¹ The writer, then, presumably sensitive to technique, may be expected to be unusually competent to explore a piece's meanings, and even its values. Mr. T. S. Eliot reports that he was once so convinced of the good writer's merits as critic and reader that he thought that "the only critics worth reading were the critics who practiced, and practiced well, the art of which they wrote."² Mr. Eliot came to think of this as an "extreme position," and surely most of us must think so, too. But extreme though this opinion may be, it is not so dubious as the other extreme, according to which writers are not worth listening to at all, except insofar as they may reveal a bit of their own art, or, especially, as they may relate interesting autobiographical anecdotes.

Another charge is sometimes leveled against the substantive limitations of a writer's literary knowledge, or the probable partisanship of his literary enthusiasms. Of course a great number of writers today have had some considerable amount of formal literary education—that is, they have received college degrees and often

¹ Mark Schorer, "Technique as Discovery," *Essays in Modern Literary Criticism*, ed., Ray B. West, Jr. (New York, 1952), pp. 189-205.

² T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays* (New York, 1932), p. 19.

enough they have done at least some graduate work. Still other writers have distinguished themselves as both scholars and creative writers. Of this latter group, we need only remark that, while we may be grateful for their dual qualifications as university staff members, we should remember that they *are* doubly qualified. Their scholarly attainments should no more set the academic standard against which creative writers, in general, should be measured, than the latter's creative attainments should set the standard against which scholars should be measured.

But of writers as a class, I think it may be truly said that their knowledge is often special and partisan. I think that probably this can also be said of most scholars (and in many cases we must think it a good thing: a partisan is at least *somewhere*). Yet, for all that, we may take delight in the image of that literary scholar who knows a great deal of literature, at least the literature of a genre or a period, who knows the various qualities and merits of many individual pieces and of their many and subtle relations to their authors and audiences, and to the history of ideas, etc. Mr. E. M. Forster said of such a scholar that he "can contemplate the river of time. He contemplates it not as a whole, but he can see the facts, the personalities floating past him, and estimate the relations between them, and if his conclusions could be as valuable to us as they are to himself he would long ago have civilized the human race."¹ This is an image of scholarly possibility to which we can only accord the highest possible praise, and it provides both challenge and justification for the scholar who models himself along those lines.

I do not mean to deny the possibility of such extensive attainment to the creative writer, but I think it may very well be true that many writers, at least, lack the scope of the scholar's learning. But writers may well possess another order of merit which, without displacing the scholar's own, properly augments general understanding. What work the writer knows, he is likely to know thoroughly and lovingly; often it will have affected both his life and his own art. It is, in short, a knowledge that has not only been possessed by the writer, but has taken possession of him.

I remember once hearing Mr. Robert Frost, talking to an admirer

¹ E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York, 1927), p. 23.

of his memory for poems, say that he isn't in the habit of trying to learn a poem so that he can later recite it. Instead, he said, in effect, "If the poem doesn't stick to me, I won't stick to it." It may be a very valuable thing for students to study with a writer those pieces which have "stuck" to him. If the writer does not know as many sonnets as the scholarly expert on sonnets, he may nevertheless have an even better idea than the scholar of what makes the ones he knows memorable literary experiences.

I am, of course, offering here a tolerant little division, handing over extensive concerns to the scholar and intensive concerns to the writer. It is a division whose applicability is likely to break down in any given case. I do not mean to pre-judge any individual; I wish only to indicate some generally relevant possibilities.

That has been, as I suggested at the beginning, my whole aim throughout this article. Just as there are many scholars, different from one another in many respects and so requiring different evaluations, so are writers unique individuals, requiring, and deserving, separate appraisals. I have here attempted only to suggest that we may have faith that such appraisals will discover many writers of significant intellectual attainments, who are good teachers, able to lead their students to a kind of educative experience which, while overlapping the experience available to the scholar's approach, provides an often irreplaceable augmentation of that approach.

WHO WILL BELL THE CAT?

By WINIFRED LYNSKEY

Purdue University

Most writers and editors accept with patience the task of securing permission to quote short passages. But when I edited an anthology recently, I became aware that this practice, which was difficult and wearisome at best, was also ridiculous and dangerous.

The book was a collection of short stories. In the critical commentaries I found myself quoting quite naturally from a poem or from a critical essay or sometimes from another story by the author under consideration. Allusions and direct quotations are indispensable in literary criticism. They illustrate, they support, they illumine.

Prodded by my desire to avoid lawsuits for plagiarism, I began to write for permission. To my amazement I found myself solemnly requesting and solemnly receiving permission to use such direct quotations as the following:

1. 23 words of prose, constituting a single sentence.
2. 16 words of prose, interpolated in a sentence of my own.
3. 9 words from a poem, interpolated in a sentence of my own.
4. 7 lines of a well-known popular song.

The seven lines of direct quotation from a song which millions of Americans can sing from memory seemed to be the most ridiculous case. First of all, the author who quoted the lines in his story had secured permission to do so. When the story was republished in my collection, securing permission became obligatory for a second time. (It is indeed fortunate that no person or publisher holds the copyright on quotation marks themselves.)

The result of my experiences was that I soon stopped quoting directly, valuable though direct quotation is. I had neither the time nor the energy to track down the original publisher, to write to him for permission, and then to transcribe accurately the

precise information of publisher, copyright date, title of book, title of selection, and page of selection. All this for nine or sixteen or twenty-three words!

II

The necessity for securing permission varies greatly. Hence, the use of direct quotations varies greatly. In common with other college teachers I have published documented essays containing long passages, even whole pages, quoted without securing permission. These quotations are not fifty years old. Often the quotation comes from articles or books published five or ten years before the documented article. Examine any scholarly journal devoted to history, literature, psychology, etc. Observe the quotations used freely without permission. A literary magazine like *The Explicator* exists for the purpose of analyzing difficult or obscure texts. Precise quotations are used *ad infinitum* without the writers' first securing permission.

Nor is financial profit a criterion for securing permission. A textbook, like a collection of stories, may conceivably make a profit. But some scholarly or learned journals also pay for published articles. Yet the writers of these articles do not secure permission for their quotations. Writers of reviews are often paid, and direct quotations can go on at length in reviews.

So much for the inconsistencies and difficulties inherent in the practice. Let us consider what may be a real danger to freedom of expression. While I was involved in my own problem, I noticed that the subject broke into print in that open forum, "Letters to the Editor" in the *London Times Literary Supplement*. In a letter printed in the issue of February 16, 1951, Mr. Ivor Thomas expressed the danger succinctly:

May I invite attention to the dangers in the increasing practice by which authors think it necessary, or desirable, to obtain permission to quote even the shortest passages from published works?

I have before me a number of books in which this practice is carried to ridiculous lengths, the author and the publisher being thanked for permission to quote even single sentences. In general, I have no doubt that permission is readily granted, the authors and the publishers thanked being gratified at the advertisement of their

names. But if this practice becomes obligatory, what will happen to works of controversy, in which category many of the noblest pieces in the English language must be included? If Mr. X, desiring to controvert the thesis of Mr. Y, which he regards as subversive of public morality and ordered society, is obliged to obtain the permission of Mr. Y for every sentence that he quotes, what will happen? What will clearly not happen is that Mr. X will seek or Mr. Y give permission. Either Mr. X will be obliged to resort to the unsatisfactory device of *oratio obliqua*, or Mr. Y's fallacious and destructive sentiments will go uncontradicted until 50 years after his death.

Let me say, first, that I have not written for permission to quote this reference. Since Mr. Thomas is concerned in part with the ridiculous aspects of the problem, I believe that certain of his phrases have a humorous cast: "subversive of public morality and ordered society"—"fallacious and destructive sentiments." But if other phrases are substituted, the argument still retains its original force.

Let us consider that Mr. X is disturbed about Mr. Y's inaccurate scholarship or about Mr. Y's faulty interpretation or even wilful misinterpretation of historical documents. If the practice of securing permission to quote becomes obligatory, what will clearly happen is that Mr. X will not seek and Mr. Y will not give permission. For fifty years—even more, according to my experience—the mistakes of Mr. Y can be perpetuated. What all this does to freedom of expression is quite evident.

III

If a doctor knows the cause of an illness he can the more readily find a cure. In a letter to the *London Times* of February 23, 1951, Mr. Gordon Hewitt, Editorial Secretary of the Lutterworth Press, speculates on the origin of the present distressing situation:

One is forced to conclude that the present habit has arisen fortuitously apart from any ethical or legal considerations; that it has been allowed to grow through a short-sighted belief in its publicity value; and that it can only now be broken by the concerted action of publishers and authors through their representative associations.

Mr. Hewitt suggests a test case so that the ambiguity of copyright laws may be clarified. Quoting a "substantial part" of an author's work might then be interpreted to mean "a paragraph or more," not "a sentence or more." Such an interpretation would bring tremendous relief. But it would not solve the question. For the question, to quote Mr. Thomas, is "not one of law, but of ethics."

Quite plainly, no one should use the writing of another for profit, either for monetary profit or for profit to one's reputation. In a rhetoric textbook, for example, a chapter on paragraphing might well quote thirty different paragraphs from various authors. Here not only permission to quote must be sought, but fees for quoting must be paid. But if I properly acknowledge my source by author and title, I take advantage of no one when, without securing permission, I quote nine words from a poem.

Far from taking advantage of an author by quoting his nine or sixteen or twenty-three words, I am paying him tribute. I do him an invaluable service. A reader can be so stimulated by a quotation that he will seek out the whole poem or the whole essay or the whole story from which the quotation comes and then will read that poem, that essay, that story in its entirety. No author could ask for more. Such an action by a reader is far more valuable to an author than a stiff acknowledgment stating the granting of permission, an acknowledgment, moreover, in fine print which nobody reads but the publisher, the editor, and the original author, all of whom knew the facts in the first place.

The spirit which infuses a set of ethics is more important than rigid rules confining these ethics. Hence it might be very difficult to codify the ethics of quoting into rules which would satisfy copyright holders.

A test case, however, might throw this wearisome, ridiculous, and potentially dangerous matter into the open for discussion.

Who will bell the cat?

Perhaps no one needs to bell the cat. Concerted action by a group of college teachers who are also writers might be equally successful in securing both discussion and remedies.

BEYOND RETIREMENT

By ROLAND I. ROBINSON

Northwestern University

Retirement age policy poses a dilemma both for teachers and for academic administrations. Individuals are variously affected by aging: some teachers lose vigor and full professional competence rather early. But the academic climate seems to preserve the health of many; it keeps them fit and vigorous up to and long after the age of compulsory retirement. And individuals differ in their willingness and desire to retire or stay in service. The need for income accounts for some of these differences, but with many it is a matter of interest and morale.

Academic administrators also view the problem with a mixture of feelings. If the compulsory age of retirement is set rather low, they suffer two disadvantages: they lose valued faculty members who could continue to be of great service, and they are under pressure to increase retirement annuity contributions. The earlier the age of retirement, the costlier the provision for a decent retirement allowance. Furthermore, the matter of retirement age may be a problem in the recruitment of mature teachers; they may prefer an institution that gives them greater latitude in choosing their age of retirement.

When, however, an academic administration sets the age of normal or mandatory retirement rather high it faces another kind of risk: that of having to carry a payroll loaded with relatively high-salaried teachers who have passed the peak of their competence. Some institutions have followed a policy of allowing extensions beyond the normal age of retirement for some teachers. But this system is awkward to administer. Who wants to tell a ruddy, tennis-playing professor of 65 that he no longer meets the intellectual standards of his discipline? Or, for that matter, who of us is able to judge his own competence and ability to remain in an academic post? Thus it is not only awkward for an academic

administration to exercise the option of extending the contract of a teacher; when this option is elected by teachers themselves it may not be very wisely exercised. Academic administrators fear, for example, that they suffer "adverse selection" in the exercise of this option: those who have outlived their usefulness tend to cling to their jobs for reasons of income; those who could still be useful more often elect to retire at the earliest optional age. The availability of Social Security benefits under the Old Age and Survivors Trust fund, recently extended to a larger group of collegiate teachers, may stimulate more early retirement, but its effect cannot be judged very adequately from the experience to date.

The existing rules of retirement vary greatly, a fact reflected in Table I. This table shows the age of 65 to be the commonest age of normal or mandatory retirement. But there are many variations, some of which contemplate extensions, and some of which do not. In practice the variation is even greater. At some institutions teachers may continue beyond age 65 merely by requesting to do so. While the administrations of such institutions have the formal right to reject such requests, in practice they seldom do so. In other institutions extensions are rarely granted, and only for exceptional reasons.

TABLE I—RETIREMENT AGES
IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WITH TIAA RETIREMENT PLANS

June 30, 1954		
	Number	Per Cent
65 normal, extensions to 70.....	108	28.4
65 normal, extensions allowed.....	69	18.2
66-70 normal, extensions allowed.....	39	10.3
65, extensions not mentioned.....	63	16.6
66-69, extensions not mentioned.....	13	3.4
70, extensions not mentioned.....	32	8.4
Optional after 65, required at 70.....	12	3.1
Optional after 65, required at 68.....	11	2.9
Lower for women than for men.....	11	2.9
Miscellaneous.....	22	5.8
Total.....	380	100.0

Based on data furnished by William C. Greenough, Vice-President of TIAA.

A fairly late compulsory retirement age, but with the option that the employing institution may advance this age for those who

have lost vigor and effectiveness, does not work out well in practice. Such an administrative rule might seem to be a fairer one, but in practice it suffers from the difficulties of bad feelings and the pressures of faculty politics. George E. Johnson, an officer of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, reached the conclusion that a fixed compulsory retirement age was the most practical policy for administrators.¹

The major burden of this note is to propose amplification and regularization of a plan already operating for improving the opportunities of those who are able to serve usefully beyond the normal or mandatory retirement age and wish to do so. It is not a novel plan; it is now operating informally in some areas. The system could be made more useful if regularized. Basically the plan involves selection of fitness by natural market processes. The effect of it should be to conserve our valuable human resource of scholarship and teaching. And one of its by-products is that it gives added incentives for scholars to maintain productivity into their mature years.

Post-Retirement Employment of Teachers

Many colleges and universities located in salubrious climates are already following the practice of appointing teachers who have been retired elsewhere.² The Ford Foundation has endowed a project for the employment of a limited number of retired collegiate teachers.

The practice has a great deal of merit. For those who are not ready to quit, no matter what the calendar may say, these new appointments may mean revived interest in life and professional activity. And it certainly has great financial advantages.

This financial advantage is twofold: added income for the retired teacher is obviously helpful even if modest. But the mere act of deferring the retirement annuity a few years tends to increase its size and adequacy enormously. This is true even if no further contributions are made to the basic retirement fund.

¹ "Is Compulsory Retirement Age Ever Justified?" *Journal of Gerontology*, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1951.

² The author, now 47 years old, is not inviting inquiries of this sort—as much as he approves of the system for others.

The increase arises out of the fact that further compounding of interest in the untouched annuity fund increases the principal; at the same time the reduced life expectancy at the deferred age of retirement increases the annuity that can be distributed from the fund. The effects of annuity deferral are shown in Table II.

TABLE II—MALE LIFE—CURRENT MINIMUM TIAA ANNUITY RATES

Assume \$7,000 salary at age 65 and premiums of 15% of salary history have provided \$250 monthly single life annuity at age 65.

	Amount	Per Cent Increase
(a) Annuity if left paid-up (no further contributions) until age 70.....	\$330.00	32.0
(b) Annuity if premiums are continued at rate of 15% of \$3,500 salary (half terminal salary) to age 70.....	349.51	39.8
(c) Annuity if premiums are continued at the rate of 15% of terminal salary of \$7,000 to age 70...	369.02	47.6

Based on data supplied by William C. Greenough, Vice President of TIAA.

Retirement systems other than the TIAA, if run on standard actuarial principles, would produce about the same results. It is only in non-actuarial systems—such as Social Security—that benefits are not increased by the deferral of retirement.

The most striking fact about this table is the sharp increase in the annuity even if no further contributions are made. Under these circumstances the value of the annuity is increased by 32 per cent. In other words, if a teacher retiring from a college or university should take employment in another institution and at a salary of such modest proportions that neither he nor the employing institution could make further contributions, the increase as a result of deferral would still be material. Continuation of contributions at half rate would lead to an almost 40 per cent increase to an age-65 annuity deferred five years. Continuation of contributions at full rate would amount to about a 47 1/2 per cent increase in the deferred annuity. In other words, the deferral of the annuity is the important element in its increase; continuation of contributions is a further improvement but a less important one.

A single-year extension of retirement increases benefits by

not quite one-fifth of the increase shown for the five-year extension from age 65 to 70. A one-year deferral of the annuity without further contributions increases benefits about 6 per cent; about 7 1/2 per cent at the half rate contribution; and with full contribution the increase would be about 9 per cent.

It is quite likely, however, that the greatest benefit of this post-retirement employment is in the morale of teachers. A very large proportion of those approaching a mandatory retirement age such as that of 65 feel their vigor and competence to have diminished very little. They rightly resent the idea of having to quit before they are really ready for the step. Professional and contributory scholarship may dwindle when those approaching retirement sense a futility in the process. Some persons respond to a change of location with renewed vigor and interest. While some older persons fear to move because the change involves finding new friends and forming a new social life, others find the process stimulating.

The only serious limitation to this practice is that it may involve an awkward or humiliating problem: that of job hunting late in life. It is quite natural that a teacher and scholar who has attained prominence and respect in his discipline should shrink from going about and announcing himself "available." It is done, as those who attend the meetings of learned societies can attest, but it is not always gracefully done. What is needed is more appropriate means for making this availability known without loss of dignity, or injured feelings.

*The Retirement Register*¹

The plan is simply this: The American Association of University Professors would compile an annual confidential register of its members who were approaching retirement that year, and make this register available to college administrations and deans of faculties. It is suggested that the circulation of this register be so confined, and not published or broadcast, as to shield the feelings of those who were not successful in finding placement. A modest registration fee by the Association could easily make the venture self-supporting.

¹ Since writing the first draft of this article it has come to my attention that this idea is not new; it has already been urged on the A.A.U.P. In this case, let me add my voice to the chorus of advocates.

In the beginning the Association might well devote some energy to the matter of encouraging use of the register by academic administrations. While it is doubtful that deans' offices could be expected to "adopt" such a plan formally, they could be encouraged to give the register serious and respectful attention.

Beyond this point the system would be self-operating. Deans of faculties and department heads would examine the names appearing on the register in the discipline in which they had impending vacancies. The appearance of the name of a nationally distinguished scholar would probably create a widespread demand for his services. The names of more modest but respectable scholars would stimulate an appropriate degree of interest. Some laggards would doubtless find the response disappointingly thin.

Just as is now generally true in faculty appointments, contracts and arrangements should be tailored to the individual circumstances. One-year appointments might be common, but employing colleges and universities might reasonably be expected to assist in providing or locating housing for those offered one-year appointments with the understood presumption that it would not be renewed.

When a teacher made a post-retirement switch from a TIAA-connected institution into another under this system, annuity arrangements might involve some administrative problems, but switches into or out of this system should present no obstacle that could not be solved by administrators of good will.

Since these post-retirement appointments would furnish little threat to the prospects of younger faculty members, it might be reasonably expected that the social life of those going into new sites could take on new dimensions of interest and stimulation. Indeed, teachers who had had considerable experience in the direction of graduate study might be of great value in developing the scholarly careers of young teachers located in colleges without graduate schools.

This plan would have its greatest effect during a period of high demand for collegiate teachers. Under such circumstances young teachers would have little to fear from the competition of their mature colleagues. In periods of weaker demand for collegiate teachers, most deans would prefer to add young men to

their staffs; the use of the register would dwindle. The plan thus has a large element of automaticity; it provides elasticity in the effective application of retirement age policy according to the total needs for teaching resources.

The advantages of such a simple arrangement to teachers approaching retirement is too obvious to need amplification. But it seems likely that the plan could have equal advantages for the administrations of colleges and universities. As anyone who has worked in educational administration knows, it is extraordinarily hard to find experienced and responsible persons for short-term appointments. Many times a staff will include promising young men but will have gaps in the middle or top that need filling. Some schools, particularly small liberal arts colleges, cannot afford the fixed charges of many senior appointments, with their presumption of tenure, without slowing down the advance of rising youngsters.

With the expected bulge of collegiate enrollment, many colleges and universities will be needing added staff members, but often they can be acquired without the fixed charges of tenure only by the appointment of the young and inexperienced. Special research projects often open up temporary gaps at quite responsible levels. The systems of visiting professorships of those in the mid-streams of their careers solves this problem at one institution only to leave a gap at another.

But most interestingly, it can be argued that the institutions losing men through retirement would gain an important if intangible benefit from this plan. Teachers approaching retirement would doubtless become aware of the fact that their chances in the market for post-retirement employment depended in some measure on keeping themselves viable, and on the continuation of professional contributions. Rather than slackening in efforts and interest as retirement approached, they would have an added incentive to maintain their usefulness.

It might be argued that the plan involves a serious irony: it contemplates the possibility that a college or university might, by its retirement age policy, lose a valuable member of its faculty to another institution only to replace him by a similar person from elsewhere, with all of the attendant difficulties and costs of transfer. This is a valid criticism. But the offsetting consideration is that

too high a normal or mandatory age of retirement has even greater problems.

As teachers we can take the view that college and university systems properly should furnish tenure up to an age at which most men can be reasonably expected to have retained vigor and professional competence. But it is fair that extensions of active service beyond that point should involve a re-evaluation and re-appraisal of fitness; something that is very much at the heart of this plan.

Administrative Meeting

Professor Hunnicutt retires today.
The college rules are plain: he's sixty-five.
His wife has taken courses, so they say.
She hopes to teach and keep them both alive.
Oh, to be sure, she's past the hiring age,
But public school enrollments are so high,
I'd say she has a chance. Then with her wage
And his two thousand pension, they'll get by.
Their house is nearly paid for, I'd surmise.
(It's really rash to call their prospects grim.)
What more on Hunnicutt? Why, when he dies,
We'll pass a resolution praising him.

ROBERT L. WRIGHT

Michigan State University

THE STONE WHICH THE BUILDERS REFUSED

By MONROE E. DEUTSCH

We are well aware that throughout the life of our nation immigration from foreign lands has brought us many a man and woman who have become outstanding in American life: this is common knowledge. Among the multitude of examples have been Carl Schurz in public life and Michael Pupin in science.

But it was in the 1930's that the tyranny and persecution by Hitler and Mussolini sent a throng to our shores—and among these there came a very large number who have made great contributions not only to the United States but to the world. Among these, for example, there have been six men who have been awarded the Nobel Prize. Some, like Albert Einstein, the German, and Enrico Fermi, the Italian, became Nobel laureates before leaving Europe. Others, like Felix Bloch and Fritz Lipmann, obtained the award after coming to America. In addition to those already mentioned, the list of Nobel prize winners includes James Franck and Otto Stern.

The fields in which some of the new Americans have attained distinction are many:

Architecture: Walter Gropius (German)

Art: Alfred Neumeyer (German)

Art History: Leonardo Olschki (Italian), Erwin Panofsky (German)

Biology: Richard B. Goldschmidt (German), Curt Stern (German)

Classics: Herman F. Frankel (German), Paul Friedlander (German), Werner W. Jaeger (German)

Economics: Gerhard Colm (German), William John Fellner (Hungarian), Edward Heimann (German), Carl Landauer (German), Emil Lederer (German), Hans P. Neisser (German), Arthur Salz (Czechoslovak), Hans Staudinger (German),

Theo Suranyi-Unger (Hungarian), Frieda Wunderlich (German)

Germanic language and literature: Hans M. Wolff (German), Bernard Blume (German)

History: Ernst H. Kantorowicz (Pole), Gaetano Salvemini (Italian)

Literature: Erich M. Remarque (German), Franz Werfel (Czechoslovak)¹

Mathematics: Emil J. Gumbel (German), Hans Lewy (German), Jerzy Neyman (Pole), Alfred Tarski (Pole), Frantisek Wolf (Czechoslovak)

Medicine: Felix Deutsch (Austrian), Fritz A. Lipmann (German)

Music: Adolf Busch (German), Fritz Busch (German), Antal Dorati (Hungarian), Paul Hindemith (German), Otto Klemperer (German), Erich Leinsdorf (Austrian), Emanuel List (Austrian), Fritz Mahler (Austrian), Darius Milhaud (French), Artur Schnabel (Austrian), Arnold Schoenberg, (Austrian), Rudolf Serkin (Czechoslovak), William Steinberg (German), George Szell (Czechoslovak), Bruno Walter (German)

Physics: Hans Bethe (German), Felix Bloch (Swiss by birth, but formerly residing in Germany), Albert Einstein (German), Enrico Fermi (Italian), James Franck (German), Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky (German), Bruno Rossi (Italian), Emilio Segre (Italian), Otto Stern (German), Leo Szilard (Hungarian), Edward Teller (Hungarian)

Philosophy: Kurt Riezler (German)

Political Science: Max Ascoli [also Journalism] (Italian), Arnold Brecht (German), Hans J. Morgenthau (German), Hans Simons (German)

Psychology: Max Wertheimer (Czechoslovak)

This list (extremely incomplete as it necessarily is) includes merely those whom the persecutions of the 1930's drove from Europe for religious or political reasons or both; it does not include the names of those who came at an earlier period or from other lands. Thus, of the Nobel prize winners in Medicine, Selman A. Waksman came to this country from Russia in 1910, and Carl and

¹ The name of Thomas Mann (German), Nobel prize-winner, is omitted, since he did not remain in the United States.

Gerty Cori, born in Czechoslovakia, migrated to the United States in 1922.

The list which has been cited gives at least a hint of the precious gifts which Nazism and Fascism made to America.

The universities of this country have been special gainers, and, as a result, research in the United States has been greatly stimulated. Among the institutions which for a considerable period have utilized the services of one or more of those named are: Brooklyn College, Brown University, University of California (Berkeley and Los Angeles), University of Chicago, Cornell University, George Washington University, Harvard University, The Institute for Advanced Study, Leland Stanford Junior University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mills College, New School for Social Research, Ohio State University, Princeton University, Smith College, Syracuse University, Washington University, and Yale University. Special credit must be given to the New School for Social Research, which, under the title "University in Exile," through the wisdom and humanity of Alvin Johnson, opened its doors wide to the outstanding men and women whom Nazi and Fascist persecution had driven from their homes.

Some of the causes which sent these luminaries to America will be of interest.

Paul Hindemith points out that he was "officially condemned for composing un-German works." Arnold Schoenberg was "forced to resign in accordance with the Aryan edict." Otto Klemperer declares he "was forced to relinquish his post (*i.e.*, as general music director of the Berlin State Opera) with the rise of the Nazi government," and speaks of "his ejection from Germany because of his race." And Emanuel List states that he "transferred his home to the United States on the Nazi occupation of Austria." Franz Werfel informs us that his "books were burned by the Nazis in 1933."

The case of Fermi is especially noteworthy. Mrs. Fermi, in her work *Atoms in the Family*,¹ states:

In the summer of the same year, 1938, Mussolini launched an anti-Semitic campaign for which there were no reasons, no excuses,

¹ Laura Fermi, *Atoms in the Family* (University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 118-120.

no preparation. . . . My father [who was Jewish] had been suddenly and unaccountably dismissed from active service in the Navy and placed in the reserve. . . . The first anti-Semitic laws were passed in September. We at once decided to leave Italy as soon as possible. Enrico and our children were Catholics, and we could have stayed. But there is a limit to what one is willing to tolerate.

And it is to Fermi that the credit is due for the chain-reaction that led to the creation of the atomic bomb. Closely associated with Fermi in this research was Leo Szilard, the Hungarian. Not only, however, is the atomic bomb in its inception to be ascribed to scientists driven from Europe by the persecution of the dictators. It is generally agreed, I believe, that the "inventor" of the hydrogen bomb was another of our transplanted Americans, Edward Teller, Hungarian. Think how much we owe to these three men for security against whatever enemies may assail us. The overwhelming importance of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb is obvious to us all.

But it is not merely these weapons that the newcomers have brought us. In many fields, notably music, physics, economics, and letters, but not only in these, we have profited immeasurably by the stupid, brutal persecution of the Hitlers and the Mussolinis. In music, for example, we have gained an extremely large number of the world's notable conductors, composers, and performers.

To the list which I have given (and I repeat that its incompleteness must be obvious) should be added those driven from Spain by Fascism. Among these are great names, such as those of Luis Quintanilla, declared to be "next after Picasso, Spain's greatest living artist," and of Fernando de los Rios (now deceased), who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Republic, as well as Ambassador to Washington. He settled in this country on the destruction of the Spanish Republic and taught in the New School for Social Research. Of him Claude Bowers says, in his work, *My Mission to Spain*:¹

Fernando de los Rios was the first of the foreign ministers with whom I dealt. Later he was the most cultured diplomat Spain had sent to Washington since Juan Valera was there. His was a

¹ Simon and Schuster (New York, 1954), p. 15.

background of culture and high public service in both politics and education. It was his uncle, Francisco Giner, who molded his mind. He had been a professor at the University of Granada and later at the University of Madrid, of which he was the Rector. Intensely interested in education, a scholar and an orator, he naturally was a liberal in politics. He became a socialist, and later a republican.

Another list of contributions to America could be made up of those who have fled from Communism in Russia and its satellites. One eminent example will suffice: Albert Szent-Györgi, the Hungarian, winner of the Nobel prize in Medicine in 1937.

How true, how very true, are the words of the Bible: "The stone which the builders refused is become the head stone of the corner."¹

¹ Psalms 118.22, Matthew 21.42, Mark 12.10.

WHAT KIND OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION?

By JOHN A. KINNEMAN

Illinois State Normal University

The editors have performed a useful service in opening the pages of the *Bulletin* to a consideration of religion in public education. As an aid to those who may have overlooked the discussion of this question, the reader might refer to Professor Clark's article on this subject in the Winter, 1954-1955 issue.

An editorial note makes it clear that Professor Clark's views are his own and do not represent the views of the group at Western Michigan College with which Professor Clark has made a study of religion and teacher education for the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. Similarly, my views are my own, and in no way constitute an official pronouncement from the "oldest teachers college in the Mississippi Valley."

The question of religious education in the schools is all the more important because everywhere, seemingly, school administrators, curriculum innovators, and even patrons and taxpayers are giving lip service to it. This lip service is derived, in part, from the fear of juvenile delinquency, and is closely associated with the quest for character development. When all else fails, there is a temptation to turn to religion and, too often, as in this instance, to religion for an hour a week of the school's time. Despite ardent attachments to the proposal, little thought has been given to the materials to be used in any such program.

This quest for religion in the schools stems also from the pernicious practice of unloading all our problems at the schoolhouse door. Education, it is naively assumed, will meet any confounding question. It matters not whether the school's personnel—the teachers—are confounded by the questions or not. It is easy, therefore, to agree with Professor Clark that there is "no area

of knowledge" which is so poorly understood. This condition is stimulated all the more because school administrators, captivated by their own programs of community relationships, are not accustomed to resist the demands which are made upon the school's time. Consequently, without understanding all the circumstances which engulf them, they are likely to jump on the band wagon in favor of religious education.

As one of his basic assumptions, Professor Clark writes that our nation "commenced as a haven for religious dissenters." Obviously, during the long colonial period, there were many deviations from this fundamental ideal. For that matter, there may still be too many such departures. However, we are entitled to assume, at least, that we want to keep this nation a haven for religious dissenters. Always, whether he be political innovator or merely a conscientious objector, there is the temptation to remove the dissenter. Despite questionable actions against dissenters taken by the police, by investigative committees, by self-appointed vigilantes and even by regulations of school boards, nevertheless, if our national traditions are to persist, our society must rely upon the courts to preserve the right to dissent.

If we enumerate the most distinctive elements in American national life, is not the acceptance of the separation of church and state—so effectively promulgated by Jefferson in the Virginia statute on religious liberty and in his efforts to establish the publicly supported University of Virginia—one of the few cornerstones of our Americanism? If, with reverence, we again read the First Amendment to the Constitution, or peruse the majority and the minority opinions of the State and the Federal courts dealing with church-state relationships, we are reminded the more, despite our occasional lapses, that the doctrine of separation of church and state was paramount in the thinking of the Founding Fathers and is paramount also in the judicial views of their contemporary interpreters.

Therefore, it is not difficult to agree with Professor Clark that there should be "considerable purification and strengthening of our ideological foundations." Without parading any super-Americanism, thoughtful citizens are entitled to ask, after nearly two centuries of operation under its beneficent guidance, if we

should not be encouraged to purify and strengthen the doctrine of separation of church and state. Is this not one of the few distinctive features in our way of life—one which, when adopted, constituted a truly revolutionary innovation, and departure from old-world traditions?

II

There is need for greater clarification of the concept "religious" than that which Professor Clark gives us. Does he mean that religion and faith are synonymous? If so, faith in what? And religion to what ends? As a basis for consideration of this question, the opponents and the proponents of religious education in the public schools must reach some agreement on when the person is religious. Until such time, it is quite useless to discuss the question. Is the person religious when he becomes proficient in repeating scriptural verses? Or when he demonstrates a high order of ethnocentrism about his affiliations? Or when he shows ardent attachments to the rites his sect prescribes? Or when he is highly demonstrative in exhibiting his loyalties? Surely, the major portion of the religious life lies beyond the realm of these activities.

Bogged down as we are by dogma, there is no certainty that agreement can be reached on the nature of the religious life or when it is achieved. Telling us at one place that "religious faith is not a mischievous social vice," Professor Clark seems to imply that one who holds a faith is entitled to promulgate it at public expense. Although a democracy must preserve for the person the right to maintain his faith—however irritating or annoying it may be to the rest of us—it does not grant him the privilege to impose his faith and his dogma, even when supported by the fiat of the school board. The courts, fortunately, are likely to sustain this position. It is hoped they may continue to do this despite Professor Clark's dismissal of the principle of the *MacCollum* case by the United States Supreme Court as "unfortunate and dubious."

All the proponents of religious education in the public schools might not declare that a willingness to partake of the Lord's Supper is essential to salvation. All of them might not subscribe

to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth; nor adhere to all the sacraments. Or, to use the content of at least one professional person zealous in his desire to accept the principle of "released time" for religious instruction, are we certain that all the proponents want every child, on school time, to learn the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, and the Ten Commandments? To such content there will be many expressions and acts of opposition, especially from religious minorities. Surely, before religious education is considered too extensively or even too heatedly, there should be some tentative agreement on the *content* to be used. Probably there can be agreement on the worthy ends to be attained, but not the means. This generalization stands also for the education of teachers to handle this uncertain body of material.

When religious education in the schools, therefore, is discussed, there is no certainty that the content of instruction shall be functional, or dogmatic and doctrinal, or institutional. Or, could it include all three of these phases? In at least some aspects of his presentation, Professor Clark leans to the third of these choices—at least when he writes that religious education should "appear as part" of American history. If the graduates of our public schools could have some understanding of the social forces which produced the Mormons, the Disciples of Christ, the United Brethren in Christ, the Unitarians, Jehovah's Witnesses, and a host of other sects—each of which is the product of the principles of free inquiry and of the separation of church and state—the exponents of the institutional interpretation could only cheer the results of public education. But many of our teachers have no understanding of such valid sectors of knowledge. If possessed at all, their meager knowledge is associated too often with condemnation of "strange" religions.

It could be hoped, also, that every literate American might know something of such bodies of material as the rise of the Papacy, the development of the mediaeval church, the Inquisition, monastic life, the doctrine of the sacraments, canon law, Gothic architecture, the Reformation and its principal personalities, the Roman and the Anglican churches, even church music, and many similar bodies of material. There was a time, before the abandonment of such essentials by the school, when such content was taught

as history. It is an unfortunate fact that this body of material is increasingly neglected in the education of teachers. It would be possible to restore it to its rightful place as history without developing a new content in religion.

In these days, too, when there is such a great quest for the contemporaneous in the curriculum, it might be hoped that an extended and enlarged literacy would enable the youthful citizen to see each of these historical phenomena in its current setting. But these materials are not religious except as familiarity with them may lead to an enlightened understanding, a broader tolerance, and more humane conduct.

But, to achieve such commendable goals, it is not necessary to organize any new courses in religion, as so many people of good will are so likely to urge. Instead of talking of life adjustment, character education, vocational competence, the education of the whole child, and other forms of educational necromancy, all that educators have to do is to restore to the curriculum some essential topics of study which were totally abandoned when European History or World History was dropped from the curriculum in favor of typing, marriage relationships, life adjustment, the man in the motor car, and social adjustment. Let us be certain, too, that these materials of worth be accorded more than an hour a week!

In meeting the child's needs, Professor Clark, by analogy, assumes that religion is akin to medicine—that, since one is allowed to operate under school surveillance, the other should, also. This is a telling point. But there is a difference. To one who refuses to refrain from criticism of the medical sciences, it is clear that their therapies are reasonably well defined—but, again, not for all people who send their children to the public schools. Until such time as the exponents of religious instruction can define their terms, limit their field, prescribe their therapies, and make their content explicit, they should be denied, it seems, access to children, on school time and in school property. Meanwhile, it is necessary to define our terms and limit our fields.

III

Although it is not germane to the question at hand, it is, never-

theless, unfortunate that Professor Clark sweeps the decks clear when he asserts that "comparative religion courses are given by instructors whose estimate of religion is only a refinement of Marx's idea that it is the opium of the people." At this juncture one is entitled to ask whether the author is writing as a scholar or as a protagonist.

Even more unfortunate, it seems, is his claim "that those most opposed" to religious education in the schools "could be classed as the unchurched." Many of my friends—lay as well as professional—who have opposed certain proposals for religious instruction in the schools, will be obliged henceforth, as it is known they can do, to offer certificates of churchmanship.

For this writer, Professor Clark has not established the case for religious education in the public schools. Neither has he proved the necessity for courses to train teachers in this aspect of professional activity. At the same time there is no belief on the writer's part that the case against religious education is established. If, before they embrace any proposals for religious education, the readers will be apprised of the importance of selecting appropriate and non-dogmatic materials, this brief rejoinder will have served some purpose. Also, as materials are selected, it will be well if objectives are refined and a clear-cut analysis is made of the conditions under which the person is religious. Until these questions are answered, there should be some restraint upon our impulses to solve so many of our current problems through religious education.

"COLORED" DEGREES IN "WHITE" COLLEGES?

By IRA LUNAN FERGUSON

Tuskegee Institute

Dr. Guy B. Johnson, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of North Carolina, surveyed 22 Southern colleges and universities attended by both white and colored students during 1952-53.¹ Among other findings, he discovered that many white professors in these institutions admitted that they sometimes gave Negro students passing grades for work which would not have been acceptable from white students.

Out of the kindness of their hearts, these white professors believe that, in setting up this "double standard" of grading their students, they are doing the Negro a good turn, and are in a measure making up to him for his history of academic deprivation and inadequate educational opportunities. These well-meaning teachers rationalize this double standard in terms of fairness to the Negro students who have not had the training and preparation available to the average white student. I have occasionally heard of such concessions being granted to some Negro students even in a few Northern universities.

Of the more than 17 million Negroes in this country, approximately 70% live in the South. A large percentage of those now in the North originally came from the South. As a consequence, most Negro students in Northern colleges and universities and in the newly opened-to-Negroes "white" colleges in the South are products of the inferior elementary and secondary schools of the South into which the Negroes are segregated. It is therefore quite true that the Negro student is at a definite disadvantage because of his poor academic background. We must remember, however, that there are white students who in many in-

¹ Johnson, Guy B., "Racial Integration in Public Higher Education in the South," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, p. 317, Summer 1954.

stances graduated from high schools which are similarly sub-standard. As the situation now stands, such disadvantaged white students may do either of two things—they may, by assiduous, industrious application, make up their deficiencies by taking extra or remedial sub-collegiate courses, or they may drop out of college. In essence, then, the practice of giving the Negro the benefit of special consideration and concessions that are not given white students is tantamount to discrimination in reverse! Negroes don't want to be discriminated against, and they don't want whites to be discriminated against in their behalf. They want to be treated just like anyone else—no worse, no better.

An academic "double standard" will more effectively operate to keep the Negro in his depressed condition than will out-and-out, forthright exclusion, because employers, not knowing of the classroom indulgences, will quite logically conclude that, even when exposed to the same training which whites receive, the Negro is still unable to measure up. Here are two young men, one white, one colored, who have graduated from an excellent integrated college with B-minus averages. Their records indicate equal collegiate performance, implying equal competence in their areas of emphasis. However, other things being equal, when the two men are placed side by side on the job, the lower level of performance rated acceptable for the Negro while he was in college incapacitates him for on-the-job success in competition with his white classmate whose progress through college was controlled by uncompromising, well-known high standards. What conclusion would the most impartial observer come to if he did not know of the operation of the double standard? He would conclude, of course, that the Negro, despite his graduation from the college, is nonetheless inferior, unequal to the acid test of on-the-job performance. Of what value to that individual Negro student, to the entire Negro race, and to society, are the indulgences and concessions given this colored student by his professors in college?

As long as the Negro student is given such concessions and is thus encouraged to maintain a lower level of performance, he will never be equipped to compete on equal terms with white college graduates in the United States. In the past, when Negroes were relegated almost exclusively to operating in a "Jim Crow" society

in the South, and even in some Northern communities, for that matter, it is understandable that some professors in integrated colleges may have asked themselves, "Why bother to give colored students the same high quality of instruction and other collegiate exposures anyway, when they will be going right back to their Jim Crow world, that demands less than A-class standards?" As a Negro myself, I even consider it quite conceivable that this double standard of grading may sometimes be a sly means of perpetuating the educational depression of Negroes, especially in circumstances where Southern colleges may be compelled by legal pressure or public opinion to admit Negroes. Negroes prefer equality of treatment. They want to demonstrate their capacity for performing at the same high level to which white students aspire in the Southern "white" colleges. They want to feel that their college degree is a representative degree of the institution conferring it, a good degree, not a "colored" degree.

Negroes want to attend integrated colleges and universities, there to compete on equal terms with all students, and to be exposed to identical classroom standards, requirements, and expectations. They want to be evaluated by the same high standards exacted of white students. They want to know that an "A" or "B" or "C" grade from an instructor represents just that, and nothing less.

Negroes do not want to feel inferior, of course; but a sense of inferiority can arise in more ways than one. When it becomes apparent and is known that well-meaning white professors are applying a double standard in the grading of work submitted by colored students, the feeling that the Negro is inferior is reinforced, not only in the Negro himself but also in the minds of his white classmates. Like some students of all races, there will be a few Negroes who will greedily seek a passing grade for failing work. But *exceptio regulum probat*; and the vast majority of Negroes want and seek no special favors. This attitude is not ingratitude, but realism. Negro students want to be considered capable of making up deficiencies in their preparation. If a Negro student does not have the background, then let us insist that he get the background. It is available, and he can get it in the very same manner that the white student whose background is inadequate gets it. If a Negro

student does not have the ability, then let him do exactly what the white student with low level academic ability does, namely, transfer to a more realistically attainable goal. This may mean seeking terminal training in an area for which he has the aptitude.

The temptation is always very great to give the underdog a break. But indulgence in this "double standard" actually boomerangs to the disadvantage of the Negro student in whose favor it is designed to operate.

AN ENQUIRY, WHETHER THE DIFFERENTIAL AND INTEGRAL CALCULUS SHOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE UNDERGRADUATE ENGLISH CURRICULUM

*Being in the form of a letter to the writer's
Cousin, a man who has long professed English
literature, from John W. McReynolds, farmer,
of Pottawatomie County, Kansas.*

Dear Cousin:

Dignum it is, and *justum* in the highest degree, that one who has been called Associate Professor of Technical Journalism—the title awes me yet!—should spend his declining years firing broadsides at the departments of English. In the first place, we tend naturally toward meanness, and you will remember that I have been for some years *ex officio* the butt of all the clever unkindnesses of all the dewey-eyed English instructors who have happened down the pike. (It is true, surely, that the speech professors bear some part of this melancholy burden, but they do not even pretend to write.) And however dishonorable a motive the spirit of revenge may be, it often takes unto itself a deal of efficacy. In the second place, Cousin, I have expended many hours and much patience in showing what a sentence is, or a noun is, or a period is, to young people who had already been certified to at least a passing proficiency in English composition by your own blighted English departments.

St. Paul wrote—in inspired English, I may add—highly of charity; and his argument convinces, to a point. I can therefore easily forgive you all the brutal humor that a University man must void at the sight of a fellow creature busily teaching the 5 W's and calling himself Professor on the strength of it. But I cannot so easily forgive those teachers who do not do their job.

It is interesting to observe how the younger learned professions, such ones as journalism, radio, speech, and even sociology and psychology, do pay a furious court to the college freshman. They

seek, it would appear, to indoctrinate in order that they may become established. But English, history, government, and the like seem—apart from the understandable tendency to acquire freshman sections as a means of subsistence for their impecunious graduate students—they seem, I say, to regard the freshman as a necessary evil, peculiar to the profession. This view I take to be the right view; but evil is to be dealt with, not ignored.

Speaking absolutely without regard to the *oughtness* of the matter, even the most hasty glance at our colleges and universities will show that Society does not regard scholarship as a sufficient *ratio essendi* for the Professor. Thus, should I ever seek employment in my own field of academic endeavor, and hope to while away the hours thinking about the theory that lies behind our government, or the theory that there is any such theory to be found there, I imagine that I shall be allowed to do so only on condition that I spend some of my time teaching American government to underclassmen. I know not if this be an educational philosophy; that it is a state of affairs, I am certain. I have no desire to question it. It seems eminently fair. And I take the case to be even so with thee, sweet Coz. If you would inquire into *The Banana in Chinese Literature*—I have seen the printed thesis, I swear it!—you may do so, and Godspeed; but you must also teach the freshman how to write English.

At the close of his sophomore year—which is to say, at the end of some fourteen years of schooling—I think the young American might reasonably be expected to do all of the following: He should be able to read and write English, and he should *do* both, which means more than mere ability; he should be able to list a dozen of the principal contributors to the language, and give a few lines from each; he should be able to divide the history of his language into some meaningful group of periods; and he should regard reading and writing as the natural occupations and duties which the privilege of an education entails. When I consider English departments as teaching establishments, I find that you do not attain to this; more, I do not believe many of you even pretend to attain to it any more.

II

This is an enquiry which concerns matters mathematical, and I have journeyed thus far into the whole matter of the English department that you will the more readily follow when we come to the mathematics itself. I shall urge the calculus, as you will see, largely on the grounds that it enhances literacy.

Language—and that this may be opinion rather than fact in no way alters the tenacity with which I hold to the opinion—begins in poetry and ends in the symbols of the mathematician. The general quadratic equation and its solution (for this much you may remember of your own schoolboy days) express, in a few symbols properly arranged, and in a calm precision, what a host of untoward words could scarcely convey. The mathematician, as the novelist, spends years in the poignant examination of his own chosen aspect of the larger reality. When he has done, as the novelist, he wishes—indeed, he *must*!—communicate. It is more than mere conjunction of figures to observe that Dawn's rosy fingers and Einstein's *e*'s and *m*'s and *c*'s are all of a piece.

And now the drift of my first argument is at once made plain. A literate I take to be one who has some mastery of expression. Of absolute necessity in any mathematical enquiry is maximum, if not perfect, precision of expression. This perfection the mathematicians call "rigor." The conclusion follows naturally, and I do not intend to belabor the argument. It is probably within your own lifetime that the mathematics and classics departments anxiously embraced one another and, in an alliance born of desperation, suffered themselves to be called mental disciplines, and allowed themselves to be pursued for this end in order to be pursued at all. How many poor unfortunates, desiring first to be loved for themselves alone and finding none to love them, have hopefully given up their womanhood for mere femaleness, and given it in vain!

To continue, it is difficult to draw the line between weakness and perversion, and I shall make no attempt to declare whether my argument in favor of the calculus be weak, or perverted. I simply

make it. It has been made before. Mathematics should be required of the English undergraduate because it compels him to examine precise expression.

Now, I freely and openly concede that there is little in scientific literature—nowadays—which really deserves to be called literature. It has not been always thus, as I demonstrate swiftly and surely by taking *New Experiments and Observations Touching Cold, or An Experimental History of Cold, begun*, by the Honourable Robert Boyle, and opening it at random.

. . . And indeed induc'd by such considerations of that kind, as seem'd the least doubtfull, I remember I sometime made several experiments of the weight of some metals, and stones, both before and after they had been much expos'd to a more vehement Cold, than would have suffic'd to turn water into ice, and also after they had been, if I may so speak, thaw'd in a warm Air. But the paper in which we registered the events of these trials having been mislay'd, I dare not charge my memory with the particulars. Only, if I mistake not, one or two of the stones seemed to have increased in weight, after having been buried in our frigorifick mixture . . .

. . . and so on. Only rarely are we given a Rachel Carlson, who has the abundancy of gifts and graces necessary to one who would measure the salinity of the whale's path. *Thaw'd in a warm Air!* Show that to your physics department, and if they, with a vehement Cold, tell you that the language is unscientific—which, of course, it is—it will be because your fathers lacked the grace to teach them English in their youth.

But we cannot cast *The American Scientist* into the outer darkness solely because it is not written in the grand manner; what that journal may lose on the one hand, I think it must gain on the other, as our technical successes bear blatant, if not eloquent, witness. Mathematics is not only a precise, but also very useful, language. It is spoken in this country. I do not urge that it should be acquired as *the* style—may God forbid it!—but as *a* style; its rudiments are readily acquired.

So much for the first argument, which, as I say, I have neither the desire nor the patience to expound in full. My second argument will, I dare to hope, appeal to you more, although your ignor-

ance may, when added to my own, create some barriers in our attempt to reach a real understanding.

Cousin, I hold you to be abysmally ignorant of the nature and extent of the scientific, or technical, revolution whose fruits so abundantly surround us. I trust to your good nature that you will find no offense in the pungency of my expression, for anyone who has taught must know the difference between ignorance and stupidity; and although there are occasions in which ignorance may be stupid, there are others in which it is only unfortunate; and indeed, as Augustine must have felt, there are even some occasions in which it is honorable.

Algebra and plane geometry, and the physics of a generation ago, are all that you have of the inner workings of this vast intellectual, even cultural, stride called Science. I grant—Cousin, I urge—that in your own educated humanity you are aware of its effects; the man who is not must be a simple clod, indeed. You know what they have done, *but you know not how they have done it*. I suppose you have attained to such proficiency in the classics as had Leacock—you will remember that he could take a page of Latin and a page of Greek and tell at a glance which was which. I cannot, then, say that the language of science is as Greek to you—there is no comparison to make. You do not know it.

III

It becomes my present task to demonstrate to you, clearly and conclusively, that the differential and integral calculus are the introductions to the language of science; that nothing less will suffice. My first argument, of course, is that I know more about it than you do; which is little enough, at that. I have sat in those classrooms longer and more recently than you. But I doubt me that you are presently prepared to receive a philosophy (as it were) from my hands, and I assume you wish a higher authority than mine. Such authority is, unfortunately, difficult to find. F. Klein, in a technical work—he was a technical man—touches upon it:

... Everyone who understands the subject will agree that even the basis on which the scientific explanation of nature rests is intel-

ligible only to those who have learned at least the elements of the differential and integral calculus

But he does not prove it, nor does he attempt to. The chairman of a friendly mathematics department tells me that no authority has bothered with such an exposition because for two centuries it has been an obvious, patent, almost a mere, fact!

Let me then ask you to pick up a dozen or so college catalogues. Look at the scientific and mathematical and technical curricula. The calculus is there writ large, and at the beginning of things. Even in the social sciences, observe about you the part the statistician plays, and then re-examine your catalogs. True it may be that there are schools who give statistics courses to those who have not the calculus; but, Cousin, read between those lines and you will discover that in some places the mathematicians will have nothing to do with such courses, and that they are given by the other disciplines themselves; and that in other places, when the mathematicians do give such courses, they give them with obvious reluctance; and that in all places, in order to acquire any real competence in statistics—which threatens now to become the master social science—the scholar must begin with the differential and integral calculus.

Lastly, I require that you pick up and examine the journals. Sigma's and f 's and integral signs bespeckle their pages and mark them for what they are as surely as capitals and rhymes were once used to identify poetry. Let us move on. Any further attempt at proof would reduce our pleasant discourse to the frivolous austerity of a technical paper. I have said the calculus is the introduction to the language of science, and I shall henceforth hold the point as having been made and admitted. What is more to our own purpose, I shall pass on to an examination, wherein I support my thesis, that the English undergraduate should learn that language.

We attended earlier to the matter of literacy and self-expression. I put forward the demand that a young man with fourteen years of schooling ought to be able to express himself; and I spoke, or certainly implied, my own deep concern that he quite often cannot. But now I find myself, after such long and pleasant converse, to be of happier countenance; I admit, for the sake of our family

if for no other, that he *can* express himself. But, Cousin, with much of the last two centuries of Western thought obscure to him, and when I consider how much he is a child of that part which is obscure, I am forced to the question, *What has he got to express?*

Your literate man must not only know how to talk to the world about him—here I take the calculus to be at least helpful—but he must also know what goes on in it. To this end, I take the calculus to be absolutely necessary. Surely I do not expect this literate man to write sonnets in, nor even about, algebra. But is it not true that a necessary prelude to successful communication (which means literacy) is a sort of community of ideas? Stevenson, in his essay on the English Admirals, speaks of Regulus going back to Carthage. The almost passionate conclusion to one of Kipling's best stories depends not only upon the phrase, *Si monumentum requiris, circumspice*, but (with a magnificent audacity of rhetoric) upon its being explained by an Asiatic who has but recently come to understand it to an Englishman who has understood it in full for the better part of his life. "And this is the second jest," says he. But who am I, who am what I was, to talk of this to you, who are what you are? Regulus and Carthage have been a part of the English-speaking world. Surely it needs no demonstration, that science is as much a part of this century as Regulus was of the last!

IV

Why learn the rudiments of the language of science? My dear Cousin, suppose someone should ask you why anyone should learn the rudiments of English. I imagine you would stare in unconcealed amazement and splutter something to the effect that, "Why, Sir! Because he *ought!* Because *everyone ought!*" And when we have done with all our discourse, I think this to be the best reason for studying the calculus.

Fair Harvard (and I have told you this before) offers a science course to those students who do not intend to major in science. The course considers celestial and terrestrial mechanics, and perseveres all the way into simple nuclear reactions. The catalogue expressly states that there are no mathematical requirements for

this course. (I have no particular quarrel with Harvard, Cousin; but, to Her everlasting glory, Her catalogue speaks plainly and clearly.) I cannot choose but feel such preparation to be inadequate. I do not think it does what I would have you set out to do.

We see about us, in this great flux of comprehensive and general education courses, an attempt to rectify our all-too-narrow learning. But I fear me this method falls far short. It is not sufficient that we lead our student carefully about the outer rim of science. We must see that he learns to walk boldly into the thing itself.

And now, good Cousin, I would make one thing especially clear to you. I hold no desire at all to find myself in a world of scientists. I seek no septic Utopia full of polished porcelain and shining steel. Indeed, I do not pretend that the calculus alone is sufficient to bring such a world into being. But I wish that our men of letters could better understand our men of science. A generation of English majors who have been schooled in *all* our language will, I take it, be fairly well prepared to add the leaven of *humanitas* to our often inhuman world.

I hold what I hold because of a strong conviction that I think it would add depth to our civilization. I think the process, the growth, the fulfillment, will be reciprocal; and that as Society arms and anoints Herself for Her proper task, humanity must be tempered in the vehement Cold of science, even as science must grow large, thaw'd in humanity's warm Air.

I sign myself, ever affectionate
and respectful,

YOUR COUSIN JOHN

STUDENTS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE DUMB

By MORTON CRONIN

University of Minnesota

A common complaint of college instructors is that their students do not ask enough questions, do not enter enthusiastically into discussions and, in general, seem to lose the faculty of speech when confronted with the subject-matter of their courses. This state of affairs is usually attributed to simple apathy on the part of students, to a failure of imagination and intellectual enterprise, or to their consuming preoccupation with the primitive concerns of young people. These explanations undoubtedly hit the mark in many instances. But they do not tell the whole story, nor even the most important part of it. Another ingredient, deep in the grain of our culture, is at work, one which exerts a powerfully inhibiting force on all students alike, whether they be bright or dull, and that ingredient is nothing more than a conventional expectation in academic society that students will be on the dumb side and, in particular, that they will be inarticulate in class.

This expectation, of course, is in accord with a portion of reality. Some students are on the dumb side and cannot speak with facility. So far, so good. But some students possess alert and perceptive minds and do not have to fumble for words. There are, I believe, enough such students in almost every class to ask as many questions as an instructor wishes to answer and to keep as many discussions going as he wishes to conduct. Why is it that one does not hear even from them very often? I maintain that it is because they have learned from experience that it does not pay. The conventional expectation that students will be slow-witted and tongue-tied not merely reflects certain facts of academic life; it also expresses a notion of propriety. Consequently, when a student disappoints this expectation, he does so at his peril.

It should not puzzle us that students have been cast in this

rôle. It is a rôle which has been assigned to subordinate classes the world over. In saying this, let me hurry to add that I do not mean to suggest that American students are grievously abused. Judging from what I know of students in other countries, those in America enjoy unusually genial relations with their instructors. But nevertheless one group—the instructors—is in authority, and the other group—the students—is subordinated, and this relationship is confirmed by some of the same devices which characterize class systems in general. A European peasant, when dealing with his landlord, will often conceal his not inconsiderable shrewdness and assume an air of cheerful stupidity. And if he is interrogated by an official, his inability to comprehend the questions or make any suitable reply may achieve really impressive proportions. And, of course, many American Negroes have learned that the best way to stay out of trouble with whites and avoid a reputation for impertinence is to play it dumb. In similar fashion, college students have discovered that if they slip out of their prescribed rôle by frequently asking questions and speaking with normal fluency, their instructors will too often respond with surprise, anxiety and, finally, indignation. Furthermore, the strength of the convention which they abuse is confirmed by the fact that their fellow students will react in the same way.

But I can hear the objection that it is not the genuinely curious student who evokes disapproval—it is only the rude and obnoxious student, or the show-off who is not happy unless he can draw attention to himself.

Maybe so. But let us consider this proposition in the light of the convention which is the subject of this essay. First of all, what is the test of rudeness? If we expect students to be dumb and timid, then the threshold which divides politeness from rudeness will be established at such a low level that the bright and vivacious student in particular is liable to soar above it. If a visiting fireman enters our office, cheerfully introduces himself, and offers to shake hands, we think nothing of it—such behavior is expected of him; but if a student should smoothly execute that routine, we would probably think him a very cool customer indeed.

Secondly, the convention itself is one of the causes of behavior

which, judged by almost any standards, actually is obnoxious. A student who expresses himself beyond the usual limits sometimes becomes so affrighted by his own boldness, when the realization of what he is doing dawns on him, that he decides he might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb. Certainly the student who sets out to be rude is an exceedingly rare animal.

As for the show-off, here again the convention casts its peculiar light. It is much easier for a student to seem like a show-off than it is, say, for one of our colleagues. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for a student to be a show-off and at the same time genuinely interested in his studies. This second characteristic often escapes our notice for the simple reason that we can hardly believe that it is real.

II

So far my remarks have concerned undergraduates. But it is interesting to consider what happens to the convention in the case of graduate students. Let us begin by sketching the typical scene in a seminar. A small group of students are seated around a table, at one end of which the professor presides. The physical arrangement makes it easy for students to exchange ideas among themselves and with their instructor. Furthermore, the instructor usually remains seated and does not ordinarily lecture. Finally, the main part of the proceedings consists of the reading of papers which the students themselves—not the instructor—have written. In view of these circumstances, one would think that here, if anywhere, students would ask questions eagerly and express their views in a normal tone of voice and with as much fluency of diction as they naturally possess. One would expect, in fact, that each such session would be in danger of becoming clamorous.

Who has experienced many clamorous seminars? The truth, of course, is that seminars are famous for the somnolence of their atmosphere, a somnolence contradicted only by the rigidity of those who read their papers and a kind of sleepy tension created by the fact that the students, however decorously, are in competition with each other. In the discussion which follows the reading of a paper, a modified version of the convention I have defined

rules the situation. Graduate students are not supposed to be as dim-witted and uninformed as undergraduates, but they are supposed to be no less timorous and inarticulate than the latter. If one listened to a recording of a seminar discussion, one could easily tell, in nine cases out of ten, which voice belonged to the professor. It would be the voice which sounded natural in its intonations, was normally fluent, and whose statements were developed at some length. The short remarks, the awkward phrases, the long pauses between words, the apologetic tones—these would be the students' contributions. The chief reason that one could not identify the instructor's voice in every instance, without exception, is that some scholars become, in their student days, so perfectly adapted that they cannot adjust to a new dispensation.

If he were not familiar with academic life, an observer might conclude, after visiting a seminar, that the teaching profession is not recruiting the kind of men that it used to. He would find it hard to believe that, before very long, when these students have received their advanced degrees, most of them will learn to function as teachers with as much aplomb as those who now teach them. Indeed, the chances are that the seminar which he visited contained individuals who have already performed successfully as teachers and some, even, who are doing so at the same time that they pursue their advanced studies. But if they are well adapted, they will possess one style as teachers, a radically different one as students.

The convention for diffidence is, if anything, stronger among graduate students than it is among undergraduates. The latter, being younger, are expected to kick up their heels occasionally and, so long as they are coltish about it, their instructors will not become seriously alarmed. Then, too, the faculty does not have much power over the future careers of undergraduates. But the case is different for M.A. and Ph.D. candidates, most of whom wish to enter the teaching profession. They are usually too old to give convincing performances as colts, and their future careers are largely in the hands of their professors. In their case the etiquette which decrees timidity in students is potently reinforced by their competition for professional success. Faculty recommendations, more than anything else, will determine their

first jobs, and even their subsequent progress in the academic world may depend upon the good opinion of their former mentors. Consequently, the successful graduate student is an exceedingly circumspect individual, the very last to bruise a convention.

There is, of course, a great discipline involved here. It sometimes requires heroic self-control for a graduate student to master his interest to the point where he can sit in class, usually for two hours, and confine himself to one or two brief remarks. I am reminded of a young man I knew in my own student days who fell so absurdly in love with his subject that it was his favorite topic of conversation, both in class and out. He was generally regarded as eccentric, eventually accepted this estimate as just, and mended his ways, but not before he had done himself considerable damage. As he explained it to me, he would have reformed sooner if the word *exciting* had not been a popular one among the professors in his department. They often used it in describing their field of study, and my friend for a long time clung to the belief that, in asking numerous questions and articulating his own excitement, he was in harmony with his environment. He gradually discovered that his *sincerity*—another popular word in his department—was widely regarded as questionable. A sizeable number of both his professors and his fellows, finding such enthusiasm incredible in a student, classified it as a form of apple-polishing.

Indeed, the emphasis on diffidence in graduate students has led to a survival mechanism which someone, borrowing a term from Negro-white relations in America, has dubbed "the alliance pattern." I well remember my astonishment, at the beginning of my own career as a graduate student, when one of my fellows asked me who my white man was. He explained that in certain parts of America a Negro often formed an alliance with an influential white man. In return for his acceptance of the rôle of loyal client and retainer, together with his performance of whatever duties that position entailed, the Negro could count on his patron to find him employment, speak for him in court and, in general, mediate between him and the white community. My informant insisted that this situation was duplicated in the relations of graduate students and professors!

The drawing of such a parallel represents, of course, a gross

parody of life in a graduate school. But one can discern a vein of truth in it. Regardless of how well they may perform on examinations, graduate students devote an inordinate amount of time to worrying about whether their instructors *like* them, a fact which results from their conviction that their success on their prelims, the acceptance of their theses, and the start which they make in their professional careers will largely depend on whether or not they have endeared themselves to their professors. And this conviction, whether correct or not, is at least partly a consequence of the conventional insistence on demureness in students. If a student must please by adopting a becoming shyness of manner, as well as by proving his intellectual competence, he comes under a double strain, especially because it is not always easy to salute both of these flags at the same time. Not infrequently it requires great ingenuity to demonstrate one's competence in a really modest way. We should not be surprised, therefore, that graduate students resort to the alliance pattern in an attempt to diminish their anxieties, and thus unwittingly create in some departments the atmosphere of an Oriental court.

III

Let me begin my peroration by asking the question, Who is to blame for all this? The answer, of course, is that no one is to blame in the ordinary sense of that word. The convention I have discussed is so camouflaged in our democratic society that we are scarcely conscious of it. In fact, about the only time we become aware of it is when it is affronted—which explains the instructor who declares, with no conscious insincerity whatever, that he wishes his students would express themselves with greater freedom, and then becomes apprehensive when the occasional deviant actually does so.

Still, if the situation is ever changed, it is the professors who will have to change it, for they are in charge. But why change it? A measure of subordination for students is a pedagogical necessity, and one might argue that placing an inhibition on their speech is a comparatively mild device for maintaining the teacher's authority—better, let us say, than putting students in uniform.

I am not prepared in this essay to assess the relative merits of such devices. But I suggest that the one which we have inspected should either be abandoned, or it should be frankly recognized for what it is and enforced without lip service to an ideal of free expression which contradicts it. If we continue to use it—as we probably shall—students should be explicitly informed that they are free to express themselves on examinations, in formal reports, and when specifically called upon in class, but that otherwise they are expected to present quiet and bashful personalities. I need hardly remark that college life, with its relentless stress on marks, honors, and recommendations, is already profoundly competitive. It might not be wise, even for Americans, to open up another area in which students are free to measure themselves against one another and against their instructors. But in any event, the status of the area should not remain ambiguous. However we decide to conduct the contest, the boundaries of the playing field ought to be well marked.

CENTRAL OFFICE NOTES

End of the Interim. As the wrapper is torn from this issue of the *Bulletin*, the three-month interim administration of the Acting General Secretary will have ended, and the Association's fourth General Secretary, Dr. Ralph F. Fuchs, will have assumed his duties. Barring sudden catastrophe, it appears that the Acting General Secretary (now resuming his familiar title of Associate Secretary) and the Staff Associate will have succeeded in their purpose—to give the Association a smooth transition between the tragically interrupted administration of Dr. Himstead to the pre-arranged beginning of the administration of Dr. Fuchs. We know that boasting is bad form, but the Central Office staff should be pardoned some modest satisfaction as it contemplates two *Bulletins* edited in three months; 2500 letters mailed; membership records, dues payments, and address changes kept up to date; the Association's books audited; the most urgent Committee A work attended to; the decencies and civilities of numerous relationships preserved under trying circumstances—this in the heat of a Washington summer, in what some of us used to call vacation season. In language of fitting modesty and solemnity: We hope that what has been done will meet the approval of the incoming General Secretary, the Council, and the membership.

Ralph F. Fuchs. A statement on the General Secretaryship, with a photograph and brief sketch of the General Secretary, appears elsewhere in this issue. Dr. Fuchs will, in due time, acquaint the membership with his outlook on his new position, the rôle of the Central Office, and the prospects for the Association. Perhaps the kindest thing his prospective colleagues can do for him, on the eve of his accession, is to warn the membership not to expect too much progress too quickly. Dr. Fuchs is a man of great ability, and he will serve the Association faithfully; but the Association will, perhaps for a number of months to come, continue to have a professional staff of only three, and there will continue to be enough work for six. The entire Central Office staff—profes-

sional, semi-professional, and clerical—has tried to give the new General Secretary a break by clearing away as much old business as possible. If the membership will give him a break by not expecting miracles, and by continuing its support, the staff will in time be increased, and the work of the Association will move forward.

Committee Appointments. The President of the Association, Professor William E. Britton, has been scrutinizing all committees with a view to possible changes in personnel. Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure is in process of complete reorganization, and a special sub-committee on "Fifth Amendment cases" and related matters (mentioned in the Spring issue) is assuming shape. Appointments to Committee E on the Organization and Conduct of Chapters are being completed. Committee T on the Place and Function of Faculties in College and University Government, whose final report was published in the Spring *Bulletin*, will be inactive as regards investigatory work; procedures concerning the equally important matter of the dissemination of information are under consideration. Committee O on Organization and Policy is in the midst of important activities and discussions concerning changes in the Constitution. Committee Z on the Economic Status of the Profession will shortly begin its biennial study of salaries in 41 selected institutions, to be published in the Winter issue of the *Bulletin*. New committees have been established as follows, in accordance with actions taken by the Council at its meetings in March:

Programs (to work with the General Secretary): Robert L. Calhoun (Theology), Yale University, Chairman; Mary L. Coolidge (Philosophy), Wellesley College; Richard H. Shryock (History), The Johns Hopkins University.

Publications: Graydon S. DeLand (Journalism), Florida State University, Chairman; W. Norwood Brigance (Speech), Wabash College; Roland E. Wolseley (Journalism), Syracuse University.

Eligibility for Membership: Douglas Maggs (Law), Duke University, Chairman; George Pope Shannon (English), Central Office; William L. Tayler (Political Science), Dickinson College.

Committee A Midway. The report of Committee A in the Spring *Bulletin* showed the unprecedented number of 108 cases "pending"

at the end of the year 1954. Slightly more than half of these remained quiet (*i.e.*, requiring no correspondence or other action) during the first six months of 1955. The rest required more or less attention. Of the "quiet" cases, some will continue to sleep, since the conditions out of which they arose have altered, or the teachers concerned have lost interest, or the investigators are convinced that everything possible has been accomplished. When it is reasonably sure that nothing more is to be done, these cases will be counted as "closed." Other "quiet" cases will require a certain amount of further attention; most of them are cases in which the Central Office staff has not found time to take the necessary concluding steps, in the face of more urgent demands. On the other hand, a few of the temporarily "quiet" cases will not be concluded either quickly or easily. As for the other half—or slightly less than half—of the 108 "pending" cases, all have required and received attention during the first six months of 1955. Some were concluded early in the year, but most are still "pending," and at least a dozen of them have been very active indeed, and could, if given all the attention needed, have absorbed most of the time of the Central Office staff. Meanwhile, there has been no moratorium on new unhappiness. The approximately 26 weeks through June 30 were closely matched by two dozen or more new cases, maintaining the standard rate, in recent years, of a new case a week. One of the new cases has already resulted in a visit by an investigating committee to "an institution in the Southwest," as mentioned in this department in the Spring *Bulletin*. No precise count has been made on cases "closed" in the first six months; their number roughly approximates that of the new cases.

Hail Utopia? Also mentioned in the Spring *Bulletin* was correspondence with two administrations seeking removal from the Association's list of Censured Administrations. There are now two more; that is, four administrations from the Association's list of five have formally indicated their desire for favorable action by the next Annual Meeting. If all four should be removed, and no other administration censured at the same time, West Chester State Teachers College would boast the only administration in the United States officially shown by "investigations by the American Association of University Professors" as "not observing the generally recognized principles of academic freedom."

Not Utopia, but Not Too Bad. Within a period of two weeks recently, those who conduct the correspondence for Committee A scored two minor successes, which jointly illustrate the uncertainty of the time factor in this work. A case with which this office had labored for almost two years was marked "closed" when the President of the institution sent the teacher concerned a check covering a half-year's salary in recognition of the sabbatical leave due and promised, but lost through the termination of the appointment. In the other case, a teacher without tenure was informed on July 15 that his appointment would not be continued for 1955-56. Informed by long-distance telephone, the Central Office sent the President a night letter, and two days later received from the President a copy of a letter extending the appointment for a year, thus meeting the requirement for due notice. If there is a moral, it is that, by working hard all the time, we accomplish something sometimes. Unfortunately, the Association cannot publicize its successes—only its failures, signalized by published reports and censure. In the nature of things, the successes can be known to only a few; and far beyond knowledge, statistical or personal, are the many times when an administrator, tempted to transgress the principles of academic freedom and tenure, remembers the Association and changes his mind.

Membership Figures. It is not yet possible to project the total figure for the year, but the Association may as well contemplate the prospect of a net loss in membership in 1955, and lay its plans for recovery and advance in 1956. The number of "two-year delinquents" removed from the membership rolls early this year is greater by 844 than those dropped in 1954.¹ As regards payments for 1955, 21,444 members had paid their dues through June 15, as against 22,598 for the same period in 1954—a tendency which may continue through the year, or may be arrested by an improved response to the October billings. Of more serious import, perhaps, is the figure on resignations: The resignations received through June 15, 1955 exceeded the total resignations for the entire year of 1954, and the October billings will bring additional resignations.

¹ These "two-year delinquents" are persons who failed to pay their dues in 1953, when they were members in full standing, with all the rights and privileges of membership, including receipt of the *Bulletin*; and again failed to pay in 1954, when they were still listed as members, though not receiving the *Bulletin*.

Finally, the figure on nominations, which should compensate for the figures on losses, is also disappointing: only 1156 nominees are listed in the Spring and Summer *Bulletins* for 1955, against 1335 in the same issues in 1954.

Financial and Other Considerations. How much the increase in dues from \$5 to \$7.50 is responsible for the prospective loss in membership can hardly be estimated yet; it might well account for the 100% increase in resignations, the decrease in the number of members paying their 1955 dues promptly, and the decrease in nominations. Be that as it may, to the increase in dues must be credited the fact that the Association's total income for 1955 promises to exceed its total income for 1954 by more than enough to cover the deficit budgeted for the year. That is, the Association is solvent. However, the possibility of improving the Association's present services, and adding other services, depends on an early recovery from the current loss of membership; it is difficult, for example, to offer positions on the professional staff of the Central Office to well-qualified and securely-placed members of the profession, unless the financial stability of the Association is assured beyond reasonable question. Moreover, aside from questions of financial solvency, loss of membership is a serious matter, simply because it is to the interest of the academic profession that a large proportion of its members be included in the membership of the Association. All should be concerned, therefore, to see that the present setback is temporary. As regards methods, the Association has always attached more value to steady growth than to spectacular membership drives; but the coming autumn will be an excellent time for chapter officers to be sure that all faculty members in their institutions are made acquainted with the Association and have an opportunity to accept nomination for membership.

We Are Source Material. Item I: Permission has been given to The Institute for College and University Administrators (sponsored by the Association of American Colleges) to reproduce and use the report of Committee A on the Evansville College case of 1948. Item II: In a doctoral dissertation, accepted by a large university, figures are given to prove that a statistically significant number of administrative officers who have appeared unfavorably in published Committee A reports (1) did not have doctorates, (2)

were born in relatively less densely populated states, and (3) were born in the South.

Educator. The Central Office recently received the following anonymous message (we have blanked out the proper names), printed with a pencil on a postal card post-marked San Francisco:

PROFESSORS ———, ———, ———, ———, ———, ———
OF ——— UNIVERSITY HAVE ORGANIZED A STUDENT
"HATE GROUP" THAT IS VERY UN-AMERICAN AND
SUBVERSIVE. AN EDUCATOR.

Moral Advice. A great deal of Central Office time goes into replies to inquiries about professional matters other than academic freedom and tenure. At times, in fact, we feel like spiritual advisers—a rôle in which we are not perfectly at ease. Here is a recent exchange of letters, slightly condensed, with identifications concealed, our correspondent's punctuation corrected, and his style and ours polished a little (we hope) for the benefit of *Bulletin* readers:

Dear Sir:

Who is and who is not entitled to use the title *professor*? I am completing a little book. The publisher would like to know whether it is legitimate to call me "Professor" Blank in advertising, although I have only an instructor's rank. I have published widely in my field, but have not completed my Ph.D. Is it correct for the publisher to call me Professor Blank? Personally, I don't mind being called *Mr.* Blank, but the publisher feels that this title might lower the potential sale of the book. Please present me and my bewildered colleagues with an answer to the above-raised question. It might also be a good idea, in some future issue of the *Bulletin*, to answer this question for the benefit of all academic personnel. Thank you.

A deep breath, and here it is:

Dear Professor [sic] Blank:

We have sought help from Webster in our deliberations on letting your publisher confer the title of "professor," when Dash University has done no better for you than "instructor." One part of Webster's definition is encouragingly generic: "One who publicly teaches, in the higher education or in the secondary school grades, any branch of learning." However, "specif." is discourag-

ing: "an officer in a university, college, school, or seminary, who delivers lectures or instructs students and on whom the title has been formally conferred by academic authority." If only Webster had stopped after "instructs students," the definition would have been that of most of the lay public, to whom any college teacher is a "professor." Many of the "red professors" named by Congressional committees were instructors, or of even less lofty status. As a village high school teacher at the age of 19, your correspondent was "Professor" to students and townsmen. Even in this office, we use the term broadly: You are *Professor* Blank to us, just as all college presidents are "Doctor" in our salutations.

We appreciate both your publisher's yearning for a prestigious title and your resolution to be honest. Our thoughts are as follows: Whenever you are formally identified by title, on the title page of your book or elsewhere, this title, if stated at all, should be "Instructor." However, the issue can often be avoided by such phraseology as "John Henry Blank, Department of Oudenology, Dash University." As regards the text of advertising circulars, if (for example) a review should be quoted, stating that "the thesis presented by Professor Blank in this work is. . .," such incidental attribution of superior rank would be at most a venial sin. Again, no academic brows would be lifted at the statement, "The author is a member of the faculty of Dash University," even though it may happen that instructors do not have voting privileges at that institution. It would not, however, be permissible, even with the generous license of hucksterdom, to make the bald statement that "the author is Professor of Oudenology at Dash University."

Having gone so far as to mention sin (everybody does; see, in this issue, "The Professor and God"), and fearing that we were about to slip over from academic mores to academic morals, we prudently brought our letter to a close, with the modest intimation that, while we are bold as lions in saving professors' (including instructors') jobs, the salvation of their souls surpasses even our talents.

GEORGE POPE SHANNON, *Associate Secretary*

Censured Administrations

Investigations by the American Association of University Professors of the administrations of the several institutions listed below show that they are not observing the generally recognized principles of academic freedom and tenure, endorsed by this Association, the Association of American Colleges, the Association of American Law Schools, the American Library Association (with adaptations for librarians), the American Political Science Association, the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, and the Association for Higher Education of the National Education Association.

Placing the name of an institution on this list does not mean that censure is visited either upon the whole of the institution or upon the faculty, but specifically upon its present administration. The term "administration" includes the administrative officers and the governing board of the institution. This censure does not affect the eligibility of nonmembers for membership in the Association nor does it affect the individual rights of our members at the institution in question, nor do members of the Association who accept positions on the faculty of an institution whose administration is thus censured forfeit their membership. This list is published for the sole purpose of informing our members, the profession at large, and the public that unsatisfactory conditions of academic freedom and tenure have been found to prevail at these institutions. Names are placed on or removed from this censured list by vote of the Association's Annual Meeting.

The censured administrations, together with the date of censuring, are listed below. Reports of investigations were published as indicated by the *Bulletin* citations.

West Chester State Teachers College West Chester, Pennsylvania (February, 1939, <i>Bulletin</i> , pp. 44-72)	December, 1939
University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri (October, 1941, <i>Bulletin</i> , pp. 478-493)	December, 1941
State Teachers College, ¹ Murfreesboro, Tennessee (December, 1942, <i>Bulletin</i> , pp. 662-677)	May, 1943
Winthrop College, Rock Hill, South Carolina (April, 1942, <i>Bulletin</i> , pp. 173-196)	May, 1943
Evansville College, Evansville, Indiana (Spring, 1949, <i>Bulletin</i> , pp. 74-111)	March, 1950

¹ Now Middle Tennessee State College.

MEMBERSHIP

CLASSES AND CONDITIONS—NOMINATIONS AND ELECTIONS

Membership in the American Association of University Professors is open to all college and university teachers from the faculties of eligible institutions and to graduate students and graduate assistants. The list of eligible institutions is based primarily on the accredited lists of the established accrediting agencies, subject to modification by action of the Association. Election to membership in the Association is by the Committee on Admission of Members upon nomination by one Active Member. Election takes place thirty days after the name of the nominee has been published in the *Bulletin*. The membership year in the Association is the calendar year (January 1 through December 31). The membership of nominees whose nominations are received before July 1 becomes effective as of January 1 of the current year. The membership of nominees whose nominations are received after July 1 becomes effective as of January 1 of the following year unless the nominee requests that his membership become effective as of January 1 of the current year.

The classes and conditions of membership are as follows:

Active. A person is eligible for election to Active membership if he holds a position of teaching and/or research, with the rank of instructor or its equivalent or higher, in an institution on the Association's eligible list, provided his work consists of at least half-time teaching and/or research. Annual dues are \$7.50.

Junior. Junior membership is open to persons who are, or within the past five years have been, graduate students in eligible institutions and who are not eligible for Active membership. Junior Members are transferred to Active membership as soon as they become eligible. Annual dues are \$3.00.

Associate. Associate membership is not an elective membership. Active and Junior Members whose work becomes primarily administrative are transferred to Associate membership. Annual dues are \$3.00.

Emeritus. Any member retiring for age from a position in teaching or research may be transferred to Emeritus membership. Emeritus Members are exempt from dues. They may continue to receive the *Bulletin* at a special rate of \$1.00 a year.

Continuing Eligibility. Change of occupation or transfer to an institution not on the Association's eligible list does not affect eligibility for continuance of membership.

Interruption or Termination of Membership. Interruption or termination of membership requires notification to the Association's Washington office. In the absence of such notice, membership continues with receipt of the *Bulletin* for one calendar year, during which time there is an obligation to pay dues.

Nominations for Membership

The following 292 nominations for Active membership and 8 nominations for Junior membership are published as provided in the Constitution of the Association. Protests of nominations may be addressed to the General Secretary of the Association, who will, in turn, transmit them for the consideration of the Committee on Admission of Members. The Council of the Association has ruled that the primary purpose of this provision for protests is to bring to the attention of the Committee on Admission of Members questions concerning the technical eligibility of nominees for membership as provided in the Constitution of the Association. To be considered, such protests must be filed with the General Secretary within thirty days after this publication.

Active

University of Akron, William S. Hardenbergh; Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical College, Winfred Thomas; University of Alabama, Daniel H. Kruger; American International College, L. Donald Fixler, Franklin W. Gallo; Antioch College, Gertrude Metcalf, Robert M. Metcalf; University of Arizona, Lloyd M. Bailey; Arkansas Agricultural and Mechanical College, John C. McGinnis; Armstrong College of Savannah, Elmo M. McCray, Jr.; Army Language School, Pao-Ch'en Lee; Augustana College (Illinois), Louis Almén, S. James Galley, Edward Hamming, Dorothy J. Parkander.

Bakersfield College, Paul Gordon; Baldwin-Wallace College, M. Ruth Smith; Ball State Teachers College, John J. Hinga, Charles E. Rosenbarger; Baylor University, Carl J. Lind, Jr.; Beaver College, Siu-Chi Huang; Belmont College, Thomas W. Davis; Blackburn College, William E. Werner, Jr.;

Bradley University, Sadayoshi Omoto; **University of Buffalo**, Yazbeck T. Sarkees.

California College of Arts and Crafts, Vernon R. Coykendall, Harry H. Krell; **California Institute of Technology**, Herschel K. Mitchell; **University of California**, Edwin H. Richardson; **University of California (Riverside)**, Eugene Eisman; **Canisius College**, Edward J. Schmidlein, Jr.; **Carnegie Institute of Technology**, James L. Houghteling, Jr.; **Carroll College (Wisconsin)**, C. Dale Fjerstad, Nancy Matthisen; **Chicago City Junior College (Wilson Branch)**, Leonard W. Deen; **Chicago City Junior College (Wright Branch)**, Oscar Shabat; **The Citadel**, Joseph P. Cameron; **The City College**, Thomas C. F. Lowry; **Columbia College**, M. Frances Jones; **Columbia University**, Georges Florovsky, Louis Forsdale; **University of Connecticut**, Irving P. Rothberg; **Converse College**, Elizabeth S. Bearden; **Cornell University**, J. Williams Conner, Jack C. Kiefer, Alexander H. Leighton, Ruth N. Lutz, Paul Olum, Eleanor R. Williams.

Dartmouth College, Robert W. Christy, Nadezhda T. Koroton, Judson S. Lyon, Richard Wagner; **Davis and Elkins College**, Knox Wilson; **University of Delaware**, Katherine E. Cheslock, Elizabeth R. Duff, Robert S. Hillyer, Paul M. Hodgson, Edward A. Hungerford, Albert Schoyen, Maryann Waltz, Ann M. Weygandt; **Delta State Teachers College**, Allene McCormick; **DePauw University**, James C. Loveless; **Dillard University**, Walter K. Waters, Jr.; **Drexel Institute of Technology**, Haym Jaffe.

Elmhurst College, Miriam B. Jones; **Emory University**, Jane A. Russell.

Fisk University, J. Russel Gabel, Coragreen Jonstone; **Flint Junior College**, Clyde E. Blocker, John Bojcun, Jean Caldwell, Edwin L. Carey, Carroll H. Clark, E. Frances Haynes, Howard Jackson, Donald Jarrard, Lena M. Johnson, Willard Kottke, Cathryn J. Lee, Ahti A. Mackela, Stanley W. Powley, Irma Schnoberger, Gayle J. Scott, Harold W. Tuckett, Naomi Vollmar.

Gannon College, John M. Chichenko; **George Pepperdine College**, Joseph W. White; **George Washington University**, Theodore Perros, James W. Robb; **George Williams College**, Channing M. Briggs.

Hampton Institute, Jessie A. Fitzgerald; **Harvard University**, Henrietta M. Larson; **University of Hawaii**, Roger Moseley; **High Point College**, Philip Smyth; **Hiram College**, Kimon M. Giocarinis; **Howard University**, Samuel E. Barnes, Pearl A. Watson; **Hunter College**, Marjorie B. Smiley.

Idaho State College, Carl C. Riedesel; **University of Idaho**, Lee Zimmerman; **Illinois College**, Ethel Seybold, Walter L. Silvernail; **University of Illinois**, Robert A. Jewett, Wolfgang Kuhn, John B. Parrish; **University of Illinois (College of Medicine)**, Robert M. Besancon, Mary J. Campbell, John P. Marbarger, George L. Webster; **University of Illinois (Navy Pier)**, Donald F. Chapp, Ross Garner, Conde R. Hoskins, William H. Huff, Edward B. McNeil, John O. Marsh, Jr., Don A. Masterton, Sylvia Patlogan, Frances Seabright, Louis L. Ullman; **Indiana University**, Dorothy C. Grovom, Dietrich C. Reitzes, Roy A. Swanson; **Iowa State College**, Elizabeth Beveridge, Louise Rosenfeld; **State University of Iowa**, Edward E. Mason; **Ithaca College**, Roberta Barnett, John W. Gunning.

Johns Hopkins University, John H. Berthel, Sidney P. Colowick, William H. Huggins, Earl H. Nash, Jr., Rosabelle P. Walkley.

Kalamazoo College, Lloyd J. Averill, Jr., Wen-Chao Chen, Ralph O. Kerman; **University of Kentucky**, Richard M. Doughty; **Kenyon College**, Oscar J. F. Seitz; **Keuka College**, Lydia J. Gambrell.

Lander College, Vernon E. Johnson; **Lebanon Valley College**, Constance P. Dent; **Lewis and Clark College**, Gay H. Jenkins; **Lincoln University (Missouri)**, Gwendolen J. Belcher; **University of Louisville**, William A. Brodsky, S. Stephen Chapman, James C. Drye.

University of Maine, George R. Cooper; **Manhattan College**, Alexander Joseph, Cornelius Justin, Cormac Philip, John S. Sich, Aurelian Thomas; **University of Maryland**, Mary H. Aldridge, Martha J. Haverstick, Richard H. Jaquith, Eugene J. Meehan, Ernest F. Pratt, Fletcher P. Veitch, Jr.; **University of Maryland (Maryland State College)**, Oscar J. Townsel, Moses W. Vaughn; **Maryville College**, Kathryn W. Martin; **Marywood College**, William Rieger; **Miami University**, Ridgely Park; **University of Miami**, Archie L. McNeal; **Michigan College of Mining and Technology**, Marion W. Hughes; **Michigan State University**, C. Ralph Henriksen; **University of Michigan**, Clifford R. Noll, Jr., Alex L. Pickens, Charles L. Rulfs; **Mills College**, Dorothy R. Fuller; **University of Minnesota**, Gust Bitsianes, Benjamin J. Lazan, Ruby B. Pernell, Norman Schmutz, G. Robert Stange, Edward T. Sullivan, Louis Tobian; **Mississippi Southern College**, Frank T. Lewis; **Missouri School of Mines**, Matthew P. Nackowski; **Montgomery Junior College**, William V. Jouvenal; **Morris Brown College**, James T. Ratliff; **Murray State College**, Lynn Winget.

Nebraska State Teachers College (Kearney), LeRoy Bauer, Wilma E. Hirst, Myron L. Holm, Margaret J. McClure; **University of Nebraska**, Erwin H. Goldenstein, Robert J. Myers; **New York City Community College of Applied Arts and Sciences**, Lewis R. Fibel.

State University of New York—Teachers College at Oneonta, Helen L. Park; **Teachers College at Oswego**, Rose Koury.

New York University, Mario Baccari, Jack J. Hasch, Frederic Kurzweil, Gordon A. McLean, Mildred E. Marcett, Armand J. Prusmack; **North Carolina State College**, J. Clark Osborne; **University of North Carolina**, Daniel A. Okun.

Ohio State University, Julia Adkins, William F. Ashe, Hazel L. Gibbony, Ethel M. Leazenbee, Betty J. Meyer, Catharine M. Williams; **Oregon State College**, Erma M. Weir; **Oregon State System of Higher Education (Portland State Extension Service)**, William K. Ferrier, Emma G. Stanton.

Pennsylvania State Teachers College (Kutztown), Gladys C. Mathias, George D. Weiss; **Pennsylvania State University**, John A. Longo, John E. Pixton, William L. Richards; **University of Pennsylvania**, Albert H. Hobbs; **University of Pittsburgh**, William J. Kuhns; **Principia College**, Stanley L. Leonard; **University of Puerto Rico**, Santiago Ramirez-Martinez; **Purdue University**, Henry C. Reitz.

Queens College (New York), George H. Grosser; **Quincy College**, Hugo Broeker.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Kurt Bing; **Rider College**, Walter A. Brower, Jr., Alfred K. Brown, Percy W. Caris, John D. Dutton, Laurence Eisenlohr, Ralph F. Gommer, Robert W. Kilgus, Emanuel Levine, Sidney Meth, John E. Moomaw, Jr., Richard B. Scheetz, Wilson G. Wismer; **Riverside College**, Rosa McKusick; **Robert College**, David A. Garwood; **University of Rochester**, Jessie H. Kneisel; **Rutgers University**, Margaret E. Monroe.

Sacramento State College, Tarmo A. Pasto, Royal M. Vanderberg; **St. Lawrence University**, Kenneth W. Baumgardner; **San Francisco College for Women**, Irene E. Ried; **Santa Monica City College**, Max Silvernale; **Sarah Lawrence College**, Meyer Rabban; **Skidmore College**, Prissilla M. Greeley, Isabelle M. Koehler; **University of South Carolina**, Rex Enright; **University of Southern California**, Robert Finn, Arthur F. O'Leary, John T. Waterman; **Southern State College**, Bruce D. McGill; **Stanford University**, John Loftis, Gerald Wentworth.

Temple University, James C. Giuffr ; **University of Tennessee**, Nicholas R. Di Luzio, Douglas A. Ross; **Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas**, Robert D. Chenoweth, George L. Robertson; **North Texas State College**, Byron E. Munson, J. W. Riddlesperger; **Texas Technological College**, Sylvan J. Kaplan; **University of Texas**, Wilfrid C. Bailey, Charles H. Lange; **University of Toledo**, Frank J. Charvat; **Transylvania College**, Hans Hahn, Donald C. Rose.

Union College (Kentucky), Howard G. Hitchcock; **Union College and University**, Charles J. Standish; **Upper Iowa University**, Herschel Hendrix; **Upsala College**, Donald C. Wright; **Howard Zinn**; **University of Utah**, Spencer L. Kimball.

Vanderbilt University, James W. Ford; **Vassar College**, Chun-Jo Liu, Mabel C. Paterson; **University of Vermont**, Richard S. Woodruff.

State College of Washington, Ivan Nye; **Wayne University**, Gretchen O. Luros, Mary Lee Nicholson, Stanley L. Sokolik; **Waynesburg College**, Wilbur H. Blum, John S. Holleran; **Western Reserve University**, Alvin J. Goldwyn, Jr., Robert C. Griffiths; **Westmar College**, Anna Stein; **Municipal University of Wichita**, Robert W. Buggert, Albert R. Parker; **Wilson Teachers College**, Daniel B. Lloyd; **Wisconsin State College (Whitewater)**, Hildegard Kuse.

Yale University, John E. Smith; **Youngstown University**, Else Fink, Wilfred M. Foley.

Junior

University of Buffalo, Anthony H. Stocks; **Columbia University**, Joseph Wagner; **Cornell University**, Louis P. Phaneuf; **Iowa State College**, David N. Harrington; **University of Pittsburgh**, Salvador F. Orochena; **Syracuse University**, Maurice Mann; **Wayne University**, William A. Faunce; **Wheaton College (Massachusetts)**, Charles E. Aughtry.

Elections to Membership

The Committee on Admission of Members announces the election to membership in the Association of 838 Active and 19 Junior Members as follows:

Active

Adelphi College, Thelma Wallace; **Alabama State College for Negroes**, Umer G. Hathaway; **University of Alabama**, Arthur H. Wuehrmann; **University of Alaska**, Alfred M. Bork, Tom E. Brady, Frederick C. Dean, Mahmoud El-Melehy, Joseph B. Fetzer, Paul R. Hagelbarger, Charles J. Keim, Charles Sargent; **Allegheny College**, Herbert F. Hess; **American University**, Austin Van der Slice; **Anderson College and Theological Seminary**, Elaine J. Harper; **Arizona State College (Tempe)**, Jean Hopkins, Paul Huber, James J. Jones; **University of Arizona**, Stewart Becker, Keith C. Hamilton, Leahmae McCoy, John W. Robson; **Arkansas State College**, Barbara J. Cuthbertson, L. Marshall Dinsmore, E. F. Nothorn, Howard W. Pasmore, Lucille Taylor; **University of Arkansas**, Robert Siegfried; **University of Arkansas (Medical School)**, Thomas R. Cox, Eva F. Dodge, Richard V. Ebert, Isadore Meschan, James T. Wortham; **Army Language School**, Philippe Tchentzoff, George C. Wang.

Bakersfield College, Paul Walker; **Baldwin Wallace College**, Kenneth O. Snapp, Roger J. Williams, Jr.; **Ball State Teachers College**, Robert J. Cooke, James H. M. Erickson, Joseph W. Hollis, Donald S. Mac Vean, George W. Rogers, Paul B. Williams; **Baylor University**, Haywood R. Shuford, Jr.; **Beaver College**, Donald W. Disbrow; **Beloit College**, John P. Smith; **Bethune-Cookman College**, Richard K. Seckinger; **Boise Junior College**, Ada V. Hatch; **Bowling Green State University**, Miriam S. DeLargey, Bernard Rabin; **Bradley University**, Byron K. Brown, Russell W. Sarff; **Brigham Young University**, Mark K. Allen; **Brooklyn College**, Samuel Goldberg, Antonia Guerrero, Adelaide Jablonsky, Mark E. Parks, Mary K. Wilson; **Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn**, Stephen P. Hoffman, Jr., J. Lawrence Katz, Ernst M. Loeb, Seymour Schuster; **Bucknell University**, J. Charles Jones.

California Institute of Technology, Paul Bowerman, Norman H. Brooks, C. Hewitt Dix, Albert T. Ellis, Alexander Goetz, Richard H. Jahns, Geoffrey Keighley, Lester Lees, H. Victor Neher, Charles H. Papas, Blane R. Parkin, Stanford S. Penner, Lloyd C. Pray, Verner Schomaker, George Streisinger, George C. Webster; **Canisius College**, John L. Blum, William F. Kean, John M. Skalski; **Carson-Newman College**, Alma Baskerville, Harvey B. Hatcher; **Catholic University of America**, M. Lucille Kinlein, John J. McClafferty, Agnita M. Moyland, Robert B. Nordberg, Mary L. Paynick, Arlene D. Schweitzer, W. Dorothy Tousignant; **Cedar Crest College**, Anna Smislova; **Central State College (Ohio)**, Paul McStallworth; **Chicago City Junior College (Wilson Branch)**, Philip S. Denenfeld, Eugene T. Gendlin, Warren C. Miller,

Michael Porte, Matthew Prastein, Thalia Selz; **University of Chicago**, Eric P. Hamp; **University of Cincinnati**, Myrl E. Bottomley, Frank D. Emerson, Paul E. Foldes, Robert Gebhart, Wilbur R. Lester, Mathias Noheimer, Wyman W. Parker; **The Citadel**, Lee P. Hutchison; **Citrus Junior College**, Harold L. Sunderland; **The City College**, Sherburne F. Barber, Bernard Bellush; **Clark College (Washington)**, J. Manning Nelson, Anna Pechanec; **Clarke College**, Thomas H. Napiecinski; **Clarkson College of Technology**, Robert J. McGill; **Clemson Agricultural College**, Lehman M. Bauknight; **Coe College**, Nadine Fillmore, Frank A. Hayes, Agnes Hibbs; **Colgate University**, Jerome Balmuth, Bruce M. Brown, Robert J. Bull, Arnold L. Herstand, John B. Hoben, Elwyn Sterling, James R. Sunwall; **Colorado Agricultural and Mechanical College**, Majorie Ball; **Colorado College**, Joyce A. Charles, Norman Cornick, Carlton Gamer, Richard Warnock; **Colorado State College of Education**, Vincent A. Cyphers, Marjorie Harkness, M. Lucile Harrison, Elizabeth Lehr, Vera L. Newburn, Pauline C. Pogue, Lee Pollard; **Western State College of Colorado**, Gerald M. Coble, Henry O. Hart; **University of Colorado**, Lee J. Stohlbrost; **Columbia College**, Marguerite Rogers; **Columbia University**, Florence Hollis, Italo S. Iaricci, Virginia Parrott; **The Cooper Union**, Gerd Muehsam, Kazem Omidvar; **Cornell University**, William W. Austin, Nyle C. Brady, Paul R. Broten, Robert F. Coffin, Calvin R. Edwards, Jeffrey H. Fryer, Lauriat Lane, Jr., Edward C. Raney, Edward L. Ruhe, Thomas W. Silk, Fred Slavick, Donald E. Williams.

Dartmouth College, Raymond W. Barratt, Diran Bodenhorn, Kenneth R. Davis, Robert Gutman, Alexander Laing, James P. Logan, Harry T. Schultz; **Davidson College**, John R. Satterfield; **Delaware State College**, John R. Price; **University of Delaware**, Donald L. Kinzer; **Delta State Teachers College**, Carol Brumby, Birdie C. Hale, Evelyn A. Hammett, Kathryn Keener, Doxie Shuler, Roy L. Wiley; **De Paul University**, Albert G. Giordano, Ernest Weinwurm; **DePauw University**, Clifton Phillips; **Dickinson College**, George Frogen; **Drake University**, Julian R. McQuiston, Snell Putney, Irwin F. Thomle, Joe D. Woods; **Drew University**, Frederick A. Shippey.

Elmhurst College, William R. Barclay, Benjamin M. Jaques, Marguerite S. Kaufman, August J. Molnar, Harold P. Wukasch; **Elmira College**, Emily F. Brady; **Emory University**, Trevor Evans, Frank W. Fales, Helen Hagan, Albert I. Lansing, Andrew Lasslo, Harry L. Williams.

Fairleigh Dickinson College, John MacEachen; **Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University**, Ansley A. Abraham, Robert L. Williams; **Florida State University**, Florence Cole, Alvin V. Fend, Martha Moore, Nancy W. Smith, Frances Tacionis; **Fort Hays Kansas State College**, Eleanor Caldwell, Charles P. Foote, Judith J. Radke, John C. Thorns, Jr.; **Franklin and Marshall College**, Walter H. Leser; **Fresno State College**, Erling H. Erlandson, William C. Wayne.

Geneva College, Becky T. Kerns, Doris E. Nevin; **George Pepperdine College**, Russell C. Cannon, I. Gaynelle Denison; **George Washington University**, David S. Brown; **Georgetown University**, Louis Levy; **Georgia State**

College for Women, Jane F. White; University of Georgia, Aleene Cross, Harold W. Young; University of Georgia (Atlanta Division), H. Reid Hunter, Charles C. Mitchell, Henry C. Pepper, Ray Taylor; Goucher College, John H. Brown, Barbara G. Johnson; Grinnell College, Dorothy L. Hoza, William T. McKibben, Stephen L. Speronis.

Hamilton College, William J. Park; Hamline University, Bernard C. Graves, Julianna Schmidt; Hampton Institute, Cornelius B. Baytop; Hanover College, Stanley B. Wheeler; Hartwick College, Forrest W. Miller; Harvard University, Daniel Abranson; University of Hawaii, Donald M. Kinch, Joseph O'Rourke, Jr., Landon A. Sarver; High Point College, Robert E. McDonald; Hofstra College, Edward A. Chalfant, James S. Edmundson, Vincent W. Gillen, John F. Hopkins, Gerrit P. Judd IV, George Mannello, Robert Myron, Harry H. Rains, Herbert D. Rosenbaum, Leonard Steinberg; University of Houston, Margaret M. Browne, Dean O. Gray, John W. Meaney; Howard University, John B. Johnson; Humboldt State College, William J. Wasserman.

University of Idaho, Kenneth A. Bush, Kenneth E. Grimm; Northern Illinois State Teachers College, Frank W. Blanning, Charles Canon, Elizabeth C. Lane; Southern Illinois University, William E. Crane, Gabriel Tsiang; University of Illinois, Bruce Edwards, Fred E. Fiedler, Bruce L. Hicks, Colleen J. Kirk, Jum C. Nunnally, Jr., George A. Steiner; University of Illinois (Navy Pier), William J. Dembski, Herbert D. Harris, Rowland Rathbun, John E. Walley, Lester D. White; Indiana State Teachers College, Ola Jerry; Indiana University, Merrill J. Allen, Harvard L. Armus, Loren D. Ayres, Milton B. Byrd, Ledford C. Carter, Aubrey Diller, Kenneth R. Dorst, Opal Gilbert, Eberhard Hopf, J. A. Jones, Margaret L. Jones, Charles D. Kelso, Richard N. Kramer, Michael G. McCann, Stuart MacClintock, Marion A. McGhehey, Poynter McEvoy, Patricia Meyer, Alton Pickens, Edgar L. Richardson, Hilda A. Sherwin, Marie Zorn; Iowa State College, Dwight M. Bannister, George M. Beal, Raymond R. Beneke, Clarence E. Bundy, Wayne S. Cole, Phillips G. Davies, C. LeRoy Day, Frank M. Di Paul, Henry W. Hinck, Herbert B. Howell, Carl C. Malone, James J. Wallace; Iowa State Teachers College, Paul Bradley, Chester R. Brothers, Richard L. Flowers, Jr., George R. Poage, Donald O. Rod, Mary E. Roof, Constance D. Schraemeyer, Florence Seeber, Mildred M. Walter, Lawrence S. Wright; State University of Iowa, Norman C. Baenziger, Harold Bellingham, Dorothy W. Cheng, Herbert F. Hasenclever, Dick A. Leabo, Edward F. Mason, Ellis H. Newsome, William E. Porter, Vernon B. Van Dyke, Marjorie A. Zumstein.

Jacksonville Junior College, James B. Fleek, Svea M. A. Risto, Art Trubiano; Jamestown College, Howard M. Droste, Harold Strandness; Jersey City Junior College, Stephen F. Roach; Johns Hopkins University, David M. Gould, Jeng M. Hsu, Stanley D. Imber, André T. Jagendorf, Louis Lasagna, Edward F. Mac Nichol, Jr., Gertrude Maengwyn-Davies, Menahem Mansoor, George W. Smith, Thomas E. Starzl, Anthony R. Stone, Carl P. Swanson, Charles D. Swartz, Robert W. Zwanzig; Juilliard School of Music, Marion S. Freschl, Irwin Freundlich.

Kansas State College, Val W. Woodward; **University of Kansas**, Robert Branner, Roy L. Kidman, William A. Martin, Jr., David Shusterman; **University of Kentucky**, Robert W. Bagley, Tadeusz Leser, William K. Plucknett; **Kenyon College**, Thomas J. Edwards.

Lafayette College, Lewis D. Clark; **Lake Forest College**, Edgar Andersons; **Lewis and Clark College**, John B. Harrington; **Lindenwood College**, William C. Engram; **Little Rock Junior College**, Benjamin A. Hardy; **Long Beach State College**, James H. F. Noguer, Richard H. Wilde; **Long Island University (First Institute of Podiatry)**, Milton Henefeld; **Louisiana Polytechnic Institute**, Amos W. Ford; **Louisiana State University**, Eugene L. Gaier; **Lowell Technological Institute**, Norwood H. Keeney; **Loyola University (Illinois)**, Georgia A. Snell; **Loyola University (Louisiana)**, Mark D. Horne; **Loyola University of Los Angeles**, Ted DeLay, William F. Fitzgerald, James H. Robb, Anthony F. Turhollow; **Lycoming College**, Robert L. Cann, Jeannette Confer, Logan A. Richmond, C. Ruth Schenley, Virginia J. Smith, Armand J. VanBaelen, Leonard T. Wright.

Macalester College, Albert L. Jamison, Dorothy M. Michel, J. Albert Palmer; **Manhattan College**, Benjamin S. Alimena, Edwards O. Hynard, G. Michael Mestice, Fabian L. Rouke, Luke Titone, Howard N. Warger, Joseph Zamparo; **Marquette University**, Beth J. Phillips, Herbert G. Zollitsch; **University of Maryland**, Robert G. Carey, L. J. Enright, Robert M. Pierson, E. Roderick Shipley; **Massachusetts State Teachers College (Boston)**, Katharine E. Barr; **Massachusetts State Teachers College (Bridgewater)**, Ralph S. Bates, Miriam M. Reinhart; **Massachusetts State Teachers College (North Adams)**, Harry L. Crowley; **Memphis State College**, Earl W. McGee; **Meredith College**, Lucy A. Neblett; **Miami University**, Homer Abegglen, Charles W. Bangert, Jacques R. Breitenbucher, Warren Castle, Harry F. Davis, Wallace I. Edwards, Langdon Elsbree, Maurice F. Foss, Walter H. Gregg, Albert A. Grinnell, Harold L. Haley, John R. Harrison, Robert E. Howard, Charles B. Huelsman, Jr., Lawrence Hynes, Bertha E. Mathias, Everett J. Miltenberger, Albert A. Moore, Robert E. Rueggeberg, G. Gene Santavicca, Richard L. Schilling, Charles E. Stousland, Christena M. Wahl, Elizabeth M. Walker; **University of Miami**, Dora E. Blackmon, Marion J. Cario, Lester R. Wheeler; **Northern Michigan College of Education**, Walter A. Chojnowski, Laurence W. Sain; **Western Michigan College of Education**, Stanley Kuffel; **Michigan State College**, Paul Bakan, Moiree Compere, David K. Heenan, Boris Musulin, Robert Pfeiffer, J. Frederick Smithcors, A. L. Thurman, Jr.; **Michigan State Normal College**, Ruth G. Fenwick, Gordon W. Fielder, Jane A. Speckhard; **University of Michigan**, José Bebin, Richard K. Brown, Kenneth P. Davis, Anna S. Elonen, Hubert M. English, Jr., Violet K. Hanley, Donat M. Kazarinoff, Kent W. Leach, Stephen B. Preston, Waldo E. Sweet; **Millikin University**, David F. Driesbach; **Millsaps College**, Harry C. Dillingham, Milton C. White; **Minnesota State Teachers College (Moorhead)**, Catherine Cater, Dorothy E. Johnson; **Minnesota State Teachers College (St. Cloud)**, Amy H. Dale, Robert J. Stevenson; **University**

of Minnesota, Philip T. Meyers, Alek A. Rozental, Frederick M. Swain, Jr.; Mississippi College, Roy E. Watkins; Mississippi Southern College, Herman Boroughs; Mississippi State College for Women, Howard Lynch, Chalmers O. Nelson; University of Mississippi, Lyle Babcock, Robert Marsden, John E. Paul, Mildred S. Topp; Central Missouri State College, Sara F. Cattle; Northwest Missouri State College, Charles E. Koerble; Southeast Missouri State Teachers College, Hazel B. Lamb; Northeast Missouri State Teachers College, Max E. Bell; University of Missouri, Carmel W. Ballew, Joe W. Duck, Marvin P. Evenson, Pauline G. Garrett, Joseph C. Hogan. Montana State University, Albert W. Stone; Monterey Peninsula College, Joseph D. Blacow; Montgomery Junior College, F. Frank Rubini, Alice J. Thurston; Morgan State College, Earl R. Moses; Mount Holyoke College, Alice Bourneuf; Mount St. Mary's College, Bernard S. Kaliss; Muhlenberg College, Minotte M. Chatfield.

Nebraska State Teachers College (Kearney), Garnet L. Austin; University of Nebraska, Clarence E. Flick; University of New Hampshire, Winifred M. Clark, Wilfred T. Harwood, Ruth McDonald; New Mexico Highlands University, Floyd W. Kelly; New Mexico Military Institute, William F. Harris, Paul Mount-Campbell, Irby C. Nichols, Jr.; University of New Mexico, Jerrold Walden.

State University of New York—College for Teachers at Albany, Edward H. Sargent, Jr.; Teachers College at Brockport, Anthony M. DeIulio; Teachers College at Cortland, Victor Bahou, Frederick E. Bieler, Joseph A. Del Popolo, Mary L. Dickinson, Albert E. Lawrence, Robert F. Lewis, John Mach, Delmar C. Palm, Lloyd C. Parks, Marie Riley, John Sinacore, Margaret W. Turner; Teachers College at Fredonia, Robert D. Price, Joseph J. Shea; Teachers College at Geneseo, Roberta Schlosser; Teachers College at New Paltz, Robert J. Strothenke; Teachers College at Oswego, Alice Sutkaitis.

New York University, Bernard Altshuler, Alvin K. Aster, Kathryn W. Bell, Norman S. Cooper, Ralph B. Flanders, Abraham L. Gitlow, John van Heijen-oort, Charles H. Helliwell, Allen J. Hoost, Paul Parnell, Stewart W. Rowe, Joseph Tanenhaus; Newark College of Engineering, Kenneth P. Swallow; North Carolina State College, Lincoln F. Ladd, Joseph A. Porter, Jr., Robert B. White, Jr.; University of North Carolina, Lowell D. Ashby, Barbara Bernard, John Ehle, Jean I. Rebentisch, Jan P. Schinhan; North Dakota Agricultural College, Kenneth Aulsebrook, Glenn W. Fisher; University of North Dakota, Dinah S. Baker, Herbert Fromm, Hugh G. Hansen, F. D. Holland, Jr., Robert Holland, Wayne R. Kube, Jay Melrose, Michael Polovitz, Wilbur F. Potter, Donald E. Severson, Edwin A. Whalin, Jr.; Northwestern University, Charles E. Barnum, George M. Cohen, Robert J. Cranford, Boris Parl; University of Notre Dame, Robert F. O'Brien, Vincent E. Smith, Robert Weinstock, Lionel D. Wyld.

Occidental College, George H. Cleland; Ohio State University, Virginia S. Cook, Leo Estel, Walter C. Sweet; Ohio Wesleyan University, Eleanor C. Johnston, Philip C. Limbacher, Jack W. Marken, Robert F. Melvill, John D.

Murati, Marion A. Sanborn, Constance C. Whitaker; **Orange County Community College**, Michael Brick; **Southern Oregon College of Education**, Ruth E. Bebbler; **Oregon State College**, Edward C. Bubl, Clara W. Edaburn, Daniel D. Evans, Hilda M. Jones, Fred M. Shideler, David G. Spencer, Lester B. Strickler; **Oregon State System of Higher Education (Portland State Extension Service)**, Helen B. Browne, James S. Hart, Ruth S. Lottridge, Charles R. Metzger, N. Joan Reynolds; **University of Oregon**, Roger L. Clubb, Ned J. Davison, George E. Etue, Jr., Grace Graham, Jean Guédenet, James Kezer, Daniel Krempel, Ira D. Lee, Edmond M. Mac Collin, Mildred B. Ringo, Max D. Risinger, Robert L. San Soucie, Robert Vagner, Henry W. Von Holt, Jr., John N. Warren.

Pace College, A. Edward Fogel, Herman Limberg; **College of the Pacific**, John W. Crawford, Edwin Ding, Helen B. Dooley-Hodgins, Harriet Sheldon, Frederick E. Steinhauser; **Pacific Lutheran College**, Anne E. Knudson, Harold J. Leraas; **Pennsylvania College for Women**, Natalie Barish, John W. Cummins, Meredith P. Gilpatrick, Alfred E. Pierce, Patricia C. Redick; **Pennsylvania State Teachers College (East Stroudsburg)**, Irving W. Foltz, Ralph H. Smith; **Pennsylvania State Teachers College (Millersville)**, Theodore H. Rupp; **Pennsylvania State Teachers College (West Chester)**, Alan P. Mewha; **Pennsylvania State University**, Simon Belasco, Sam Shulits; **University of Pennsylvania**, Robert F. White, Jr.; **University of Pittsburgh**, Irwin Bendet, Eleanor H. Berge, Charles H. Duncan, Edwin H. Hill, Harold L. Segal, George H. Shames, Carl E. Wedekind; **University of Portland**, Leonid Enari, Ernest Hayes; **Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College**, Hazelyn D. Scott; **Pratt Institute**, Richard J. Bové, Roger L. Crossgrove, Arnold Friedmann, Marion Hertzler, Irving A. Taylor, Demetrius Zelios; **Princeton University**, Harold E. Lurier, Richard K. Seymour, F. Wilson Smith; **University of Puerto Rico**, Edwin Toro-Goyco; **Purdue University**, Patrick F. Belcastro, James W. Cobble, L. Winston Cone, Richard Kessler, Robert C. Nagler, Harold W. Porter.

University of Rhode Island, Hugh D. Cochrané, Niels Rorholm, Andrew Velletri; **University of Rochester**, Joseph W. Cole, John H. Kautsky, William A. Small; **Rutgers University**, Arthur C. Young.

St. John's University (Minnesota), William L. Cofell, Joseph F. Heininger, Emerson Hynes, Justus G. Lawler; **St. Lawrence University**, Robert C. Goodridge; **St. Michael's College**, John J. Devlin, Jr.; **St. Olaf College**, Paul Ensrud, Carlyle W. Holte, Kenneth L. Jennings, Jo Ann Magnuson, Ella H. Roe; **San Antonio College**, James D. Bennett II; **San Francisco State College**, Dan D. Tarbell; **San Jose State College**, Richard G. Tansey; **Santa Monica City College**, Evan B. Brockett; **Sarah Lawrence College**, Adda B. Bozeman, Albert Lauterbach, Helen M. Lynd; **Savannah State College**, Walter Larkins; **Shurtleff College**, Edward Sittler; **Smith College**, Daniel Aaron, Wendell S. Johnson, Donald Sheehan; **University of South Carolina**, Donald O. Bushman, Craig L. Dozier, Newton Edwards, Joseph D. Grugan, David H. Means, Margaret H. Moses, Josephine A. Piekarz, James W. Rat-

liff, Jr.; **South Dakota State College**, R. L. Kristjanson; **Southern Methodist University**, Joseph F. Trosper; **Stephens College**, Byron L. Osborne, Jr.; **Stetson University**, Richard B. Moreland; **Susquehanna University**, Amos A. Stagg, Jr.; **Sweet Briar College**, Harriet H. Rogers; **Syracuse University**, Wilbert A. Berg, Floyd Covert, John R. Hartnett, Wallace R. McAllister, William Mangin, Ernest J. Milner; **Syracuse University (Utica College)**, Rosemary E. Ullrich.

Temple University, Robert R. Bell, Roselynd Largman, Frank T. Y. Liu, Elmer L. Offenbacher, Leon Ovsiew, David S. Sarnier, Charles Sass, Anita Shmukler, Wayne A. Smith, John M. Ward; **Middle Tennessee State College**, Robert E. Corlew; **University of Tennessee**, G. Eugene Albert, James F. Davidson, Joseph L. Frye, Michael J. Joncich, Madeline Kneberg, Thomas M. N. Lewis, Lawrence F. Silverman; **North Texas State College**, C. Grant Ferguson; **University of Texas (Dental Branch)**, James Burkhart; **University of Texas (Medical School)**, Frederico Gonzales; **University of Toledo**, Helen K. Cramer, Andrew Fejer; **Trinity College (Connecticut)**, W. Scott Worrall; **Tufts University**, Kathryn A. McCarthy; **Tulane University of Louisiana**, Frank L. Keller, John P. McGovern.

Union College (Kentucky), Francis Cole; **Union College and University**, William B. Martin, Jr., Alan Nelson, William H. Oldenbrook; **U. S. Merchant Marine Academy**, David MacKenzie; **U. S. Naval Postgraduate School**, James E. Sinclair; **Upsala College**, Carl E. Glans, Ralph O. Hjelm, Salvatore Picillo, Gunars Salins; **University of Utah**, Roscoe H. Woolley.

Vanderbilt University, Robert L. Gilmore; **University of Vermont**, Leonidas M. Jones; **Medical College of Virginia**, Richard Slatten; **Virginia Polytechnic Institute**, Warren K. Stone; **Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Radford College)**, Nicolò Lo Mascolo, Joan E. Morgan; **University of Virginia**, Irby B. Cauthen, Jr., Francis Duke, Robert N. Hoskins, Nelson T. Leavings, Jr., Edward J. McShane.

Wabash College, Owen Duston; **Wagner Lutheran College**, Gertrude Anger, Charles W. Carpenter II, Harald C. Normann, Sigvart J. Steen, Esther C. Wood; **Central Washington College of Education**, Beatrice Haan, Roy F. Ruebel, T. Dean Stinson; **Washington and Jefferson College**, Warren E. Lemley; **State College of Washington**, Jerome Green, Donald L. Masson, Vernelle L. Meusborn; **Washington University**, Nicholas Babchuk, Lorene A. Bahn, John T. Bird, Jr., Paul J. Campisi, William H. Crawford, Thomas H. Eliot, C. Harvey Gardiner, Peter Geist, Thomas F. Gould, Earl G. Herminghaus, Frederick H. Kanfer, Abel G. Ossorio, Ralph C. Patrick, Jr., Robert D. Sard, Elizabeth Schrieber, Carl E. Sherrick, Jr., Morris S. Wortman; **University of Washington**, Franklin Badgley, William B. Ballis, Walter L. Dunn, Henry R. Fea, Ward Fulcher, Franklyn D. Holzman, Alfred A. Meyer, Peter Misch, Frank Neumann, Douglas Osborne, Robert A. Sutermeister, Gerard R. Torrence, E. P. Winter, Crispin M. Wood; **Wayne University**, J. Russell Bright, Marion Edman, Richard B. Hahn, Wilhelmine L. Haley, Manetta Heidman, Philip W. Jackson, Stanley Kirschner, Dorothy LaSalle, Nicholas

M. Lazar, Vivian Mathews, Charles A. Nagler, Charles H. Nilon, Harold F. Powell, Robert R. Spekhard, Edith L. Wellever, Rico Zenti; **West Liberty State College**, Keith H. Burdick; **Western Carolina College**, Kaffin R. Hayes; **Western Reserve University**, Sanford Cohen, Frances H. Cunningham, E. Gwendolyn Fortune, Kingsley H. Keiber, Wilma A. Minniear, Herbert P. Secher; **Municipal University of Wichita**, Richard H. Bloomer, George A. Comstock, Robert W. Duncan, Vivian V. Rockwood, James K. Sours, Roberta J. Wills; **College of William and Mary (Norfolk Division)**, Herbert L. Sebren; **Winthrop College**, John A. Freeman, Hampton M. Jarrell; **University of Wisconsin**, Raymond L. Moloney, William H. Stone, Homer D. Swander; **Wittenberg College**, Pauline Metzger, Virgil E. Rahn; **College of Wooster**, Lois E. Allison; **University of Wyoming**, Britta James.

Yale University, Leonard D. Eron; **Youngstown College**, John W. Bare, Stephen V. Pulkerson, Walter E. Mayer, Eugene D. Scudder, Joseph F. Swartz, Yu-Min Sze.

Transfers from Junior to Active

New Jersey State Teachers College (Newark), William R. McKenzie; **Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas**, Robert W. Barzak.

Junior

Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Paul G. Blacketer, Melvin D. Long; **University of Chicago**, Jean P. Trudel; **Cornell University**, Carl Klaus; **Florida State University**, Hoyt E. Bowen, Tenhoe E. Hermanson, Morris G. Sica; **George Peabody College for Teachers**, Kenimer H. Morgan; **University of Hawaii**, Roland J. Lunday; **University of Illinois**, Harry G. Haile; **University of Michigan**, Zane B. Carothers; **Syracuse University**, A. Walter Olson; **Tulane University of Louisiana**, Egon de Kamarasy; **Virginia State College**, Florence J. Cobb; **Washington University**, Lee E. Schroeder; **Yale University**, Margaret H. Foreman; **Not in Accredited Institutional Connection**, Hortense Doyle (Graduate work, Xavier University, Ohio), Grand Coteau, Louisiana; Clifford C. Menger (LL.M., Brooklyn Law School), North Bergen, New Jersey; John W. Stone (M.B.A., University of Michigan), Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Academic Vacancies and Teachers Available

To assist in the placement of college and university teachers the American Association of University Professors publishes notices of academic vacancies and of teachers available. Factual data and expressions of personal preference in these notices are published as submitted. It is optional with appointing officers and teachers to publish names and addresses or to use key numbers.

Letters in response to announcements published under key numbers should be sent to the Association's central office for forwarding to the persons concerned. Address in care of the General Secretary, American Association of University Professors, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D.C.

Vacancies Reported

No reports of vacancies have been received since the publication of the Spring Bulletin. Announcements of available fellowships have been received as follows:

150 Fellowships in Social Sciences and Humanities for 1956-57

Faculty members are invited to nominate students for the National Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Program of the Association of Graduate Schools in the Association of American Universities for the academic year 1956-57. The fellowships are currently restricted to study in the fields of the Social Sciences and Humanities, primarily for those who have not begun formal graduate work. The program is designed primarily to recruit for the college and university teaching profession young men and women who possess the highest qualities of intellect, character, and personality.

Each Fellow will be granted a sum of money sufficient to guarantee him an adequate living for the year of his incumbency, the normal stipend for an unmarried Fellow being \$1250, plus an amount to cover tuition. Adjustments are made for married Fellows and in case of other special considerations.

Nominations should be submitted as soon after September 1 as possible and no later than November 15, 1955. There are 12 regional committees assisting in the recruitment and selection of Fellows. If the address of the Regional Chairman for an area is not available locally, nominations may be made to the National Director, Professor Robert F. Goheen, National Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Program, South Reunion Hall, Princeton, N. J.

Fellowships for Women, 1956-57

The American Association of University Women offers 28 fellowships to American women for advanced study or research during the academic year 1956-57. In general, the \$2000 fellowships are awarded to young women who have completed residence work for the Ph.D. degree or who have already received the degree; the \$2500-\$3500 awards to more mature scholars.

Applications for the fellowships must be submitted by December 15, 1955. For detailed information, address the Secretary, Committee on Fellowship Awards, A.A.U.W., 1634 Eye Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. Requests for application forms should include statement of academic status.

Foreign-Area Study Fellowships, 1956-57

The Ford Foundation offers fellowships for the academic year 1956-57 for study and research on foreign areas. The fellowships are available to persons under 40 years, for graduate or postdoctoral work in the social sciences or humanities that pertains to Africa, Asia, the Near East, the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Study and research may be undertaken in the United States or abroad.

Applications will be accepted through December 15, 1955. Details may be obtained from The Ford Foundation, Foreign-Area Fellowship Programs, 477 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.

Teachers Available

Administration—Dean of Fine Arts: Man, 36, married, 1 child, Ph.D. Total of 10 years' teaching experience and supervisory work in college and university. Member of A.A.U.P., College Art Association of America, Phi Delta Kappa, Sigma Delta Pi, National Art Education Association. Listed in *Who's Who in American Art*. Publications. Desire opportunity at administrative level to utilize interest and experience in widespread academic fields. Available summer or fall, 1956. A 5084

Art: Man, single. Experienced teacher. Trained at Technische Hochschule und Kunstgewerbe Schule, Hanover, Germany. M.A., University of Chicago. Exhibited in U. S. since 1926. One-man shows in New York and Chicago. Available September, 1955, for college or art school, preferably near east or west coast. Landscape, portrait, design, life drawing, theory, history of art. A 5085

Art Education: Man, 36, married, 1 child, Ph.D. 10 years' teaching experience, etc. Publications. Accomplished artist. Listed in *Who's Who in American Art*. Member of Phi Delta Kappa, A.A.U.P., College Art Association of America. Desire position to direct and teach graduate and undergraduate art courses in design, art education, painting, graphic arts, crafts, art history. Prefer department head, full professor, or equivalent in college or university. Available summer or fall, 1956. A 5086

Biology, Zoology: Man, 35, married, 2 children, Lutheran. Ph.D. Teaching and research experience largely in human anatomy and physiology. At present, assistant professor at Midwestern liberal arts college. Preference: east of Mississippi. Available September, 1956. A 5096

Chemistry: Man, 31, married, no children. Ph.D. from leading university, 1953, in physical chemistry. Military service in World War II. Several publications; teaching experience. Interests in both experimental and theoretical chemistry. Desire teaching position with opportunity to initiate own research. Present rank, assistant professor. Available September, 1956. A 5087

Chemistry: Man, 45. Ph.D. organic, 13 years in academic work in programs from B.S. through Ph.D. Desire change to a more favorable academic climate. Publications and textbook. Present two-semester salary \$5500. A 5088

Fine Arts: Man, 36, married, 1 child. Ph.D. Latin American study and travel. Emphasis on painting, art education, design, crafts, graphic arts, art history. 10 years' teaching experience and research. Listed in *Who's Who in American Art*. Exhibited nationally. Publications. Member of A.A.U.P., Phi Delta Kappa, Sigma Delta Pi, College Art Association of America. Desire position

- in college or university with undergraduate and graduate work. Prefer department chairmanship or full professor. Available summer or fall, 1956. A 5089
- French: Man, 42, single. Ph.D., Columbia University, Fulbright grantee, summer, 1953. Numerous courses in linguistics, Sanskrit, Greek, Indo-European, Romance Philology, Anglo-Saxon, Middle English, Russian, Spanish, Vulgar Latin, Old French, etc. Excellent war record. Experienced teacher. Prefer college or university. Will consider any location. Salary open. Available fall, 1955. A 5090
- French, Spanish, Italian, Latin: Man, 40, Ph.D., Columbia. Phi Beta Kappa (junior year). 11 years' teaching experience at both secondary and college levels. Special interests: language laboratories; 19th century French and Spanish poetry. Musical background. Extensive foreign travel; residence in France. Now assistant professor Northeast college; desire associate professorship or better. Available September, 1956. A 5091
- Philosophy, English Literature, and Economics: M.A., University of Oxford, England; 16 years' successful experience in both undergraduate and graduate teaching in England and U.S.A.; desire appointments for summer, 1956 and for academic year 1956-57. A 5092
- Research Engineer: Associate Professor, 40, 12 years' experience in refrigeration and air conditioning. Developed Extrusion and Polar Chips automatic ice-making processes. 4 issued or pending patents. Author many articles. Directed \$20,000 research in juice freezing, \$17,000 in evaporative air cooling. Director of analysis, Austin, Texas Air Conditioned Village. Desire research or product development position, preferably with Western university or firm. A 5093
- Sociology and Social Psychology: Man, 36, married. Ph.D., Iowa, now Assistant Professor at State university in East. 5 years' experience university teaching in introductory sociology, social problems, social psychology, research methods, minorities, urban, crime and delinquency, and the family. 2 years' chairman of graduate social science program. 3 years' professional counseling. Publications. Desire teaching, research, or departmental administration, or combination of these, with opportunity for advancement. Want change in June or September, 1956. Excellent references. A 5094
- Zoologist, Physiologist, Ecologist, Paleontologist: Man, 37, married, 2 small daughters. M.A., Ph.D. (California). 8 years' teaching and (not or) administration in two non-tax and tax colleges. Publications list and curriculum vitae on request. Have taught lower and upper division anatomy, physiology, biology, ecology (and conservation), zoology, paleontology, boxing, football. A 5095

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